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Abstract 
Drawing from historical political thought and 20th century western philosophy, this 
dissertation advances a theory of ‘secular enchantment’ of nature, humanity, and their 
relationship. Its underlying social and political goal is to inspire an ethic of ecological 
conservation and stewardship. Its philosophical goal is to lay a new ontological foundation for 
thinking and talking about the unique human place within the ecological world.  
Modern scientific inquiry and reasoned philosophical reflection can expose the facts and 
uncover the truths about the human relationship with nature. Such an endeavour is important, and 
forms the backbone of this dissertation. But it is not enough. The natural world is in crisis and 
the truth alone cannot save it. If it is to be deemed worth saving, nature must be restored as a 
fundamental site of meaning in human life.  
The great modernizing project has purged the supernatural from nature, and with it the 
grounds for meaning and ethical direction. Still, wielded properly, science and philosophy can 
reestablish the enchantment of nature. Using a wide variety of thinkers, this dissertation shows 
that rational inquiry can inspire a sense of wonder for ecological complexity, and for the special 
place humans occupy in the natural whole.  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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The present historical conjuncture is increasingly being understood as one of ecological 
crisis. Atmospheric carbon continues to climb to dangerously high levels, spurring unpredictable 
and devastating changes in the global climate. The oceans are both rising and acidifying, 
resulting in the displacement of people and the extinction of marine life. Natural resources and 
wilderness areas are in significant decline. In only a few generations, the planet may no longer be 
able to sustain human life. The well established scientific consensus, of course, is that these 
phenomena are anthropogenic. It seems cruelly paradoxical that humans are inflicting the 
ecological damage that could very well lead to their own demise as a species, as well as 
significant disruptions to non-human nature. Yet, it is not humans, per se, who are the chief 
perpetrators of the ecological crisis. Rather, it is humans acting within the totalizing logic that is 
modern capitalism.  Ecologically-minded critical scholars have for some time directed their 1
attention to the connection between the capitalist system of production and environmental 
degradation. Increasingly, even mainstream thinkers are exposing this relationship (see Klein 
2014). While avoiding vulgar Marxist formulations concerning socio-political determination by 
the economic base, the present argument does take seriously the historical materialist insistence 
that real empirical conditions of existence — production and consumption carried out by 
individuals in the context of determinate social relations — exert an important causal influence. 
 This is not to assert that capitalism is the only socio-economic system that is ecologically destructive. 1
The environmental record of the U.S.S.R. indicates that socialist systems can be a threat as well. 
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In other words, capitalism is a key analytical category and is a necessary object of ecological 
critique. However, adequate socio-historical methodologies recognize that capitalism is not an 
all-encompassing totality, but is rather a totalizing logic. In this way, real causal potential is 
rightfully given to the agency of individuals acting within the context of that logic, as well as to 
their (possibly counter-hegemonic) ideas. As it concerns the present analysis, this means that 
while the capitalist system of production is deeply implicated in the contemporary ecological 
crisis, progressive solutions must look further than merely transforming the economic system. 
They must account for the ideas that are operationalized in capitalism’s treatment of the ecology 
and seek to provide alternatives to those ideas.  
It is precisely here where the present argument seeks to intervene in contemporary 
ecological thought and practice. A different way of thinking about nature can help to encourage 
different ways of interacting with it — for better or for worse. What is argued here, however, is 
deeper than the case that changed ideas about the natural world will lead to more sustainable 
ecological practices. This dissertation is intended as an exploration of the human place within a 
dynamic ecological system. More than a contribution to a set of ideas, it is a philosophically and 
scientifically informed project that aims to uncover the truth of some core aspects of human 
being-in-the-world, which can only be articulated with reference to the ecological world. As 
Herbert Marcuse has argued, adequate ways of thinking about the world have at their centre an 
“ontological concept of truth” (Marcuse 1964, 130). These modes of analysis take as 
fundamental an opposition between the truth of things and the facts of everyday reality. 
Dedicated scientific and philosophical thought can strive towards a better understanding of the 
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ontological truth, with the underlying goal of improving the actual state of affairs. As it concerns 
this dissertation, that means working toward a better understanding of three things: nature itself, 
conceptualized as ‘ecology’; humans, especially their special powers of self-consciousness and 
praxical transformation of nature; and, most importantly, the human relationship with nature. As 
they are conceived in the ideology of capitalist modernity, these three components are 
tremendously distorted. Humans are understood as radically separate from nature, which for its 
part is taken to be merely the raw material to be manipulated for human advancement. This way 
of thinking about humans and nature not only informs devastating ecological practices, as well as 
the subordination of many human beings, but it is also fundamentally untrue. It will be the core 
objective of this dissertation to describe an alternative to this dominant way of thinking about 
nature and the place of humans within it. More than simply an alternative, this conception will 
endeavour to be adequate to its object, to be an accurate and defensible description of the 
ontology of human-ecological relations. A more reasonable theory of human ecology will not be 
sufficient to carry out the goals of an adequate ecological politics, or to create a just and 
ecologically sensitive post-capitalist future. Nonetheless, it will be a necessary condition. 
In the early 21st century an extended exploration of ‘enchantment,’ let alone a 
dissertation dedicated to a ‘re-enchantment’ of humanity and nature, seems out of place. Indeed, 
the term has mythico-religious and spiritual connotations. It smacks of new-age mysticism and 
its abstract metaphysical speculation, or of backward religious ontologies. ‘Enchantment,’ surely 
does not seem compatible with modern scientific thought. And yet, it will be argued here that the 
concept of ‘enchantment’ is necessary if humans are to understand themselves, the ecology, and 
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their integration within dynamic ecological systems. This dissertation will defend a version of 
‘enchantment’ that can be substantiated not in spite of but rather explicitly because of modern 
science. This version of ‘enchantment’ makes reference to the sense of wonder and amazement 
engendered by human experiences of, and in, nature, as well as through contemplation of their 
own place in the world and the special powers they possess. More specifically, this means that 
science provides no shortage of reasons to be amazed by nature. Meanwhile philosophy, 
particularly the philosophy of mind, shows that humans have unique and special characteristics 
— namely subjectivity and self-consciousness — that can inspire genuine awe. This approach to 
enchantment strives to be compatible with philosophy and modern science, and can do so only 
on the basis of a non-reductionist and non-mechanistic ontology. As Hobbes would have it, if all 
life can be reduced to simple matter in motion, all quality passes into quantity and the possibility 
of genuine novelty is foreclosed. On the other hand, actual experience of the world indicates that 
while matter is indeed foundational, it can be organized — or even organize itself — according 
to laws and patterns that cannot be reduced to the physical. It is these moments — the emergence 
of biological life from physical and chemical processes, and the development of self-
consciousness out of biology — that must be appreciated as ‘enchanted,’ even as they can be 
accounted for within the framework of scientific inquiry.  
This dissertation will build its case for an ‘enchanted’ conception of human ecology (a 
term that refers to the human relationship with nature) by exploring the ways in which that 
relationship has been portrayed in three philosophical schools. The first of these is termed the 
‘historical-dialectical’ tradition and refers to the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, G.W.F. 
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Hegel, Karl Marx, as well as the Frankfurt School thinkers Herbert Marcuse and Theodor 
Adorno. The second school, process metaphysics, is most commonly associated with Alfred 
North Whitehead. However, this dissertation will focus more attention on the lesser known 
Charles Hartshorne, whose work speaks more directly to ecological issues. The third and final 
approach is emergentism, a tradition in the philosophy of science that explores the emergence of 
qualitative novelty. This is a diverse tradition with investigations spanning neuroscience to 
Marxism. The present analysis will centre on the emergence theory of Roy Bhaskar, the founder 
of the Critical Realist school of philosophy of science. The purpose of these expositions is to 
help clarify the place of human beings within their ecological context, so that we can better 
appreciate what is special, or ‘enchanted’ about both humanity and non-human nature. This, the 
most substantial theoretical contribution of the present argument, takes as constitutive the 
fundamentally contradictory character of the human-ecological relationship. That is, humans are 
simultaneously a part of nature but also outside of it in important ways. On the one hand, they 
are physical, chemical, biological entities, embedded within nature as a whole and within 
particular ecosystems. Humans rely on constant interaction with the natural world for their 
continued survival. In this way, they are very much a part of nature. On the other hand, however, 
humans have characteristics that no other animals possess. The most important of these is self-
consciousness: thought that is able to conceive of itself as such. This power, Rousseau was the 
first to argue, makes humans historical beings, able to consciously decide how they will interact 
with nature to produce and reproduce themselves. They are not determined by the laws of nature 
to the same extent that non-human nature is. Rousseau famously remarked that when nature calls 
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all other beasts obey, but humans can choose to disobey — often to their own detriment 
(Rousseau 1987, 44). Likewise, Marx observed that non-human animals cannot choose how they 
interact with nature, while humans do have the power to do so (Marx 1992, 328-9). If these two 
facts — that of human integration in nature and that of human separation from it — are held too 
far apart, numerous problematic dichotomies arise: nature vs. culture/history, naturalism vs. 
humanism, ecocentrism vs. anthropocentrism, etc. Adequate theories of human ecology must 
transcend these dualistic ways of thinking and conceptualize human being as something that is at 
once identical and non-identical with nature. Indeed, there have already been many important 
developments in this area (see Biro 2005).  
In an important sense, this exploration is about self-discovery. It takes up the command 
from the oracle at Delphi for humans to know themselves. Philosophical thinking since Plato has 
emphasized the importance that knowledge about the truth of human being has for political 
affairs. This dissertation aims to contribute to these discussions by describing some existentially 
necessary facets of human being-in-the-world that are connected to ecological relationships. In 
essence, this dissertation is a meta-theoretical contribution. It seeks to provide the ground for 
such things as Ecological Political Theory, but does not delineate a particular political project. 
This is not to say that it does not have political motivations. The renewed conception of human 
being herein described can serve as the foundation of a new ‘political.’ This term is often 
associated with the political theory of Sheldon Wolin. For Wolin, ‘politics’ refers to the ongoing 
affairs pertaining to the organization of powers and distribution of resources. ‘The political,’ on 
the other hand, is an episodic occurrence in which the collectivity comes together and exercises 
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its power to protect its own wellbeing (Wolin 1994, 11). Terry Maley observes that “Wolin is 
acutely aware the creation or revival of the political… takes place in a disenchanted world that 
has been made meaningless by the awesome powers of the modern state, bureaucracy, and 
capitalism as well as by the science and technology that have come to dominate these spheres of 
life” (Maley 2011, 21-2). Not seeking to return to any form of ‘enchantment,’ ‘Post-modern’ and 
‘post-Marxist’ approaches have attempted to preserve ‘the political’ while denying it any 
ontological foundations (Valentine 2006, 510). This dissertation takes precisely the opposite 
approach, affirming materialism as well as ontological and epistemological realism. More 
concretely, this means that humans and the ecological systems in which they find themselves are 
not only really existing, but they are possible objects of scientific and philosophical discovery. 
We can have valid, if limited knowledge of ourselves and these truths can and must serve as the 
ontological grounding for a renewed ‘political’ that is adequate to the social and ecological 
challenges of the current conjuncture.  
This dissertation, then, has two projects — one philosophical, the other political. The 
philosophical projects consists in the attempt to theorize humans and the ecology in such a way 
that they can once again be objects of wonderment: a sort of materialist, scientific, non-
supernatural ‘enchantment.’ The political project is simply the suggestion that this understanding 
of humans, nature, and their place within it can provide the ontological foundation for a renewed 
sense of the ‘political.’ Perhaps surprisingly, none of the thinkers dealt with in the substantive 
chapters of this dissertation are associated in any significant way with the concepts of 
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‘enchantment,’ or the ‘political.’  To be sure, the historical-dialectical philosophers — Rousseau, 2
Hegel, Marx, Marcuse and Adorno — are all political thinkers. Hartshorne and Bhaskar may 
have political leanings, but their philosophy deals in no significant way with politics or the 
‘political.’ The historical-dialectical thinkers, with the possible anomaly of Adorno, do not 
devote much attention to enchanting or re-enchanting the world. On the other hand, Hartshorne’s 
philosophy is motivated by a sort of theology — pantheism — but one which rejects 
supernaturalism. Bhaskar, meanwhile, is ambiguous: his early work consists of a materialist 
philosophy of science, but in later writings he develops a controversial mysticism. Ultimately, 
what each of these thinkers thinks specifically about enchantment is not of direct importance to 
the analysis developed here. In the investigations of these philosophers that make up the 
substantial contribution of this dissertation, the emphasis will be on how each one conceptualizes 
the human relationship with nature, and what this tells us about both humans and the ecological 
world. The goal is an amalgam of these different ways of seeing human ecology, one which is 
more true than the sum of its parts. This final picture will, on its own, command a discourse of 
enchantment.  
Human Ecology and ‘Enchantment’  
The process of ‘disenchantment’ has a long history in the western tradition and has been 
accelerated with the development of modern science since the scientific revolution. Here, the 
 The exception here is Adorno, who addresses disenchantment at great length in his Dialectic of 2
Enlightenment, co-authored with Max Horkheimer. 
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analysis will concentrate less on the specific ways in which scientific discovery has disenchanted 
the world, and more on how nature has consequently come to be understood as mere ‘stuff,’ or 
lifeless inert matter. Gilbert G. Germain argues that self-conscious discourses of disenchantment 
begin in earnest with Descartes (Germain 1993, 1). Germain notes that for the ancients, Aristotle 
in particular, scientific study was intended to uncover the ontological order of being. Descartes 
breaks decisively with this tradition by arguing that science instead has the purpose of knowing 
nature to control and manipulate it. With Descartes the concern is no longer, as it was for the 
ancients, the good or true life, but instead simply a comfortable life — one presumably made so 
by the control of nature. Most importantly, for Descartes the knowing subject is wrought from its 
formerly integrated place in the order of being. That is, subject and object are ontologically 
detached. What were formerly the highest philosophical concerns, metaphysics and ontology, are 
replaced by epistemology (Germain 1993, 11-13). The autonomous ego confronts a nature, or res 
extensa, that is fundamentally other. This is the important ontological movement: the separation 
of subject and object. Whether the epistemological solution is rationalist, as with Descartes, or 
empiricist, as with Hume, the end result is the ontological separation of mind and matter. Nature 
comes to be understood as essentially mechanical and fundamentally inert. It is lifeless matter 
that can be controlled by the rational ego. All meaning is arrogated to the subject.  
The concept of enchantment — or more accurately, disenchantment — finds its first 
political theoretical expression in the work of Max Weber, who is said to have advanced the 
‘disenchantment thesis.’ Although the concept was an essential feature of his own inquiry, Weber 
mentions the concept explicitly in only a few places in his work (Germain 1993, 28). Writing in 
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the early 20th century, Weber observed that modern science and technology, though their 
processes of rationalization, erase all need for recourse to the explanatory power of magic. 
Indeed, magic is ultimately shown to be a powerless art, while science is much less so (Germain 
1993, 29; Wolin 1985). For Weber disenchantment does not necessarily imply that humanity is 
moving towards a complete knowledge of the world, but rather that science operates under the 
assumption that if it wanted to, it could attain such knowledge (Weber 2004, 12). He describes 
disenchantment as follows: 
It means that in principle… we are not ruled by mysterious, unpredictable forces, 
but that, on the contrary, we can in principle control everything by means of 
calculation. That in turn means the disenchantment of the world. Unlike the 
savage for whom such forces existed, we need no longer have recourse to magic 
in order to control the spirits or pray to them. Instead, technology and calculation 
achieve our ends.   3
Weber is not so much concerned about questions concerning the actual history and philosophy of 
science. Rather, he is primarily interested in sociological inquiry. For him, the motivating 
questions are not about the ways in which science disenchants the world, but rather with how we 
have come to think and act as though the world is disenchanted (Germain 1993, 34). In his 
influential essay “Science as a Vocation,” Weber describes how science and rationalization alter 
public life. In earlier times human affairs were animated by “the ultimate and most sublime 
values” which have now retreated into “the abstract realm of mystical life or into the fraternal 
feelings of personal relations between individuals” (Weber 2004, 30). In other words, in the 
modern world social and political life are no longer governed by appeals to higher forces or more 
 Weber 2004, 12-3.3
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supreme values. Science, as Weber saw it, can offer no meaningful prescriptions on how to live a 
good life. It is fundamentally neutral with respect to values.  
Borrowing heavily from Weber, the Frankfurt thinkers Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer make extensive use of the concept of disenchantment. For Adorno and Horkheimer 
the process of ‘enlightenment,’ which they understand much more broadly than ‘the 
Enlightenment,’ modern science, and rationalization, necessarily entails the disenchantment of 
the world. In their Dialectic of Enlightenment, they write, “Enlightenment, understood in the 
widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear 
and installing themselves as masters. […] Enlightenment’s program was the disenchantment of 
the world” (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 1). As opposed to Germain, for whom Descartes’ 
separation of subject and object is the decisive moment in modern disenchantment, Adorno and 
Horkheimer see Francis Bacon’s project of mastering and controlling nature as emblematic. They 
remark that the animating feature of ‘enlightened’ thought is its treatment of nature as a means 
for human control (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 1-3). Like Weber, the Frankfurt School 
thinkers see disenchantment as the erosion of meaning in human affairs: “On their way toward 
modern science human beings have discarded meaning” (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 3).  
But Adorno and Horkheimer take their analysis further than Weber, taking aim directly at 
the modern ‘scientistic’ way of treating nature, and elaborating a sophisticated critique. 
Following Nietzsche’s famous declaration that ‘God is dead,’ Adorno and Horkheimer observe 
that the modern, rationalizing, controlling subject has in fact replaced God. They write, “In their 
mastery of nature, the creative God and the ordering mind are alike” (Horkheimer and Adorno 
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2002, 6). Just as in the dynamics of capitalist exchange relations commodities become mere 
abstract equivalents, bearers of quantitative value, nature becomes, for the modern ego, an 
abstract equivalent. It is simply inert ‘stuff,’ to be organized, classified, and ultimately controlled. 
Adorno and Horkheimer comment, “Nature, stripped of qualities, becomes the chaotic stuff of 
mere classification, and the all-powerful self becomes a mere having, an abstract 
identity” (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 6). In this passage, the disenchantment of the human 
subject is hinted at, a theme to which the analysis turns below. Here, the important observation is 
that the meaning and value that was once found in nature is reduced to simple abstract quantity 
and the controlling subject imposes meaning from the outside (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 
6-7). A direct consequence of this disenchantment and expropriation of all meaning by the 
subject is alienation. In a world in which nature is fundamentally ‘other’ and inherently 
meaningless, humans are increasingly alienated from their natural foundations. Adorno and 
Horkheimer hold, “Human beings purchase the increase in their power with estrangement from 
that over which it is exerted” (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 6).  
In all this there is a distinct ambivalence about modern science — if not concerning its 
epistemological validity, then certainly about its ultimate role as a progressive historical force. 
Indeed, as Adorno and Horkheimer see it, enlightenment necessarily becomes its opposite: myth. 
They write: 
Just as myths already entail enlightenment, with every step enlightenment 
entangles itself more deeply in mythology. Receiving all its subject matter from 
myths, in order to destroy them, it falls as judge under the spell of myth. It seeks 
to escape the trial of fate and retribution by itself exacting retribution on the trial. 
In myths, everything that happens must atone for the fact of having happened. It is 
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no different in enlightenment: no sooner has a fact been established than it is 
rendered insignificant.  4
Such pessimism about the historical possibilities opened up by scientific understanding can 
perhaps be explained by Adorno and Horkheimer having been survivors of Nazi Germany and its 
unprecedented horrors. To them, this was the logical conclusion of the modern rationalizing 
project. Understandable as this position may be given its historical circumstances, it is not one 
that is replicated in the present analysis. While the so-called ‘scientific’ ontology of subject-
object and human-nature dualism will be interrogated, the privileged status of scientific 
methodology will be upheld. Insofar as the as the present argument is a critique of ‘scientific’ 
understanding, it will be one that challenges the dominant conception of nature as inert, lifeless 
matter. In fact, this prevailing view will be shown to be fundamentally non-scientific. The 
Frankfurt School theorists correctly observed that these types of discourses have been 
instrumentalized in the wholesale and uncritical domination of nature. This has resulted not only 
in ecological catastrophe, but dehumanization as well.  
Drawing on the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, William Leiss’ The Domination 
of Nature offers an intellectual history of this approach to nature and its corollary: the 
domination of people. In a 1994 preface to this work (originally published in 1972), Leiss notes 
that the notion of human mastery of nature is one that characterizes the modern consciousness. 
The idea that progress requires the domination of nature is not necessarily the invention of 
capitalism, but it is certainly complementary (Leiss 1994, xviii). Leiss observes that both 
 Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 8.4
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capitalist and socialist projects have treated nature as something to be controlled and mastered, 
and both have resulted in unsustainable ecological degradation. In the current conjuncture, the 
important political task, he holds, is to formulate “an appropriate representation of the relation 
between humanity and nature” (Leiss 1994, xxvi). Horkheimer, Leiss notes, makes a 
fundamental distinction between two types of reason: objective and subjective. The former sees 
truth as ontological category that is part of the necessary order of things. For objective reason, 
human rationality is part of the rationality of the world. Subjective reason, on the other hand, 
concerns itself with non-rational, ultimately subjective ends, and does not consider the value or 
order of non-human entities (Leiss 1994, 149). Leiss writes, “subjective reason exclusively seeks 
mastery over things and does not attempt to consider what extra-human things may be in and for 
themselves” (Leiss 1994, 149). Unsurprisingly, it is subjective reason that Horkheimer associates 
with enlightenment, disenchantment, and the domination of nature. Leiss holds:  
[T]he attributes of the modern scientific conception of nature which predispose it 
for the purposes of mastery are, in part: the principle of the uniformity of nature, 
the inherent technological applicability of its findings, the reduction of nature to 
pure ‘stuff’ or abstract matter through the elimination of qualities as essential 
features of natural phenomena, and especially the primacy of mathematics in the 
representation of natural processes.  5
The final outcome is the radical separation of subject and object, and a corresponding scarcity of 
any objective or collective sense of meaning. As Horkheimer himself describes it, “As the end 
result of the process, we have on the one hand the self, the abstract ego emptied of all substance 
except its attempt to transform everything in heaven and on earth into means for its preservation, 
 Leiss 1994, 151-2.5
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and on the other hand an empty nature degraded to mere material, mere stuff to be dominated, 
without any other purpose than that of this very domination” (Horkheimer 1947, 97). Unlike 
Horkheimer, who sees it as gone forever, Leiss stresses the importance of a return to objective 
reason. More specifically, Leiss advocates a reinterpretation of the mastery of nature. This would 
mean a shift of focus to ethical and moral development as opposed to scientific and technological 
development, or ‘progress.’ Importantly, the mastery or domination of nature would cease to be 
the subordination of non-human nature to the whims of subjective reason. Instead it would 
become the control of ‘internal nature,’ those human impulses that unchecked lead to ecological 
degradation. Leiss writes: “The task of mastering nature ought to be understood as a matter of 
bringing under control the irrational and destructive aspects of human desires. Success in this 
endeavour would be the liberation of nature — that is, the liberation of human nature: a human 
species free to enjoy in peace the fruits of its productive intelligence” (Leiss 1994, 193). Leiss’s 
analysis explains the deep interrelation between disenchantment, the domination of nature, the 
modern ontology of radical subject-object separation, and subjective reason. 
Leiss makes it clear that for Horkheimer both human subjectivity and the world it 
inhabits have been degraded by disenchantment. It is clear that there is no possibility of returning 
to a world that is understood to be ‘enchanted’ in a literal sense; modern science’s banishment of 
magic is far too epistemologically robust to be abandoned. Nor would a progressive politics even 
want to return to a time when (non-existent) impersonal and arbitrary forces animated social life. 
Nonetheless, the present analysis contends that some form of ‘re-enchantment’ can both provide 
much needed meaning to human affairs and describe adequately the place of human beings in the 
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ecological world. Describing such a form of ‘re-enchantment’ that can be compatible with 
science and philosophy will form the main theoretical thrust of this dissertation. Taking an 
important cue from Germain, the present argument acknowledges that any contemporary 
alternative to disenchantment must grapple with the “ontological interrelation of humans and the 
non-human natural world,” (Germain 1993, 4). That is, such an alternative must articulate an 
acceptable human ecology.  
The critique of disenchantment is longstanding and takes numerous forms, many of 
which are thoroughly problematic. In contemporary ecological thinking there is a disturbing 
form of anti-humanism that broadly falls under the classification of ‘deep ecology.’ In the field of 
political theory, this general outlook has recently been expressed by Jane Bennett in her Vibrant 
Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Bennett observes quite correctly that for progressive 
change to occur in ecological terms, the inherent value of non-human nature must be recognized. 
She seeks a view of nature that takes it to be more than ‘mere stuff.’ As she puts it, “There will 
be no greening of the economy, no redistribution of wealth, no enforcement or extension or 
rights without human dispositions, moods, and cultural ensembles hospitable to these 
effects” (Bennett 2010, xii). The philosophical undertaking, holds Bennett, is to effect a sort of 
‘re-enchantment’ of non-human entities, showing that they are capable of meaning and action 
without human intervention. To this extent, Bennett’s project is admirable. Unfortunately, she 
takes the analysis much too far, abandoning science and a commitment to rational inquiry. She 
disturbingly argues that “A relentless approach toward demystification works against the 
possibility of positive formulations” (Bennett 2010, xv). Elsewhere she advocates that we 
  !16
“revisit and become temporarily infected by discredited philosophies of nature,” including 
superstition and animism (Bennett 2010, 18). Trying to articulate an ecological ontology and 
politics with no reference whatsoever to ecological science, Bennett arrives at a worldview in 
which all entities are considered ‘actants’ that interact on a totally equal plane. That is, all entities 
exert agency and causal force on their surroundings to the same degree. An earthworm exercises 
agency in the same way humans do (Bennett 2010, 96). In one particularly ridiculous passage, 
she contends that a pile of debris caught in a storm sewer has the ability to ‘act’ (Bennett 2010, 
4-6).  
Absurd as are Bennett’s formulations, her errors provide a foil for two important 
philosophical commitments that will be described in this dissertation. The first commitment is to 
a differentiated and hierarchical ontology. Whereas Bennet argues for a fundamental ontological 
and ecological equality, this view sees different entities as in important ways radically unequal. It 
will be shown that process metaphysics and emergentism deal with this issue in different but 
complementary ways. In short, entities differ greatly with respect to both their internal 
complexity and causal power. For example, biological entities are significantly more internally 
complex than physical ones. Higher animals are capable of exerting much greater degrees of 
causal force than are single-celled organisms. Although she does not admit it, Bennett’s levelling 
opens path to a dangerous form of deep ecology in which ontological equality provides the 
foundation for ethical equality. If her anti-humanist formulations are true, an earthworm 
possesses the same moral worth as a human. Luckily, this is not the case. Herein lies the second 
important commitment: humanism. While Bennett highlights the very important point that 
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humans are not the only bearers of ethical value, she also denies humanity its unique place within 
the differentiated ecology. Foreseeing the types of errors committed by Bennett, Murray 
Bookchin writes in his Re-Enchanting Humanity: A Defense of the Human Spirit Against Anti-
Humanism, Misanthropy, Mysticism, and Primitivism that attempts to re-enchant nature often end 
up disenchanting humans: 
I find it particularly ironic that at a time when so many of these anti-humanist 
book and articles exalt the need to ‘re-enchant Nature’, the ‘Planet’, and indeed 
the entire ‘Cosmos’, the most pronounced effect that have is to ‘disenchant’ 
humanity itself: specifically, its unique potentiality for rationality. […] In the end, 
it is our claim to be able to reason and to rationally intervene in the world around 
us that is under siege. The special features that make us remarkable products of 
natural evolution are in one way or another viewed with acute suspicion or 
forcefully maligned.  6
While it will be argued here that ecological politics must account for and respect the inherent 
value of non-human nature, Bookchin’s warnings must always be heeded. There is something 
special about humans. What exactly this is will be the focus of much of this dissertation. It will 
be shown that humanity’s special characteristics are deeply dependent upon natural (biological 
and ecological) foundations. Furthermore, the proper expression of these unique causal powers 
requires human social forms that are properly in and of the natural world. In the course of 
developing a world-view that encapsulates these truths about the human place within the 
ecology, simplistic dualisms, such as the ontological divide between humanism and naturalism or 
the ethical boundary between anthropocentrism and ecocentrism, will be shown to be wholly 
inadequate.  
 Bookchin 1995, 5. 6
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The Political (and the Ethical) 
Taking up Weber’s observation about disenchantment, Wolin translates the phenomenon 
into what he calls ‘the absence of myth’ (Wolin 1985). In modern society belief in myth — or in 
the enchantment of the world — carries on, but Wolin describes it variously as “the consolation 
of marginal minds” and “a confessional sign of powerlessness in a technological society” (Wolin 
1985, 218). Wolin’s contributions are of particular importance because he focusses on the 
specifically political consequences of disenchantment. That is, it is precisely this ‘absence of 
myth’ that determines the politics of modern society. Returning to Weber’s “Science as a 
Vocation,” Wolin writes that this text perfectly captures “the tension between modernist 
deference toward the natural sciences and the postmodernist despair at their cultural 
consequences…” (Wolin 1985, 220-1). In the absence of any foundational myth, individuals are 
left to decide for themselves what is right and wrong, good and bad. Politics is divorced from 
ethics, and political life is no longer animated by a collective sense of the ‘good,’ or of the ‘good 
life.’ Just as Hobbes inaugurated modern political though with precisely such a denial, 
postmodern thought carries it through to its logical conclusion. Tracy B. Strong takes up Hannah 
Arendt’s term, ‘thinking without a banister,’ to describe the modern lack of foundations. He 
writes that for Arendt “humans no longer could rely on any transcendental grounding to finalize 
their thinking — be that God, or nature, or history” (Strong 2012, 1). Understanding very well 
the consequences of this postmodern condition, Wolin, it will be shown, attempts to create a new 
sense of the ‘political’ that can inform politics — and indeed establish a polity — in spite of the 
lack of mythological or transcendent foundations. This dissertation takes much more inspiration 
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from canonical philosophy and political thought than from contemporary political theory, in the 
sense that it is concerned primarily with the ontological foundations of political action and 
ethical judgement. Contra Arendt (and Strong), it is argued here that the categories of nature and 
history, properly understood, form the bases for reasonable judgement. While ‘post-foundational’ 
theory, of which Wolin’s may be a species, is shown to be logically contradictory and politically 
dubious, there are nonetheless important lessons to be gleaned from contemporary theory. First, 
however, it is necessary to ask what precisely is meant by ‘the political’? 
Although in contemporary political theory the term is frequently associated with Wolin, 
Arendt also used the term. Drawing heavily from Aristotle, Arendt aims to delineate a special 
sphere of human existence, above all others. That sphere is the political one, and it alone can 
endow human life with meaning. As Ronald Beiner puts it, “Without politics, without a common 
space in which human beings speak and act, life is empty and meaningless, but with politics… 
life is capable of ‘splendor’” (Beiner 2014, 2). Despite longstanding ideas that Arendt’s 
philosophy is fundamentally neo-Aristotelian, Beiner disrupts this claim. For Aristotle humans 
are essence-bearing individuals who fulfill their telos in the activity of politics. Arendt, however, 
disputes such teleology and argues instead that humans are constituted not by what they are (as 
Aristotle would have it) but by what they do, or more specifically, who they are (Beiner 2014, 5). 
There is no essence beyond the appearance that makes human what they are. For Arendt, the 
analysis pivots on the difference between ‘life,’ which is essentially subjective experience and 
‘world,’ which refers to the inter-subjective sphere of collective meaning-creation (Beiner 2014, 
6). Thus, as noted above, Arendt refuses to delineate any universal conception of the good, or of 
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human nature, as the foundation of political activity. Like Wolin, however, her conception of the 
political is open, democratic and collective (see Kalyvas 2008, 254-291). These characteristics 
make her definition of the political of importance to the argument developed here.  
According to Jeremy Valentine, ‘the political’ is a conceptual object that occupies the 
space between the realm of politics and the factors that condition it (Valentine 2006, 506). 
Valentine observes that the main thrust of the modernizing project has been to destabilize and 
subvert any solid ground or foundation for political life. This brings into serious question the 
possibility of establishing a sense of ‘the political.’ As Valentine puts it: 
Thus what may be most significant about the concept of the political is that a 
requirement to establish a ground goes against the critical and radical thrust of the 
thought and politics through which modernity happens. In other words, the 
political is the attempt to establish a ground where the possibility of doing so has 
been subverted through ungrounded radicalization….  7
Operating in the distinctly modern fashion in which an ultimate ground of normativity has been 
abolished, Valentine nonetheless wishes to describe some sense of ‘the political.’ For him, in the 
context of “deconstructive or post-foundational” politics, the political is best described as the 
difference between politics and their grounding (Valentine 2006, 507). The question he poses, 
then, is if “it is possible to extract some sense of the political from within modernity 
itself?” (Valentine 2006, 509). To do so, and to thereby create a truly postmodern sense of ‘the 
political,’ Valentine insists that political thought must advance beyond what he calls the 
‘metaphysics of presence.’ Here, he points to Jacques Derrida’s belief that Western metaphysical 
thought has decided to “conceptualize concepts in exactly the same way that empirical 
 Valentine 2006, 507. 7
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phenomena are conceptualized as fully present to sensation and consciousness” (Valentine 2006, 
506). Bracketing the absurdity of Derrida’s claim, the way beyond such a scenario would 
necessitate further interrogation of the distinction between the conceptual and the empirical. 
Taking this even further, Valentine argues that a properly post-foundational politics avoids the 
metaphysics of presence completely (Valentine 2006, 510). That is, such a politics would avoid 
entirely all reference to transfactual concepts and thereby any appeal to necessary truths. He 
identifies several approaches to ‘the political’ that satisfy this criteria, two of which are of 
interest to the present argument. 
First, Jean-Luc Nancy argues that the contemporary disintegration of the polity is an 
indication that there can be no appreciable ground for any sense of ‘the political.’ Instead, writes 
Valentine, for Nancy “the political becomes a matter of relations organized by the shared 
commonality of nothing” (Valentine 2006, 510). Valentine criticizes this formulation on the 
ground that these ‘relations’ do not necessarily preclude violence. The issues with Nancy’s 
approach run much deeper, unfortunately. He commits the central error of all postmodern 
thought: a self-referential contradiction. While denying, on the one hand, the possibility of any 
ontological foundations for ‘the political,’ on the other hand Nancy points to the “shared 
commonality of nothing,” which serves as a political foundation. Just as to say that no certain 
knowledge of the external world is possible stipulates one piece of certain knowledge, Nancy’s 
shared commonality of nothing, necessarily designates a shared commonality of something. On 
this very basis, his anti-foundationalism reverts into a form of foundationalism.  
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Second, there is Wolin, whose ‘radical-democratic’ approach also makes reference to a 
sense of commonality. For Wolin, however, the commonality occurs in distinct ‘moments.’ That 
is, it is episodic. To use his own words, the political refers to “moments of commonality when, 
through public deliberations, collective power is used to promote or protect the wellbeing of the 
collectivity” (Wolin 1994, 11). As opposed to the day-to-day affairs of politics, ‘the political’ 
signifies a rupture, a punctuation in the equilibrium that re-organizes and re-conditions political 
affairs. Valentine holds, “These are essentially creative, heterogeneous and transgressive 
moments, temporary and occasional, which are equated with democracy and revolution; they are 
contrasted with business-as-usual politics in the polity…” (Valentine 2006, 510). The important 
point here is that ‘the political’ is based on a shared, democratic moment, characterized by the 
recognition of an element common to all political actors.  
Wolin passes over the possibility that such commonality has its basis in a deeper truth, or 
in something more fundamental. In this way, Valentine sees a correspondence to another 
important contemporary political theorist: William Connolly. Valentine approvingly cites 
Connolly’s assertion that “nothing is fundamental” (Valentine 2006, 510; Connolly 1995). 
Connolly’s sense of pluralism, or ‘pluralization,’ finds its premise in the increasing acceptance 
that ‘nothing is fundamental,’ and that therefore everything is contingent (Valentine 2006, 510). 
Thus Connolly, like Nancy, commits a self-referential contradiction: if nothing is fundamental, at 
least one thing is fundamental. These thinkers — and those mentioned here are merely a few 
examples of what is a widespread pathology that plagues contemporary theory — necessarily 
find themselves in the dead end of attempting to do political theory, which is the study of the 
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good and the ends of political life, with no feasible conception of what the good, or even human 
nature might be. 
Thus, one of the central difficulties posed by these various anti-foundationalisms is that 
they suggest a ‘political’ and a politics that lack substantial content. If Connolly is in fact correct 
that nothing is fundamental, there is nothing solid on which to base political action and no 
ultimate standard by which to evaluate social and political reality. The entire project of political 
theory is premised on investigations of ‘the good,’ and those who deny its possibility relinquish 
the right to call their undertakings political theory. As Beiner writes, “I am extremely skeptical 
that one can participate in the theory enterprise at all without asserting claims about human 
nature, the human good, ‘the good’ for human beings, and so on” (Beiner 2014, xxv). 
Throughout the 20th century theorists consistently backed away from such grand claims. There is 
no doubt that concerns about the totalitarian results of many universalizing theories inspired the 
postmodern trend to renounce the banister, to use Strong’s phrase. But decades of anti-
foundationalist speculation have left us with the choice of outright nihilism on one hand, or 
committing the performative contradiction of making normative claim while simultaneously 
denying their basis in deeper truth, on the other. In the early 21st century there is an increasing 
recognition that theory and politics do require foundations. We may return to thinking with a 
banister, but we must be certain that it is the right banister. What exactly that banister is, and how 
it might be discovered are open questions. However, it is more and more clear that any thought 
that calls itself political theory must focus on questions regarding the truth of human being and 
the possible ‘good life’ that we may achieve.  
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In this endeavour, there is something useful to be extracted from the preceding discussion 
of the political. These thinkers, and Wolin in particular, articulate the necessity of a common 
moment in the political process. In other words, the political, and therefore politics as well, 
require a shared experience of commonality. Politics requires a political community, even if its 
expression is a fleeting one. For Nancy, it is the shared experience of sharing nothing 
fundamental. For Wolin, the common moment is episodic. What the theorists of ‘moments of 
commonality’ fail to interrogate are the conditions that make such moments possible. That is, 
they assume that the common moment can happen contingently, that it ‘simply occurs.’ This 
seems highly unlikely. Much more convincing is the argument that humans all possess something 
fundamental that allows them to share these moments of commonality. In other words, they 
possess a trait, or a set of traits, that provide the conditions for expressions of ‘the political.’ In 
this formulation, the political does not occur accidentally and despite fundamental difference. 
Rather, it is a moment — and sphere of experience — that can only happen if humans share 
something essential in common. Along with the rich history of political philosophy since Plato, 
the present study seeks to uncover (if even partially) this essence of human beings — their 
species differentia. In so doing it aims to provide some solid ontological ground for the political, 
as well as contribute to discussions about ‘the good,’ and the ends of human life.  
In placing so much emphasis on ‘the political,’ Wolin tried to correct what he saw as a 
perennial flaw in political theory: the reduction of politics to ethics or philosophy (Wiley 2006, 
215). In his seminal work, Politics and Vision, Wolin writes, “Unless the distinctively political 
context is preserved, political theory tends to vanish into larger questions, such as the nature of 
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the Good, the ultimate destiny of man, or the problem of right conduct, thereby losing contact 
with the essentially political questions that are its proper concern…” (Wolin 2004, 40). Wolin 
may be correct that political philosophy often does lose sight of its distinctly political character. 
The foregoing discussion of the political is meant to delineate the importance of politics in the 
contribution to human ecology that forms the substance of this dissertation. However, it is also 
the case that it is because of its interest in ‘larger questions’ that political theory can make 
convincing contributions to political affairs. It is its interest in the truth of human being that 
allows political theory to describe valid ontological foundations for the political and for politics. 
In a related manner, political theory also makes pronouncements on ‘right conduct,’ or ethics. In 
the present historical conjuncture the questions posed by ecological ethics are becoming 
increasingly important. More specifically, in the context of alarming natural resource depletion, 
the matter of reasonable use of non-human nature is of critical significance. Along with 
providing ground for renewed conceptions of the political, the theory of human ecology set forth 
in this dissertation aims to contribute to critical discourses concerning reasonable use of natural 
resources. More specifically this will entail an interrogation of the dichotomy between 
anthropocentrism and ecocentrism. The former accords the only special moral status to humans, 
while the latter denies it entirely. The view developed here preserves the special status of human 
beings, while also appreciating the ethical necessity of respecting other forms of life. 
Furthermore, a fuller sense of the human place within nature encourages different ways of being 
in nature, of using and interacting with it, as well as appreciating the endless aesthetic 
experiences that it offers.  
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Chapter Outline 
To sum up, this dissertation is a contribution to the tradition of political philosophy 
insofar as it aims to describe some ontological facts about human being-in-the-world. These 
facts, it is argued, can form the foundations for a sense of ‘the political,’ and thereby politics, that 
are not only radically democratic and inclusive, but also adequate to confronting the ecological 
apocalypse that looms over late modern capitalism. The intention is to inspire an appreciation for 
the ‘re-enchantment’ of human being, the ecology, and the human-ecological relationship. 
Enchantment does not suggest supernatural factors. Indeed, the discussion makes use of modern 
scientific ontology and theories of causation. Modern science, it will be asserted, can help 
stimulate a sense of enchantment. The scientific understanding of and appreciation for human 
cognition, ecological complexity, and the human integration within natural processes increases 
the capacity for meaningful aesthetic experience of human ecology. The task at hand, then, is to 
describe a logically defensible theory of the human place in nature. This exploration of the 
human-nature dialectic begins with Rousseau, Hegel and Marx, as well as Adorno and Marcuse. 
Each of these thinkers stresses the importance of history in the development of the relationship 
of subject and object (humanity and ecology). Subsequently, alternative paradigms, including 
process metaphysics and emergentism, are brought into the discussion. I suggest that these 
bodies of thought can be brought into a creative dialogue with the lineage that extends from 
Rousseau to the Frankfurt School, having important affinities as well as fertile divergences. 
The argument develops as follows. Chapter I begins with a brief excursion into Ancient 
Greek cosmology, which describes the complete inclusion of humans in nature. On the other 
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hand, Descartes and Locke are exemplary in their insistence on radical exclusion — the total 
split of subject and object. According to several important commentators, Rousseau is the first to 
see that humans are simultaneously identical to and different from the ecology (Biro 2005, 58). 
The majority of this chapter is devoted to his notions of nature, convention, perfectibility and 
history. Interestingly, while Rousseau sees that our reason has irreversibly set us on the path of 
history, he is one of the first to acknowledge that reason disenchants nature and can impair our 
ability to generate meaning.  
Chapter II extends Rousseau’s argument by bringing Hegel and Marx into the 
conversation. In each of these bodies of work, the notion of a simultaneous identity and non-
identity characterizes the subject-object relationship and by extension the human-ecology 
relationship. Much of the best contemporary ecological theory follows this tradition of political 
philosophy. Here, the categories of history, alienation and mediation are central, as is the notion 
that humans are decidedly a part of nature, yet also distinctly outside of it. As Andrew Biro 
writes, “what is necessary is a way of thinking about the human relationship with nature that 
does not force us into choosing nature at the expense of convention or vice versa” (Biro 2005, 
76). Borrowing heavily from Rousseau, Hegel and Marx help us to extend this line of thought. 
For Hegel, it is accomplished through his system to absolute idealism, while for Marx it is 
historical materialism. Unlike Rousseau, however, the Germans are ‘enchanted’ by reason. While 
they acknowledge that the subject is dependent on the object, it is the former that is the ultimate 
source of meaning. For Hegel and Marx, reason is what drives history forward, and although it 
does entail a certain loss, it is ultimately progressive.  
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In Chapter III Adorno and Marcuse enter the conversation. They are the inheritors of the 
project commenced by Rousseau, Hegel, and Marx. From Adorno we are given the most 
theoretically and technically dense account of the subject-object relation contained in this 
dissertation. It is also likely the most robust, and in purely theoretical terms, has the most to offer 
the philosophy of human ecology. Adorno’s account of the identity and non-identity of subject 
and object is as nuanced and enriching as it is demanding. Marcuse’s account of the subject-
object relation, also invaluable, introduces the Freudian concepts of basic and excess alienation 
and deepens the understanding of the historical relation between humans and nature. At the end 
of this chapter, Marcuse is also marshalled to defend a version of ecological aesthetics. This is 
central to the sense of ‘enchantment’ of nature that is here delineated. Although they are greatly 
influenced by Hegel and Marx, the Frankfurt theorists are not ‘enchanted’ by reason. Quite the 
opposite: they see it as utterly disenchanting of nature and connect it to the loss of meaning in 
modern life.  
Chapter IV brings to light a shortcoming of the identity/non-identity paradigm: the 
specific content of the sameness humans share with nature is often reduced to materiality, while 
the difference is explained as mind/consciousness. This is not incorrect, but it is incomplete. As a 
necessary supplement, this chapter shows that process metaphysics can provide a more concrete 
foundation for both the identity and the non-identity of human and nature. Process thinking, 
particularly that of Charles Hartshorne, focuses on the unity of being, but stresses that being 
exists in degrees. Its principal ontological category is sensitivity: entities have being to the 
degree that they are internally complex and therefore externally sensitive. In this way, humans 
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can be understood as identical with nature to the extent that they — like all entities — are 
sensitive to some degree. However, humans can be understood as sensitive and complex to an 
ontologically different degree that other elements of the ecology. Not only does this help to 
extend the arguments of the ‘historical-dialectical’ thinkers, contained in the foregoing chapters, 
it also has important implications for ecological ethics.  
If process metaphysics shows humans to be complex to an ontologically different degree, 
it does not necessarily explain the faculty of self-consciousness that characterizes human 
existence and being-in-the-world. In other words, process thinking is limited in its ability to 
explain where the quantitative measure, complexity of processes, passes over into a qualitative 
distinction. In Chapter V, the concepts of  ‘stratification’ and ‘emergence,’ long influential in 
philosophy of science and biology, helps to explain thinking that is aware of itself. In short, 
emergence relies on a conception of stratified and hierarchical order of nature. Higher (more 
complex) strata contain properties and generative mechanisms that are irreducible to the 
properties of the strata below them. For example, sociology is dependent upon but not reducible 
to biology. In this way, self-consciousness can be shown to have material and biological 
foundations, but cannot be reduced to these categories. As Sean Creaven notes, the different 
strata of nature are identical to the extent that they are each part of a unified hierarchy, yet 
different in the sense that they differ qualitatively and in that higher strata are irreducible to 
lower ones (Creaven 2007, 21). This line of thinking shows emergence to have affinities with a 
process conception of the world.  
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The totality of this analysis points to the existence of layers of reality that are not 
immediately material. Many variants of ecological thought have pronounced spiritual elements 
that are deeply problematic. However, the turn to a philosophy that sees both nature and 
humanity as ‘enchanted,’ to borrow terminology used by Weber and the Frankfurt School, need 
not be incompatible with reason and scientific thinking. It simply means a rejection of 
determinism, mechanism, and vulgar materialism. Indeed, phenomenology, process metaphysics, 
and emergentism all point in this direction. Working from, and synthesizing, these diverse 
philosophical paradigms, my dissertation aims to show that the identity and non identity of 
humans and nature can only by fully understood when the active, super-material — although not 
supernatural — side of both humans and nature is brought into play. Such a project takes its 
inspiration from Hegel’s lament that “‘thought’ is all too commonly used as if it belonged only to 
spirit, or consciousness, while ‘objective’ is used primarily just with reference to what is 
unspiritual” (Hegel 1991, §56).  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Chapter 2: Ancient Cosmology to Rousseau 
Introduction 
In this first substantive chapter, I set the foundations for the discussion of the human 
place within nature through an analysis of the subject-object dialectic. The basic subject-object 
ontology has been thoroughly challenged in the history of philosophy, and as a basic schema it 
hardly remains useful for understanding human ecology. In essence, the subject is represented by 
the cognizant, conscious human psyche, while nature is the inert, passive object of experience. 
This rudimentary Cartesian picture, in which the two poles of the dialectic are held as completely 
differentiated and distinct, obfuscates the complexity and depth of the human-ecological 
relationship. It is in the critiques of this representation, however, that are to be found some more 
illuminating truths about human ecology. There are a great many such critiques to be found in the 
history of philosophy as well as contemporary theory. In a work of the present scope it would be 
impossible to outline them all, let alone do any of them justice. This chapter articulates in detail 
the position of Rousseau, who in turn set the stage for the exposition of Hegel, Marx, and the 
Frankfurt School theorists in the following chapters. This selection of thinkers, which I will refer 
to as the ‘historical-dialectical’ school, is not meant to be exhaustive. Indeed, there are many 
others who tackle the subject-object dilemma, and could also be marshalled in favour of 
arguments concerning the specialness of humans and/or the ecology. Rousseau, Hegel, Marx and 
the Critical Theorists represent a certain lineage though, and together they provide a quite 
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reasonable and critical foundation for thinking about the human place in nature in terms of the 
subject-object conception.  
Ancient Cosmology 
The important thing about the historical-dialectical thinkers is that they each conceive of 
human beings as simultaneously inside and outside of nature. Humans are a part of nature, yet 
also somehow fundamentally different from it. The subject is identical to its object, but also non-
identical to it. The complex and dialectically mediated relationship between subject and object 
develops in the course of history. There are two approaches to human ecology and subject-object 
relations that may be contrasted with this one. The first holds that human being is completely 
identical to nature, which is understood as essentially unified. The other sees human subjectivity 
as entirely divorced from nature. Here, nature is fundamentally ‘other,’ lifeless, and inert. 
Although often forgotten, R.G. Collingwood’s 1945 study, The Idea of Nature, remains a key 
secondary text on the history of cosmology. Here I will bring Collingwood back into play, as his 
analysis speaks to contemporary ecological theory. The present analysis takes advantage of 
Collingwood’s typology of cosmological thinking, particularly his conceptions of the Greek and 
Renaissance views of nature. The Greek view is sharply distinguished from the Renaissance by 
its conception of mind as embedded in all being, an outlook that is embraced by some 
contemporary ecological thinkers. Collingwood’s classification provides a structural apparatus 
that is useful for understanding the history of cosmological thinking. In much contemporary 
thought there are sharp metaphysical distinctions between animate and non-animate nature, as 
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well as between humans and the rest of nature. While Collingwood’s more general argument — 
concerning the relationship between changes in the philosophy of nature and the evolution of 
natural science — is not of concern for this essay, his historical typology of the development of 
cosmology provides an excellent analytical structure, which I would like to revise and update as I 
develop it in light of the historical-dialectical school. Collingwood’s conceptions of the Greek 
and Renaissance views help to illustrate the way in which subsequent thinkers treated in this 
chapter see nature and the human relationship with nature. 
“Greek natural science,” writes Collingwood, “was based on the principle that the world 
of nature is saturated or permeated by mind” (Collingwood 1945, 3). This immediately means 
that nature itself is something that is active and alive. ‘Mind’ imbues all of nature with a vitality. 
Furthermore, mind actively organizes and determines the motion and order of nature. This is a 
holistic view of the natural order. It is important that the Greeks saw nature as ordered; in 
addition to being essentially ‘alive,’ nature conformed to rationally knowable, or scientifically 
discoverable, patterns. For the Greeks, this meant that the mind within nature was also intelligent 
(Collingwood 1945, 3). Ecologically, this has important consequences. Collingwood explains: 
The life and intelligence of creatures inhabiting the earth’s surface and the regions 
adjacent to it… represented a specialized local organization of this all-pervading 
vitality and rationality, so that a plant or animal… participates in its own degree 
psychically in the life-process of the world’s ‘soul’ and intellectually in the 
activity of the world’s ‘mind’, no less than it participated materially in the 
physical organization of the world’s ‘body.’  8
 Collingwood 1945, 3-4.8
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The result is an all-encompassing totality: mind, body, and soul all bound together. However, 
while nature is psychically, intellectually, and materially interconnected, it is still composed of 
discrete individual parts. It is, then, a differentiated unity. According to Collingwood, the notion 
that there are physical identities between human and non-human nature is not foreign to the 
contemporary understanding. What strikes the modern reader about the ancient view though, he 
writes, is the concept of a psychic and intellectual connection with nature (Collingwood 1945, 4). 
Beginning with Copernicus, the Greek view of nature was eventually replaced by what 
Collingwood calls the Renaissance view. This view repudiates the idea that nature is an active 
organism and that it is imbued with life and intelligence. To be sure, the movements of nature are 
still rationally ordered. But the order is imposed from without, rather than from within. 
Accordingly, the concept of immutable ‘laws of nature’ is central to the Renaissance view 
(Collingwood 1945, 5). Collingwood writes, “The Renaissance thinkers…  saw in the orderliness 
of the natural world an expression of intelligence: but for the Greeks this intelligence was 
nature’s own intelligence, for the Renaissance thinkers it was the intelligence of something other 
than nature: the divine creator and ruler of nature” (Collingwood 1945, 5). While for the Greeks 
mind inheres essentially in nature and in the body, the Renaissance view abolishes this unity. 
This separation is most clear in the philosophy of Descartes, who hypothesized that mind and 
body are metaphysically distinct substances. Spinoza’s monism is hardly an improvement, holds 
Collingwood: “for thought and extension are in his philosophy two utterly distinct attributes of 
this one substance, and each, as an attribute, completely transcends the other” (Collingwood 
1945, 7). Ultimately the Renaissance view can be summed up as an analogy: that of a 
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clockmaker and a clock. The clockmaker stands in for God and the laws of nature, while the 
clock itself represents nature (Collingwood 1945, 8-9). The analogy has another advantage in its 
portrayal of nature as essentially mechanistic. For the Renaissance view, nature is both devoid of 
its own inherent life force, and is composed of matter that moves and changes according to 
mechanical laws.  
Much of the secondary literature on the cosmological scheme portrayed in Plato’s 
Timaeus concerns its supposedly Pythagorean roots; the fundamental role played by numbers in 
the creation of nature is said to be Plato’s extension of Pythagoreanism (see Russell 2008, 
108-110). The present analysis, however, sets aside the Pythagorean question and even the 
problem of a numerical foundation. Instead, the focus here is on the active totality of nature as 
described by Plato. Superficially, the role of god in the creation of nature as depicted in the 
Timaeus contradicts Collingwood’s Greek view of nature, and, in fact, seems much closer to the 
(external) machine maker of the Renaissance view. However, Plato (speaking through Timaeus) 
is clear that there is only one sphere of being. Timaeus says, “So, in order that this living thing 
should be like the complete Living Thing in respect to uniqueness, the Maker made neither two, 
nor yet an infinite number of worlds. On the contrary, our universe came to be as the one and 
only thing of its kind, is so now and will continue to be so in the future” (Plato 1997, 31b1-5). 
Understood this way, god is both the creator of nature and its immanent life force. G.R. Carone 
claims that in the Timaeus god is synonymous with the world-soul (Carone 2006, 49). 
Importantly god, or the divine demiurge, begins with unformed matter and “disorderly 
motion” (Plato 1997, 30a5). The demiurge infuses its own reason and perfection into this 
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unformed matter to create an ordered, reason-filled nature. Timaeus says, “Since the god wanted 
nothing more than to make the world like the best of the intelligible things, complete in every 
way, he made it a single visible living thing, which contains within itself all the living things 
whose nature it is to share its kind” (Plato 1997, 30d1-31a2). The remainder of the Timaeus is a 
description of the formation of nature along these lines, from the basic geometric shapes to the 
bodies and souls of human beings.  
This type of cosmogony does not immediately seem to have any significance for 
contemporary ecological thought. As Joanne H. Wright notes, Plato’s account is creationist as 
opposed to evolutionary (Wright 2004, 27). This means it has little identity with modern 
evolutionary science and would seem to have little to say about ecology. Furthermore, the 
Timaeus contains a series of latent political aims that make it incompatible with progressive 
politics: Wright observes that Plato’s creation story is distinctly patrogenic and thus serves to 
obscure the necessity of women in human reproduction (Wright 2004, 31-32). For these and 
other reasons, it does not seem compatible with a materially grounded science of ecology. 
Nonetheless, the concept of a single, interconnected sphere of being, ordered according to the 
laws of reason is an important one. Firstly, the idea of being as ordered makes possible scientific 
enquiry; systematic knowledge of nature is possible only if it is structured according to 
underlying, yet discoverable, principles. More importantly, Plato’s description of the totality of 
nature as singular and permeated by reason provides a basis for a basic identity between human 
and non-human nature. In the Timaeus this is presented as an analogy between the human body 
and the universe — microcosm and macrocosm. Johansen explains this as follows: 
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Timaeus says, having intelligence also implies having a soul, while having a soul 
implies having a body. The cosmos thus becomes an ensouled body, qualifying as 
a living being. The account of the cosmic soul and body occupies Timaeus up till 
69, after which the exposition turns to the composition of the human soul and 
body, which is itself modelled on that of the cosmic soul and body. One might say, 
therefore, that Timaeus’ entire cosmology is in fact biology.  9
This last point may be overstated. The specifically biological, biotic, or ecological concerns of 
the Timaeus are not clear. Nonetheless, it is obvious that, to use Collingwood’s terminology, 
human bodies are materially, psychically, and intellectually connected to nature.  
In his History of Western Philosophy Bertrand Russell makes a clumsy transhistorical 
distinction between those thinkers who are concerned with numbers (Pythagoras and Plato) and 
those whose thought emphasizes empirical study, namely Aristotle (Russell 2008, 738). While 
the careful student of philosophy is rightly skeptical of such broad claims, the opening lines of 
Aristotle’s primary cosmological investigation, in Book A of the Metaphysics, do display an 
appreciation for observational — or what would today be called empirical — analysis that is not 
present in Plato (Aristotle 1941a, 980a-981a). However, their differing foundations should not 
obfuscate the similarities in the pictures of nature drawn by Plato and Aristotle. After an 
exposition of Pre-Socratic and Platonic ontologies, Aristotle claims, “It is evident, then… that all 
men seem to seek the causes named in the Physics, and that we cannot name any beyond 
these…” (Aristotle 1941a, 933a12-14). These causes are, of course, the material, formal, 
efficient and final (Aristotle 1941b, 194b16-195a3). Of course, the addition of efficient and final 
causes to the metaphysical scheme represents a significant and important supplement to Plato’s 
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‘formed matter.’ The key point here, however, is that the movements within nature arise from 
efficient causes that are part of nature. Thus, Aristotle describes nature as self-moving, which is 
very similar to the configuration discussed in the Timaeus (Collingwood 1945, 82). This 
conception of nature as self-moving and self-causing — as containing within itself the principles 
of its own movement — is sharply contrasted with the view offered by the thinkers in the 
following section.  
Descartes and Locke 
Western thought takes a decisive and irreversible turn with René Descartes’ division of 
subject and object. When the French philosopher posited mind and body as two distinct 
substances (somehow connected in the pineal gland) the unity of nature conceived by Greek 
thought was shattered. Of course, Descartes did not reach his conclusion entirely independently; 
scientific developments, especially in astronomy and physics, set the stage for the Cartesian 
revolution. In this regard, the contributions of Copernicus, Bruno, Bacon, and others were 
pivotal. But a set of dualisms — between body and mind, nature and god, rationalism and 
empiricism — become explicit with Descartes (Collingwood 1945, 100). He writes, “our soul is 
of a nature entirely independent of the body…” (Descartes 2010, 70). The metaphysical division 
of body and mind, as well as the cosmological separation of god and nature, are especially 
significant for rethinking the human relationship with the ecology.  
The detachment of subject from object — of the human subject from its natural object — 
places human consciousness distinctly outside the realm of nature. The consequences of this 
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view, with regards to ecological thought, are immense. Humans are seen as unequivocally 
morally superior to the rest of nature, and the ecology is understood as devoid of any ‘active’ 
element, which is believed to reside solely in human consciousness. Nowhere is the human/non-
human distinction more unambiguous than in Descartes. Humans have thoughts, he writes, and 
animals do not. Furthermore, this metaphysical difference translates into an ethical one: humans 
are justified in the complete domination of animals. Descartes writes: 
I cannot share the opinion of Montaigne and others who attribute understanding or 
thought to animals. I am not worried that people say that human beings have 
absolute dominion over all other animals; for I agree that some of them are 
stronger than us, and I agree that there may also be some animals which have a 
natural cunning capable of deceiving the shrewdest of human beings. But I 
consider that they imitate or surpass us only in those of our actions which are not 
guided by our thought.  10
The key differentia, the basis upon which Descartes draws the conclusion that animals do not 
have thoughts, is that they do not use speech. “All human beings use [speech],” he writes, 
“however stupid and insane they may be, even though they may have no tongue and organs of 
voice; but no animals do. Consequently this can be taken as a real specific difference between 
humans and animals” (Descartes 2010, 72). Animals, for Descartes, exhibit no measure of free 
will, and act simply according to external mechanical laws. This exposition is not meant to 
criticize Descartes from an animal-rights perspective — although such a critique may be 
warranted. Rather, it is to demonstrate the difference between the Greek and Cartesian views of 
nature. For Descartes, thought, mind, or the otherwise active and alive element, is restricted to 
human consciousness; conversely for the Greeks activity permeates all of nature.  
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While the passages from Descartes examined above restrict the discussion of non-human 
nature to animals, this conception implicitly extends to the totality of organic and non-organic 
nature. John Locke, however, is explicit about the human dominion of all nature. For Locke, the 
‘active side’ is represented by human labour power. In Chapter V of his Second Treatise of 
Government, Locke holds that while all of nature belongs to humanity in common, individuals 
may combine their own labour with the inanimate parts of nature, making them their own private 
property (Locke 2009, 285-289). Wolin notes that private property is central to Locke’s outlook 
because he sees it as necessary for increased productivity (Wolin 1989). While he sets limits on 
accumulation in the state of nature, Locke uses the introduction of private property and money, 
along with arguments about natural right, to make the case for unlimited accumulation — all for 
the sake of enlarged output (Maley 2011, 135; Macpherson 2011, 202-203). So preoccupied with 
productivity is Locke that he justifies the appropriation of land from those who are not using it to 
its most profitable capacity (Locke 2009 285-302). The venerable C.B. Macpherson has rightly 
called this the ‘political theory of appropriation’ (Macpherson 2011). Disturbingly, this line of 
argument has historically been used to justify the dispossession of First Nations territory in North 
America, and is still at work in more recent debates concerning Indigenous land claims (see 
Cheney 2011).  
Nature, for Locke, is simply the raw material provided by god for humans to furnish the 
goods required for their material advancement. On its own, nature is almost entirely without 
value. Locke writes: 
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[L]abour makes the far greatest part of the value of things, we enjoy in this 
World: And the ground which produces the materials, is scarce to be reckon’d in, 
as any, or at most, but a very small, part of it; So little, that even amongst us, Land 
that is left wholly to Nature, that hath no improvement of Pasturage, Tillage, or 
Planting, is called, as indeed it is, wast [sic]; and we shall find the benefit of it 
amount to little more than nothing.  11
Elsewhere, Locke announces that “‘Tis Labour then which puts the greatest part of Value upon 
Land, without which it would scarcely be worth any thing…” and that “Nature and the Earth 
furnished only the almost worthless materials…” (Locke 2009, 298). The human view towards 
nature, for Locke then, is an entirely instrumental one. Nature is to be dominated without 
restraint, with the goal of extracting from it the maximum possible quantity of value (Locke 
2009, 291). For Locke, as for Descartes, the ecology is understood essentially as ‘other,’ having 
no identity with humans. In the following section, Rousseau is marshalled to complicate this 
view. 
Rousseau 
“Fascination with and curiosity about origins… and an interest in the beginnings of 
human societies, human life, and indeed the cosmos itself, lie at the heart of religious, scientific, 
and philosophic inquiry,” holds Joanne Wright (2004, 3). This is certainly true for Rousseau, who 
constructs an elaborate origin story, an account of the ‘state of nature,’ in his Discourse on the 
Origin of Inequality (henceforth the Second Discourse). For Rousseau, the state of nature serves 
as an ideal from which to base his normative politics and critique of social inequality, modernity 
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as a whole, and even civilization itself; it is the foundation of his political thinking. While 
Rousseau is by no means the first or only thinker to posit a pre-political condition as a 
foundational origin story, he differs from other state of nature theorists — notably John Locke 
and Thomas Hobbes — in that his state of nature is also the regulative ideal of his politics. Of 
what, then, does Rousseau’s state of nature consist?  
In the Second Discourse Rousseau begins with a description of the physical conditions of 
humans in their natural state. He is not interested in the biological evolution of the human 
species, for “Comparative anatomy has as yet made too little progress…” (Rousseau 1987, 40). 
However, Rousseau is concerned with the relationship that humans should have, and apparently 
did have, ‘naturally,’ with their ecology, or their natural physical surroundings. Rousseau 
envisions a person in the state of nature as follows: “I see him satisfying his hunger under an oak 
tree, quenching his thirst at the first stream, finding his bed at the foot of the same tree that 
supplied his meal; and thus all his needs are satisfied” (Rousseau 1987, 40). The ‘savage’ person 
described in Rousseau’s account is a free and autonomous being. This person is not dependent on 
others for the satisfaction of his or her needs. Indeed, this state of independent, autonomous, self-
legislating freedom is, for Rousseau, how people ought to live. Interestingly, it is of equal 
importance, but seems to have received far less attention, that Rousseau’s ‘natural’ human exists 
in a state of direct connection with physical nature, within ecological processes undamaged by 
human interference. At this stage, humans are pre-social and have not yet developed their faculty 
of reason. They therefore cannot make the types of distinctions that would allow them to 
dominate nature they way Locke so championed.  I contend that for Rousseau the alienation from 
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nature that humans experience in civil society is as much an alienation from direct intercourse 
with the ecology as it is a separation from the state of autonomous freedom. These twin forms of 
alienation are, perhaps, two sides of the same coin. Rousseau’s comparisons between the natural 
state and civil society further illustrate this case. 
“Since the savage man’s body is the only instrument he knows,” maintains Rousseau, “he 
employs it for a variety of purposes that, for lack of practice, ours [the bodies of those in civil 
society] are incapable of serving” (Rousseau 1987, 40). With only their bodies as instruments, 
humans in the state of nature are tough, independent and versatile. In contrast, people in civil 
society lack “force and agility” (Rousseau 1987, 40). Their bodies are weak and ill-adapted for 
most tasks. Furthermore, Rousseau holds that while wild animals, such as bears and wolves, 
exceed natural humans in brute strength, humans in nature are skillful and cunning and therefore 
learn not to fear the beasts (Rousseau 1987, 41). Consequently, humans in the state of nature live 
in perfect confidence and security in their surroundings. Although they may be the most 
formidable animals, for Rousseau natural humans are still in a condition of physical unity with 
their surroundings. They are perfectly integrated into the metabolism of their ecology and hardly 
affect it, taking only what they need. Without the pressures of civil society, especially the market, 
there are no competitive or social reasons to take more than one needs. The quality of this 
lifestyle means that as physical beings these humans are infinitely superior to those living in civil 
society. However, it also means that humans are inseparable from nature; the division of human 
subjectivity from its objective surroundings has not yet taken place. Nature, at this point in 
Rousseau’s analysis, might still be understood as the Greeks described it: a perfect unity of 
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which humans are part. Asher Horowitz writes, “At the proto-human stage nature is still an 
undifferentiated whole, a simple unity in which neither subject nor object can be said to have yet 
appeared” (Horowitz 1987, 73). This stage is “proto-human” because it is the division of subject 
and object — the differentiation of self/mind from the physical body — that makes human 
“being” possible. Rousseau makes this clear as he turns from a consideration of humans as they 
are physically to how they are morally. 
When he turns to explain the “metaphysical,” or moral condition of humans, Rousseau 
introduces a key distinction between humans and other animals: “an animal cannot deviate from 
the rule that is prescribed to it, even when it would be advantageous to do so, while man deviates 
from it, often to his own detriment” (Rousseau 1987, 44). Rousseau now switches to a distinctly 
Renaissance terminology about nature; humans and animals are machines and the operations of 
nature are governed by laws (Collingwood 1945, 5; Rousseau 1987, 44). However, humans 
realize that they do not need to follow the commands of nature. Humans are now understood as 
free agents, controlling their own actions (Rousseau 1987, 44). They are still free, autonomous 
and self-legislating, perhaps even more so, but human subjectivity is at this moment 
differentiated from the objectivity that surrounds it. It is the awareness of the ability to 
consciously — even self-consciously — transform and interact with the ecology that renders the 
subject separate from its object. This is not to say that subject and object are permanently 
isolated, but that they become differentiated and mediated.  
For Rousseau, there is a moment at which the human subject realizes that it is not bound 
by the laws of nature or determined by them. Entering into this condition also introduces the 
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possibility of what Rousseau terms ‘perfectibility.’ Rousseau describes this potential as “the 
faculty of self-perfection, a faculty which, with the aid of circumstances, successively develops 
all the others, and resides among us as much in the species as in the individual” (Rousseau 1987, 
45). It would be a mistake to assume that Rousseau’s use of the term ‘perfectibility’ means that 
humans can attain perfection. On the contrary, Rousseau asserts only a few lines later that this 
capacity “is the source of all man’s misfortunes…” and that it “eventually makes him a tyrant 
over himself and nature” (Rousseau 1987, 45). However, what ‘perfectibility’ does mean is that 
change — self transformation — is possible. Thus, after the separation of subject and object, 
humans enter into a dynamic state, over which they — theoretically — can freely exercise 
control over themselves and over nature.  
For Rousseau and his contemporaries, who wrote before the Darwinian revolution and 
the emergence of evolutionary biology, the phylogenetic change of humans, or any other animal, 
could not occur in nature. Nature was a state of continuity and eternity, not dynamism and time. 
Rousseau writes, “There was neither education nor progress; generations were multiplied to no 
purpose. Since each one always began from the same point, centuries went by with all the 
crudeness of the first ages; the species was already old, and man remained ever a 
child” (Rousseau 1987, 57). In this account, there is no historical change, nor is there biological 
evolution. However, with the separation of subject and object and the consequent formation of 
human freedom and perfectibility, historical change of the human species becomes possible. 
Still, this change is not yet considered ‘history.’ At this point Rousseau gives an account of 
human change that is independent of nature, change that occurs within convention. Already the 
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line between nature and convention, and ‘savage’ humans and their ‘civilized’ counterparts starts 
to blur. Humans still live in the pre-political condition, but after the separation of subject and 
object, the state of nature becomes dynamic rather that static. Interestingly, in a short passage 
that might be read as proto-Hegelian, Rousseau refers to the “progress of mind,” which occurs as 
a result of the separation of subject and object (Rousseau 1987, 46). He suggests that with its 
separation from nature, human consciousness develops on its own. Hegel will later assert that it 
is this development — of mind — which is the true causal force that drives history forward.  
Horowitz maintains that for Rousseau the moment at which they attain perfectibility 
humans have not entered history; they may have left the pure state of nature, but history proper 
has not yet commenced. The human species first passes through a stage of ‘pre-history,’ in which 
“the biological and psychological foundations of culture are laid…” (Horowitz 1987, 73). In the 
second stage, which Horowitz calls history, culture develops (Horowitz 1987, 73-74). Of course, 
Rousseau conceived of this development as a more fluid process than simply the transition of 
‘pre-history’ into ‘history.’ In the first part of his Second Discourse, Rousseau recounts the 
development of speech, which was initially simply a primeval “call of nature,” but eventually 
developed and became more sophisticated (Rousseau 1987, 49). With the evolution of speech 
and then language, general ideas became possible and then social relations, beginning with the 
family, develop (Rousseau 1987, 50-51). At this point though, humans have not reached the state 
of civil society. Social relationships are generally benevolent, because they are governed by the 
natural sentiment of ‘pity,’ which prevents humans from doing unnecessary harm to one another 
(Rousseau 1987, 55). Finally, with the institution of private property, social relations become 
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dominated by invidious comparison, humans forget their natural pity towards one another, and 
civil society is truly established (Rousseau 1987, 60). Clearly, Rousseau did have an acute sense 
of the complicated relationship between nature, convention, and history. Leaving nature, or no 
longer being bound by natural law, does not mean that humans immediately enter civil society. 
Building on this account of the gradual transformation of humans over time, Horowitz 
maintains that the strict division of nature and convention is actually impossible, and is indeed 
not the point of Rousseau’s analysis:  
Although the second Discourse purports to separate nature from artifice and 
condemn the latter in terms of the former, it actually accomplishes the collapse of 
the two concepts within a sophisticated concept of history. Artifice is essential to 
the nature of the historical being, yet artifice is never identified with nature, nor 
does it ever replace nature.  12
Artifice, to be sure, is different from nature, but it is not completely separate from it. Elements of 
nature, then, continue to exist in history and in civil society. From an ecological perspective, the 
absolute separation from nature is an impossibility, as humans are fundamentally dependent on 
physical nature for their continued existence as material beings. History becomes the realm in 
which nature and convention are not divided abstractly, but rather exist together and are 
mediated dialectically. Horowitz writes, “Nature is therefore something that lives on in history 
just as history is the dialectical unfolding of human nature” (Horowitz 1987, 85).  
The phylogenetic development of the human species also means development in the 
human-ecological relationship. While perfectibility means the development and change of 
humans, both as individuals and as a species, this process of change does not occur simply in 
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‘mind,’ or in human consciousness. With the realization of their freedom, humans begin to freely, 
and eventually self-consciously, transform nature. Not only is human subjectivity separate from 
its object, physical nature becomes the object of the human transformative capacity. Through this 
process, humans also transform themselves, Horowitz holds. He writes that perfectibility is “the 
process of self-transformation that occurs when men at first unconsciously and later consciously 
set out to transform nature” (Horowitz 1987, 73). Importantly, the potential to transform nature 
in such a way, as a free agent, must have existed in humans in the pre-political condition, as this 
freedom is an essential — if not the essential — characteristic of human being. It is when this 
free agency is realized and exercised that humans can be said to have reached the level of 
perfectibility and the subject is decisively separated from its object (Biro 2005, 76). Therefore, 
perfectibility, the separation from nature, and free, self-conscious transformation of nature 
clearly means a fundamental change in the human relationship with the ecology.  
If perfectibility is a process that is characterized by change over time, and it also 
represents a profound shift in how humans interact with nature, then the human relationship with 
nature, or human ecology, can and must also be understood historically. In other words, the 
human relationship with the ecology changes and develops over time. As well, it follows that the 
ways in which humans interact with nature are therefore free and self-conscious. Marx would 
later develop this notion much further in his explorations of human ‘species-being’ and alienated 
labour, contained in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (Marx 1992, 328), but 
the idea is certainly present in Rousseau’s Second Discourse. Biro holds that because the free and 
self-conscious transformation of nature requires the division of subject and object, the human 
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relationship with nature is necessarily one of alienation (Biro 2005, 76). It is my contention that 
an adequate manner of thinking about ecological politics, one that in Biro’s words will offer a 
“way of thinking about the human relationship with nature that does not force us into choosing 
nature at the expense of convention or vice versa,” (Biro 2005, 59) requires a more rigorous 
analysis of the concept of alienation from nature than that which Rousseau provides. But 
Rousseau does offer a useful point of departure for further exploration into this problem because 
his philosophy establishes the idea that separation from nature is a necessary condition of human 
existence. In other words, there is no ‘going back’ to an uninterrupted relationship with nature. 
This raises a difficult question regarding the goal of ecological politics, which do, in a sense, 
seek to turn back the clock of climate change and ecological degradation. However, the reversal 
of these problematic trends need not be at odds with Rousseau’s theory. All living entities adapt, 
change, and posses the capacity to recover from adverse events. Such is the unending forward 
movement of historical, as well as biological, time. Overcoming the calamities of climate change 
and ecological degradation, then, are best understood as moving forward to something better, 
rather than going backwards in time.  
Returning to a state of perfect harmony with nature, however desirable he may have 
thought it, Rousseau recognized as a complete impossibility. He holds that the state of nature “no 
longer exists… perhaps never existed… [and] probably never will exist…” (Rousseau 1987, 34). 
For Rousseau the state of nature serves only as a regulative ideal. In addition, Rousseau 
acknowledged that an accurate account of the state of nature, while desirable, is indeed not 
attainable. He holds that his description of the state of nature is, and can only ever be, 
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conjectural: “Let us therefore begin by putting aside all the facts, for they have no bearing on the 
question. The investigations that may be undertaken concerning this subject should not be taken 
for historical truths, but only for hypothetical and conditional reasonings…” (Rousseau 1987, 
38). Rousseau admonishes Hobbes and Locke who both, in their fictional descriptions of the 
state of nature, attribute to humans the characteristics they recognized humans to have in civil 
society (Rousseau 1987, 40-41). However, even Rousseau himself cannot achieve a clear view of 
the natural state, because from his location in civil society he is unable to avoid reading 
convention into nature.  
While this problem represents a certain and irresolvable contradiction in Rousseau’s 
thinking on the state of nature, or on the possibility of a return, I would like to suggest that there 
is a deeper, more substantive aporia as well. For Rousseau the fundamental quality of human 
being is freedom. But this freedom arises out of an capacity to self-legislate. For the subject to 
self-legislate, it must be separate from its object; it must in some way exist outside of its natural 
object so as not to be governed by the laws of nature but by its own, self-given laws. The ideals 
of freedom and complete non-alienation, then, are irreconcilable. Accordingly, an attempt at an 
unmediated return to nature, or an unqualified reunification of subject and object, would also 
entail the end of human freedom. Capturing this sentiment, Horowitz writes that Rousseau 
“could not advocate a real return to nature without advocating the destruction of the [human] 
species” (Horowitz 1987, 32-33). Immediately following this, Horowitz also remarks, “But 
neither could [Rousseau] rest content with a simple reliance on reason to deliver mankind from 
its self-imposed calamities” (Horowitz 1987, 33). Rousseau therefore proposed resolutions to the 
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acute miseries of modernity, which he so lamented. Still, I contend that this tension between the 
subject-object dilemma and the possibility of human freedom plagues not only Rousseau’s 
attempts to envision a better future or alternative modernity, but also one of the most important 
pieces of secondary literature concerning Rousseau’s treatment of these problems: Ernst 
Cassirer’s famous essay “The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.” However, this tension also 
provides a site for creative reinterpretation and rethinking of the human-ecological relationship.  
Voltaire made the famous claim that Rousseau idealized the state of nature so much that 
he wished humans to return to the forest and to walking on all fours. Biro notes that this is a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the Rousseauian project: Rousseau constructed his state of 
nature as a regulative ideal and was well aware that any attempt to achieve such a state in 
practice was impossible (Biro 2005, 59-60). However, Rousseau’s later works, in particular the 
Social Contract, attempt to provide political solutions to the problems diagnosed in the Second 
Discourse. His aim was in some way to overcome the alienation and relations of unfreedom he 
saw in modernity, while keeping humans within their social and post-natural condition (Biro 
2005, 60). However, debate persists as to Rousseau’s central problematic, his consistency, and  
which of his later works is the definitive solution. 
Ernst Cassirer’s classic contribution to Rousseau scholarship, his essay “The Question of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau,” establishes the Social Contract as the conclusive answer to the 
problems described in the Second Discourse. Cassirer recognizes that the process Rousseau 
describes is bound up in a history that moves only in one direction: there is no going back. “The 
return to the simplicity and happiness of the state of nature is barred to us,” writes Cassirer, “but 
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the path of freedom lies open; it can and must be taken” (Cassirer 1988, 18). Cassirer is correct 
that the return to a pure state of nature is implausible. But it is not so clear that Rousseau would 
have accepted Cassirer’s dichotomy of simplicity and happiness on one hand, and freedom on the 
other. Indeed, Cassirer later notes that Rousseau could not escape the eudaemonism of 18th 
century philosophy: “Rousseau himself, it is true, was unable to break theoretically the hold of 
the eudaemonism which dominated all eighteenth-century ethics. From the outset, his whole 
thought was moved by the problem of happiness: its aim was to find a harmonious union of 
virtue and happiness” (Cassirer 1988, 29). Meanwhile, the central problematic to which the 
Social Contract addresses itself is freedom. Cassirer’s analysis, then, is burdened with an 
inconsistency about what exactly Rousseau tries to accomplish in the Social Contract. 
Additionally, the central, most difficult, and most theoretically fruitful problem — that of the 
subject’s alienation from others and from nature, in modernity — is left out of Cassirer’s 
account. But this inadequacy should only direct attention back to the central aporias in 
Rousseau’s own thought: the tensions between freedom and non-alienation and between subject 
and object. Cassirer’s mistake is to assume that these problems, articulated in this way, can have 
theoretical or practical solutions. 
Whether Rousseau’s solution is convincing or not remains to be answered, as does 
whether the resolutions of the Social Contract are indeed consistent with the Second Discourse. 
To the latter question, Cassirer certainly responds in the affirmative. He notes that until his old 
age, Rousseau was completely satisfied that his body of work was theoretically unified (Cassirer 
1988, 17). Cassirer, too, is convinced that the symptoms diagnosed in the Second Discourse 
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receive coherent and persuasive resolutions in the Social Contract. He writes that the two works 
“contradict each other so little that each can rather be explained only through and with the other” 
(Cassirer 1988, 25). This is possible, according to Cassirer, because in the Social Contract 
Rousseau recreates the community that he had found so wanting in modernity. Again, Cassirer 
contradicts his own assertion that it is only freedom which the Social Contract offers. Humans, 
in Rousseau’s vision of the social contract, are no longer alienated from each other; there is a 
rediscovery of community. The ‘general will’ is more than a mere association of individuals for 
purposes of political expediency or stability. Rather, is it the embodiment of the real ethical 
substance of the community. Cassirer writes, “the will, as ethical will, really exists” (Cassirer 
1988, 24). Accordingly, the ‘general will’ becomes the foundation of legitimate political power. 
The state is not only allowed to execute the ‘general will,’ it becomes intertwined with, and 
grows with society (Cassirer 1988, 25).  
Cassirer’s claim that the Social Contract and the Second Discourse are congruous is 
convincing — to a point. The unfreedom and social estrangement described in the Second 
Discourse are claimed to be superseded with freedom, legitimate political power, and the 
establishment of real community in the Social Contract. Rousseau describes the problem as 
follows: to “Find a form of association which will defend and protect, with the whole of its joint 
strength, the person and property of each associate, and under which each of them, uniting 
himself to all, will obey himself alone, and remain as free as before” (Rousseau 1994, 54-55). 
The Social Contract claims to offer an answer to this problem. Of course, the real liberty one 
might enjoy in a community whose members are “forced to be free,” is dubious (Rousseau 1994, 
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58). Substantially however, Cassirer’s account — and Rousseau’s — only really seems to 
address the problem of freedom. Where Cassirer falls short, the problem lies in Rousseau’s own 
deficiencies. Even on the problem of freedom, the Social Contract offers at best the feeble 
assertion that individuals might remain free within the social contract if they unanimously 
consent to give up all of their natural freedom. The existence of the “Legislator,” the “Censor,” 
and the establishment of a civil religion in Rousseau’s proposed contract make his contention 
that this state is truly free highly doubtful.  
In the Social Contract, Rousseau also attempts to overcome the invidious comparison, 
competition between individuals, great disparities in wealth, and the inauthentic ways of being 
that all characterize modernity. But the project fails because Rousseau does not deal sufficiently 
with the problems of alienation, nature, and alienation from nature. The division of the subject 
from its natural object (i.e. physical nature) receives no attention and the reunification of 
individual subjects with one another is given only dissatisfying treatment in the formation of the 
‘general will.’ Rousseau describes the general will as an “act of association [that] produces, in 
place of the individual persons of each contracting party, a moral and collective body… and 
which, by the same act, is endowed with its unity, its common self, its life, and its 
will” (Rousseau 1994, 56). It might be argued that the Social Contract succeeds in establishing a 
true community by binding together the totality of individual subjectivities into a single unified 
will. However, this still only amounts to a synthesis of particulars; it says nothing of the 
mediation between subject and object, or of the relationship between humans and nature.  
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It is Biro’s contention that Rousseau was fully aware that the problems he identified in 
the Second Discourse could be resolved only through dealing with the issue of alienation from 
nature. Indeed, alienation from nature for Rousseau is the principle cause of human suffering 
(Biro 2005, 60). The conflict between the general and particular wills — the divergence that the 
Social Contract attempts to rectify — is rooted in human separation from nature. Biro writes that 
the “distinction between individual self-interest and the interest of the community as a whole — 
a distinction… that is rooted in the problem of alienation from nature — is of course what the 
Social Contract is intended to overcome” (Biro 2005, 68). The objective, then, is for humans to 
remain within political society, but also to overcome alienation. Understood in this way, the 
program contained in the Social Contract seems even less convincing. While it may purport to 
reclaim what Rousseau understands as the essential human quality of freedom, it says very little 
regarding the human relationship with nature — either ‘human nature’ or the ecology.  
Referencing some Marxist commentators on Rousseau’s work — Louis Althusser and 
Lucio Colletti — Biro holds that a key distinction that Rousseau overlooks is between 
‘exchange’ and ‘division of labour.’ That is, Rousseau does not acknowledge the difference 
between the particular society that he inhabited, ‘exchange’ society, and society in general, 
understood by the Marxists as ‘division of labour.’ The failure to recognize this difference, 
according to Althusser and Colletti, prevents Rousseau from articulating a convincing resolution. 
This is because the critique of one determinate society thereby becomes a critique of society tout 
court (Biro 2005, 69-70). Rousseau is left having to reform society is all its forms, rather than 
one particularly deleterious form. An interesting corollary to the distinction between ‘exchange’ 
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and ‘division of labour, is the differentiation between ‘basic’ and ‘surplus’ alienation. In what 
follows, I map Biro’s exploration of these two concepts, in their relation to Rousseau, and 
suggest that these distinctions can serve as the foundation of a rethinking of the human-
ecological relationship.  
Biro holds that “For Rousseau, alienation from nature — the splitting of human 
subjectivity from the natural object… is the defining characteristic of human existence” (Biro 
2005, 76). I would like to suggest, however, that ‘alienation’ is too strong of a word to describe 
this necessary quality of the human-ecological relationship. Rousseau is quite right that human 
subjectivity exists apart from its object and that humans are not bound by laws of nature. It is this 
separation that permits freedom, as well as free, self-conscious transformation of nature. 
Nevertheless, humans are also fundamentally in and of nature, specifically in an ecological sense. 
In material terms, humans are absolutely dependent on the ecology for their continued physical 
existence; nature is “man’s inorganic body…,” as Marx will later remark (Marx 1992, 328). In 
ideational terms, the ecology provides the ‘boundedness’ that human consciousness requires to 
situate itself. As such, the term ‘mediation’ provides a better descriptor for the relationship 
between humans and the ecology. In other words, human subjectivity is necessarily apart from its 
natural object, but it is not independent of it; the two elements are different, but not distinct.  
Building on Rousseau’s notion of perfectibility, I have shown that the human relationship 
with the ecology is one that exists in history; that is, it changes over time. As such, even if the 
human-ecological connection is not necessarily one of complete alienation — and, because we 
depend on the ecology for our survival, never can be — how the relationship is mediated is not 
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static. Biro draws an instructive comparison between Althusser and Horowitz. Althusser has an 
over-simplistic reading of Rousseau, history, and alienation — a consequence of his 
determinism. For him, the problem of alienation is overcome with the development of the 
productive forces: the growth of capitalism, which eventually erupts into socialist revolution, and 
the creation of communism. Alienation can be totally overcome, for Althusser, but its solution 
lies in total alienation (Biro 2005, 78). Horowitz, on the other hand, realizes — as Rousseau did 
— that subject and object cannot be re-unified and that alienation is a necessary condition of 
human existence (Biro 2005, 78). However, as Biro writes, “if Rousseau cannot recommend a 
return to a natural state, neither does he want to suggest that all moments or forms of alienation 
[read: mediation] must be judged to be equal” (Biro 2005, 77). For Rousseau it is possible to 
make judgements about how and to what extent the relationship between society and nature is 
mediated. 
Using both Freud and Marcuse, Horowitz makes a key distinction between ‘necessary’ 
and ‘excess’ denaturation. Others call this ‘basic’ and ‘surplus’ alienation, and Biro uses the 
terms ‘objectification’ versus ‘alienation.’ Differences in terminology aside, Horowitz’s 
distinction makes it clear that for Rousseau, not all forms of alienation from nature are the same. 
Indeed, he argues that Rousseau attempts “to separate the necessary denaturation of a cultural 
and social being from the unnecessary or excessive denaturation attending inequality or class-
divided society” (Horowitz 1987, 213). With this in mind, Rousseau’s project in the Social 
Contract becomes, if not convincing, much more understandable. Engineering and entering into 
a social contract is not intended to overcome alienation, or solve the subject-object split, for 
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Rousseau, but represents one of the more benign forms that alienation could possibly take 
(Horowitz 1987, 211). If the relationship between individual subjects in political society and 
‘human nature’ can embody different forms, some better than others, then the same can be said 
of the human-ecological relationship. That is, the ways that the human-ecological relationship 
are mediated need not be understood as static or immovable. Thus, the alienation from nature 
that is manifested by industrial capitalism is not a necessary consequence of the impossibility of 
a total reunification of humans with the ecology.  
Biro writes that Rousseau’s pre-political state of nature is — subsequent to the separation 
of subject and object — dynamic. So too, therefore, must be the state of political society (Biro 
2005, 77). Indeed, it is Rousseau’s account of human freedom, the freedom which arises from the 
separation of humans from nature and the condition of perfectibility, that permits this dynamism. 
Rousseau’s own inability to create a state in which alienation from nature takes a more benign 
form does not mean that the project should be abandoned. Combining Rousseau’s understanding 
of the human relationship with nature as dynamic and historical with his assertion of the 
fundamental human potential for freedom creates the possibility of a truly critical and radical 
politics. This has further implications for a post-modern, post-capitalist ecological politics. While 
there is no eternal human nature, or pure uncontaminated ecology, to which humans can return, 
we can use the freedom that we have by virtue of the subject-object separation to create a 
renewed relationship with the ecology. Transcending capitalist social relations means not only 
developing a new politics, but also taking control of how our relationship with the ecology is 
mediated. 
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Rousseau does not have the last word on the division of subject and object. Kant, Hegel, 
and many others continue the exploration, and bring to it much more logical and philosophical 
rigour. But Rousseau’s account provides a theoretically rich point of departure for contemporary 
ecological politics and ecological political thought. There are two principal reasons for this. First, 
Rousseau’s insistence that humans cannot return to nature precludes futile attempts to rediscover 
a ‘natural’ human state of existence, or a perfect, idyllic, or unmediated relationship with the 
ecology. Rousseau forces us to think of nature and convention not as polar opposites, but as two 
categories that are entwined in the historical process. Second, while a return to nature is 
impossible, Rousseau’s explanation of the human capacities of ‘perfectibility’ and freedom create 
the possibility of radical reconfigurations of society and politics, as well as corresponding 
rearrangements of human-ecological relations.  
Conclusion  
The above discussion of Rousseau shows the central importance of history, nature, and 
self-transformation in his analysis. It is now evident that Rousseau’s outlook is a rich and 
complicated one. He is the progenitor of what has here been called the ‘historical-dialectical’ 
approach to subject-object analysis and human ecology. Where the ancient Greeks saw perfect, 
timeless unity, and Descartes and Locke saw radical separation, Rousseau sees complex, 
historical intertwinement. He balances the sameness and difference of subject and object — the 
identity and non-identity of humans and the ecology. What, though, does this say of 
enchantment? I would like to suggest that there is a fundamental paradox at work in here in 
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Rousseau. On the one hand, his analysis points to the specialness, the enchantment, of human 
beings. We are that unique species that leaves the eternity of nature, enters historical time, and 
takes control of its own destiny. This character of our being, as will be consistently argued in the 
remainder of this dissertation, surely inspires a sense of enchantment. On the other hand, 
Rousseau sees the outcomes of this special characteristic as thoroughly disenchanting. Reason, 
which allows humans to control and manipulate nature, washes away the magic of the ecological 
world. Furthermore, history, made possible by reason, takes humanity further and further away 
from its connection to nature. While Hegel and Marx, the subjects of the following chapter, 
might be said to have succumbed to the ‘enchantment of reason,’ Rousseau is clearly more 
ambivalent. While he may not have all the answers and solutions, Rousseau’s thought is clearly a 
necessary moment in the generation of a self-understanding of the human location in nature.  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Chapter 3: Hegel and Marx 
Introduction 
The previous chapter made clear that philosophical thinking on the human place in nature 
changed a lot from the ancients, to Descartes and Locke, and then to Rousseau. With the latter, 
human ecology can be said to take on a historical and dialectical character. Hegel and Marx 
continue this tradition, making important contributions of their own. They use more explicitly 
the ‘subject-object’ terminology, and in many place take the analysis to further philosophical 
depths than Rousseau. Commonalities abound; however, it is clear that Hegel and Marx diverge 
from Rousseau in one key way. While he sees the necessity of historical change he nonetheless 
laments it. For Hegel and Marx, on the other hand, there are things that are lost in the inevitable 
march of history, but it is ultimately a progressive force. This is because Rousseau sees human 
reason and its corollary, the domination of nature, as essentially disenchanting. Conversely, 
Hegel and Marx might be said to be ‘enchanted by reason’ and its seemingly infinite 
possibilities. Although this outlook is worthy of critical scrutiny, it also illuminates what is 
special about human being: self consciousness, rational thinking, and the capacity to labour 
freely. Of course, Hegel and Marx do not share the vulgar outlook, exemplified by Locke and 
Descartes, that humans are completely outside of nature. Their philosophies advance the 
discussion of human ecology that is central to this dissertation in important ways. This is 
especially evident in their abilities to balance the simultaneous identity and non-identity of 
subject and object. To make this case, the present chapter proceeds as follows. The first section, 
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on Hegel, begins with a discussion of his political philosophy to give an idea of his method and 
general outlook. It then investigates Hegel’s famous Phenomenology of Spirit, to draw out the 
human ecological implications of his theory of subjectivity and self-consciousness. The second 
section turns to Marx, a student and critic of Hegel’s. Marx focusses more explicitly on the 
category of labour in the historical process, and this has important implications for the human 
relationship with nature.  
G.W.F. Hegel  
At first glance, Hegel’s work seems a world apart from Rousseau’s. The latter’s writing 
style is easily comprehended and his philosophy is not, for the most part, conceptually difficult. 
The German, on the other hand, presents the reader with a daunting set of works that initially 
appears to be impenetrable. Hegel’s style is famously difficult, a hurdle that is compounded by 
the fact that he often introduces his own terminology. Despite these apparent differences, as it 
concerns the present study Rousseau and Hegel confront much the same principal political and 
ethical problem: alienation. More specifically, this means the separation of subject and object. 
Subjectivity can be conveniently (although not adequately) summed up as the phenomenological 
capacities and inwardness of the human individual. The meaning of objectivity, however, is far 
more ambiguous. For example, it can refer to the objective political and ethical community, to 
the object of phenomenological experience, or even to the objective physical natural world — 
the ecology. With the exception of the critical theorists, and particularly some of the literature on 
Adorno, this ambiguity is often insufficiently appreciated, especially in political theory. It has 
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been shown in the forgoing that conceptualizing ‘the object’ as ‘the ecology’ complicates but also 
enriches Rousseau’s political philosophy. Like Rousseau, Hegel aims to overcome the radical 
separation of subject and object to restore a sense of community and subjective at-home-ness in 
the world (see Dallmayr 1994, 50-53). Going further than Rousseau’s ‘political solution,’ as per 
the Social Contract, Hegel attempts to ultimately identify subject and object. It remains 
controversial whether this means the complete subsumption of subjectivity into an objective 
whole, as Adorno, for example, has alleged. What is clear, however, is that for Hegel subjectivity 
shares an identity with objectivity insofar as the categories of knowing are identical to the 
categories of being, as argued in his Encyclopaedia Logic. The human-ecological significance of 
this argument will be explored further below. Immediately evident however, is that Hegel offers 
a strong foundation for believing that humans are in very important ways identical with nature.  
The question of where to begin with Hegel is a difficult one. As Fred Dallmayr has noted, 
Hegel was a truly systematic thinker. He was “the last great systematic thinker in the history of 
Western philosophy, a thinker who sought to render all facets of reality accessible to 
philosophical understanding and to integrate them into an intelligible whole” (Dallmayr 2002, 1). 
A thinker whose oeuvre is so all encompassing presents no easy points of departure, especially as 
the elements of Hegel’s system are all so deeply intertwined. Hegel himself saw phenomenology, 
the study of the bare facts of consciousness, as the necessary first step. As a result, his 
Phenomenology of Spirit acts as the precursor to his systematic philosophy. This dissertation 
aims to offer an exposition of Hegel’s thought in terms of the developmental trajectory of 
subject-object dialectics that also includes Rousseau, Marx, and the Frankfurt School. As such, 
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the Phenomenology — that work which explores most in-depth the contours of human 
subjectivity — would seem like a logical place to begin. However, to highlight the important 
continuities between Hegel and Rousseau, the present analysis will begin with Hegel’s political 
work, the Philosophy of Right. It is here that it is most obvious that Hegel was grappling with 
many of the same political and ethical problems as Rousseau. Most central is the challenge of 
finding a sense of community in the context of a modern society that stresses individuality above 
all else. Along with demonstrating the affinities with Rousseau, the Philosophy of Right also 
offers an accessible presentation of Hegel’s subject-object dialectic. In short, this may be 
described as a primary and simple immediacy of subject and object, which is then broken apart 
into alienated subjectivities in modernity. Hegel effects a preservative sublation that conserves 
individuality while also recreating a sense of community and wholeness. In this movement we 
also discern Hegel’s dialectical method of thesis-negation-synthesis. 
Only then does the analysis approach Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. This seminal 
work has been called a ‘phenomenological anthropology,’ as it charts the development of the 
human faculty of self-consciousness from it most basic — and necessarily speculative — 
beginnings. Hegel’s aim here is to give an account of the nature of human consciousness. I will 
begin the analysis with those parts of Hegel’s thought that highlight the self-negational character 
of human thinking — that is, the ability of human consciousness to conceive of itself as both 
subject and object. As well, attention will be given to those sections of the Phenomenology that 
describe the place of this self-negational consciousness within the objective world. While the 
Phenomenology of Spirit offers some substantial evidence for the ‘specialness’ of human 
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consciousness, Hegel’s Encyclopaedia Logic provides an excellent entry into explorations of the 
identity of subject and object. Most importantly, in this work he makes the case that the 
categories of knowing are identical to the categories of being. In other words, the categories that 
we — subjectively — use to understand the world are the same as those that actually order the 
objective world. ‘Absolute Knowing,’ as Hegel calls it, is thereby made possible. In a later 
chapter, I will discuss Adorno’s assertion that Hegel collapses entirely the distinction between 
subject and object — and how this move may be detrimental to epistemology as well as human 
ecology. At this point, the important notion that can be gleaned from Hegel is that important 
elements of the inwardness of self-consciousness, that most human characteristic, find important 
continuities in the objective world, and the ecological world in particular.  
A final consideration before turning to the texts concerns the notion of ‘dialectics.’ 
Although this has been a tired, formulaic, explanatory catch-all abused by Marxists of all stripes 
for decades, the concept of dialectical thinking can nonetheless still be incredibly useful for 
contemporary ecological theory. But it must be more than a simplistic a priori formula imposed 
on historical events to dogmatically confirm grand unscientific theories. Friedrich Engels did 
dialectical methodologies no favours by formalizing the notions of ‘negation of the negation,’ 
‘identity of opposites,’ and the ‘law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa.’ 
Even in Hegel, the ‘negation of the negation,’ or ‘thesis-antithesis-synthesis’ triad often appears 
as formula applied to the facts before adequate empirical consideration. This aside, the 
endeavour to understand the world dialectically is still a fruitful one. What, then, does this mean? 
The dialectical method, properly conceived, appeals to the fact that all one-sided determinations 
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call forth their opposites and demonstrate the two-sidedness of thinking and being. It is Plato, not 
Hegel, who is the originator of this type of thinking, a detail openly acknowledged by the latter 
(Hegel 1991, §81). Just as Plato overcame Parmenidean and Heraclitean metaphysics to show 
that being is both change and continuity, Hegel brings together several categories, including 
identity and difference. The argument defended in this dissertation pivots on this possibility. 
What is special about human being, it is argued, is its simultaneous identity with and difference 
from the rest of nature. Such opposite determinations can only inhere in a single subject — 
humanity — if we accept a dialectical understanding. It is in this matter, it will be argued below, 
that Hegel has much to offer contemporary ecological theory.  
Perhaps the best way to delve into Hegel’s thought, and his Philosophy of Right in 
particular, is to pinpoint the political and sociological problem he was trying to work out. Hegel 
was trying to understand the nature of modern society and its pathologies. A great admirer of the 
Ancient philosophers, Hegel was also interested in the Greek world and its worldview. The 
Ancient Greek world was definitely not the modern world. But why? Greek society was 
‘compact,’ in that there was a unity between the individual and the polis. Needless to say, the 
reality is much more complicated than this (see, for example, Wallach 1994). Still, for Hegel, in 
the ancient world individual subjectivities were inseparable from the objective whole of the 
political community. This fostered a deep sense of at-home-ness in the world. For Hegel, the 
Athenians were justified in their execution of Socrates because he represented a moment of 
radical subjectivity that was antithetical to the nature of their society. Hegel saw that it is also 
precisely this sense of radical subjectivity that characterizes modern society. This may ultimately 
  !67
represent a loss, but like Rousseau, Hegel realizes that there is no going back — not to the 
simplicity of the state of nature, nor to the sense of deep integration offered by non-modern 
societies. However, also like Rousseau, Hegel envisions an alternative to the alienation that 
pervades modern sociality, a way of recapturing some of the at-home-ness that non-modern 
societies offer. For Rousseau, the movement from simple unity, to alienation, to political 
compromise maps easily onto the progression from state of nature, modern society, and finally 
the social contract. For Hegel, however, the triadic movement takes place in many stages, and 
even occurs within these stages. For the sake a simplicity and clarity, the analysis here makes use 
of only one of these movements as it appears in the Philosophy of Right. In the third and final 
section of the book, called ‘Ethical Life,’ the family and ‘civil society’ reach a higher unity — 
but are not eliminated — in the state. While this political philosophy has no intentional 
ecological meaning, it does offer key insights into Hegel’s historical-dialectical approach to 
subject-object relations. It is therefore a necessary stepping stone in developing Hegel’s human 
ecology.  
‘Ethical life’ is for Hegel the solution to the problem of ‘recht’ or ‘right’ in modern 
society. In its preceding moments, ‘abstract right,’ and ‘morality,’ right is an objective and 
subjective phenomenon, respectively. In ‘ethical life’ the immediate at-home-ness of non-modern 
society is reconciled with the modern/Socratic moment of individuality. What is ‘right’ is 
concretized in institutions, and is objectified yet also the expression of free subjective wills. It is 
the moment in which freedom, the true nature of human being, is concretely actualized. As Hegel 
describes it: 
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Ethical life is the Idea of freedom in that, on the one hand, it is the living good — 
the good endowed in self-consciousness with knowing and willing and actualized 
by self-conscious action — while, on the other hand, self-consciousness has in the 
ethical realm its foundation in and for itself and its motivating end. Thus ethical 
life is the concept of freedom developed into the existing world and the nature of 
self-consciousness.  13
Ethical life is an order that is made concrete by the objectification of subjective wills (Hegel 
2008, §144). While it is the unity of ‘abstract right’ and ‘morality,’ ‘ethical life’ also contains 
within itself two incomplete moments — the family and civil society — that come together in a 
higher synthesis: the state.  
The family, then, represents a moment of immediate unity. It is a distinctly natural 
relationship, in which its members feel perfectly at home. Hegel writes: 
The family, as the immediate substantiality of spirit, is specifically characterized 
by love, which is spirit’s feeling of its own unity. Hence in a family, one’s 
disposition os to have self-consciousness of one’s individuality within this unity 
as the essentiality that has being in and for itself, with the result that one is in it 
not as an independent person but as a member.  14
 The family is a natural relationship because it is held together by feelings of love and trust. 
Although it exists for the natural reproduction of the species, it is not — contra Kant — merely a 
sexual contract. In his description of the family, Hegel clearly is concerned with ‘nature’ in only 
the most general sense and obviously not in the specific sense of ecological relations. What, then,  
does it have to offer to an exploration of human ecology? In Rousseau we can discern a three 
stage movement from immediate unity, to alienation, to a reconciliation that preserves identity 
and difference. With more philosophical sophistication, this movement is described in various 
 Hegel 2008, §142. 13
 Hegel 2008, §158.14
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ways and on various levels in Hegel. By describing Hegel’s general approach, we can deepen 
our understanding of the simultaneous identity and non-identity of humans and the rest of the 
ecological world.  
The key first moment, then, is of immediacy and at-home-ness — the family. In the next 
step, however, the closeness of the family is broken apart and individual subjects are merely that, 
individual subjects. This stage is called ‘civil society’ and represents the sphere of economic 
activity. The concept of ‘civil society’ marks Hegel’s most important contribution to political 
theory. He here makes the observation that in capitalist modernity an individual’s economic 
relationship to the rest of society is not directly connected to, nor is it determined by, their 
political status. In other words, one’s political status and their economic status are independent. 
This was certainly not the case in feudal or slave-owning societies. The key aspect of this level 
of relationships between individuals is that Hegel refers to it as ‘gesellschaft,’ rather than 
‘gemeinschaft,’ meaning society rather than community (see Hegel 1971 §523). As he notes in 
the Philosophy of Right, the individual is the first principle of civil society. He writes, “In civil 
society each individual is his own end, everything else is nothing to him” (Hegel 2008, §182). 
Individuals are not bound together by any sense of natural connection or common interest. To be 
sure, individuals are interdependent, because of the division of labour. In this sense, Hegel argues 
that each particularity moves towards universality (Hegel 2008, §183). But they are ultimately, at 
the level of civil society, self-concerned agents maximizing their own interests. Civil society, just 
like the family and the state, represents a ‘moment,’ that is, a stage that is at more logical than 
chronological. He writes that “its formation follows later in time than that of the state… (Hegel 
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2008, §182). But it is a necessary logical step in the completion of ‘ethical life’ because it 
captures individuality. At this stage individuality and subjectivity are the primary factors. The 
individual subject is radically alienated from other subjects as well as from any sense of 
community or at-home-ness in the world.  
Like Rousseau, Hegel is seeking some way of moving beyond the pervasive sense of 
alienation that characterizes the human experience in modern/civil society. In the third and final 
stage of ethical life — the state — the two prior elements come together in a higher unity (Hegel 
1971, §535). The familial relationship is rooted in feelings of closeness. However, such feelings 
can only extend so far. On the other hand, the freedom of individual subjectivity is a good and 
necessary development, but as the principle governing civil society results in conflict between 
individuals. The challenge, then, is to preserve individuality while creating a sense of being at 
home in the world. For Rousseau, this is more straightforwardly accomplished as individuals 
freely consent to be governed by the general will. Hegel recognizes that it is not feasible to 
obtain this type of universal consent. However, he sees, like Rousseau, that it is important that 
the law be an expression of the ethical substance of the community. Hegel holds that the law 
emerges from the activities of the collective and evolves to express those activities. It is, as such, 
the expression of the freedom of individuals acting collectively. Although in this moment 
individuals do not experience the immediate at-home-ness of the family, they nonetheless 
confront political life, in the form of the state and its laws, as something that is the expression of 
themselves — that is, they do not experience it as something fundamentally ‘other.’  
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Thus far the emphasis has been placed on the general similarities between Hegel and 
Rousseau. They each propose, to put it in the roughest terms, a three-stage movement from 
immediacy, to alienation, to reconciliation. This broad correspondence should not serve to elide 
the differences between the two thinkers, who have innumerable important divergences. Of 
particular consequence is that Hegel’s categories are sometimes vaguely historical, but mostly 
logical, while Rousseau’s stages are more explicitly chronological. For Hegel, the problem of 
immediacy and alienation is mirrored by the issue of identity and difference. For example, the 
human identity with nature is contrasted with human difference from it. The foregoing exposition 
of his Philosophy of Right suggests that there is a compromise between immediacy and 
alienation in the higher unity of family and civil society in the state. Might there also be a higher 
unity of the human identity with nature and difference from it? This central question will next be 
explored through a discussion of the key element of human difference from nature: self-
consciousness, in particular as it is described in the Phenomenology of Spirit.  
The Phenomenology occupies a somewhat awkward position in Hegel’s oeuvre. It is not 
properly part of Hegel’s ‘system,’ or his systematic philosophy, as described in the Logic. It 
describes the ascent of natural consciousness to the standpoint of absolute knowing — a 
necessary condition for his philosophy proper. Stephen Houlgate writes, “The role of the 
Phenomenology… is not to set out Hegel’s own philosophy, but to lead natural consciousness 
from its own certainties to the perspective of philosophy, and to justify such philosophy in the 
eyes of consciousness” (Houlgate 2013, 8). The Phenomenology, which was written early in 
Hegel’s career, has sometimes been regarded as the necessary frontispiece to his ‘system,’ but 
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one that can be discarded upon its completion. However, H.S. Harris holds that Hegel’s 
phenomenological study forms a necessary component of the system: “the Phenomenology 
always continued to be essential to Hegel’s system as a whole. It closes the circle of the system 
as a theory of human experience and cognition” (Harris 1995, viii). Let it suffice to say that 
while it may be a preface to Hegel’s system, it is nonetheless one that is integral and logically 
necessary. The Phenomenology is perhaps best described as a ‘phenomenological anthropology,’ 
that is, a necessarily speculative — yet logical — account the development of human cognition. 
Hegel’s purpose is to describe the development of mere ‘sense-certainty’ through a series of 
stages into the standpoint of philosophical consciousness, or absolute knowing. The present 
analysis will focus on only a few of these transitions: those leading from the immediacy of 
simple natural consciousness, to the moment when thought becomes aware of itself — self-
consciousness. It is this moment, I hold, that marks the key moment of human separation from 
the rest of the natural world. 
It is important to understand that unlike later phenomenologists who took fully developed 
human (self-)consciousness as their point of departure, Hegel begins with the simplest and most 
natural moment of consciousness (Houlgate 2013, 30). This he calls ‘sense-certainty’ and 
represents the simplest and most immediate form of cognition. It is only aware of its immediate 
object and in terms that are not in any way conceptual. Hegel describes sense-certainty as 
follows: “All that it says about what it knows is just that it is: and its truth contains nothing but 
the sheer being of the thing [Sache]. Consciousness, for its part, is in this certainty only as a pure 
‘I’; or I am in it only as a pure ‘This’, and the object similarly only as a pure ‘This’” (Hegel 
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1977, §91). It would be incorrect to equate this moment of consciousness with a primordial state 
of immediacy in which subject and object have not been separated. Clearly there is a subject and 
an object, but consciousness has yet to become aware of anything outside of its immediate 
experience. Harris writes, “Sense-experience is infinitely rich, both in the sense that we keep on 
extending its range and in the sense that we can go farther and deeper into something that we 
have experienced already. But all we can ever say at the level of immediate awareness is: ‘This 
is’ and ‘This is what I am aware of’” (Harris 1995, 23). Through a series of logical steps — a 
detailed account of which falls outside the purview of this dissertation — Hegel shows sense-
certainty to be inadequate. Put simply, with immediacy as its sole concern, sense-certainty 
eventually is confined to sheer indeterminacy, unable to grasp the determinate qualities of the 
world (Houlgate 2013, 34).  
In the next moment, ‘perception,’ consciousness no longer is interested in individual 
‘things,’ but in what it means to be a ‘type of thing.’ That is, is becomes interested in the 
properties of things (Hegel 1977, §113; Harris 1995, 25). Consciousness is now well on its way 
to conceptual thinking. Importantly, the introduction of general properties of things means that 
things are now understood as a combination of being and not-being. Houlgate writes, “the 
simple, immediate this proved not just to be simple and immediate — not just to be this — but to 
be the unity of being and not-being. For perception, therefore, the object explicitly combines 
being this with not just being this” (Houlgate 2013, 46). The subjective and objective parts of 
consciousness are now clearly differentiated (Harris 1995, 25). It is more than likely that it is this 
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cognitive development that separates human consciousness from that of all other higher animals. 
It is an important movement toward conceptual thinking.  
However, for Hegel, perception is inadequate because although it grasps concepts, it sees 
them as one-sided and abstract (Houlgate 2013, 56). The ‘understanding’ comes into effect as a 
way to bring opposite determinations together and show that contradiction is intrinsic to truth 
(Harris 1995, 28; Houlgate 2013, 56). The understanding begins to grasp the ‘inner being of 
things,’ but still only in the form of ‘picture thinking.’ It cannot properly comprehend the real 
relationship between essence and appearance. Houlgate holds that Hegel “is drawing attention to 
a fundamental ambiguity in the understanding’s conception of inner being: that being is the truth 
in contrast to appearance and also appearance itself as it is in truth” (Houlgate 2013, 67). The 
understanding has not yet reached the level at which it reflects back upon itself. This starts to 
change, however, when the understanding takes the ‘infinite’ as its object. Hegel explains, “Since 
this Notion of infinity is an object for consciousness, the latter is consciousness of a difference 
that is no less immediately cancelled; consciousness is for its own self, it is a distinguishing of 
that which contains no difference…” (Hegel 1977, §164).  
This is a key transition and marks an entry into the “native realm of truth” (Hegel 1977, 
§167). Here, consciousness transcends sense and perception and goes outside of itself to 
comprehend itself, but then returns into itself. Hegel writes, “self-consciousness is the reflection 
out of the being of the world of sense and perception, and is essentially the return from 
otherness” (Hegel 1977, §167). Here, consciousness is sophisticated enough to understand itself 
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as both the subject and the object of its cognition. If the progress towards conceptual thinking in 
perception seemed impressive, this is truly amazing. Hegel writes: 
Consciousness, as self-consciousness, henceforth has a double object: one is the 
immediate object, that of sense-certainty and perception, which however for self-
consciousness has the character of a negative; and the second, viz. itself, which is 
the true essence, and is present in the first instance only as opposed to the first 
object. In this sphere, self-consciousness exhibits itself as the movement in which 
the antithesis is removed, and the identity of itself with itself becomes explicit for 
it.  15
This development occurs relatively early in Hegel’s Phenomenology. It is still a long road to the 
attainment of absolute knowing. Even here, though, Hegel hints at a certain identity between 
subject and object, which will characterize the culmination of his phenomenological exploration. 
More to the point, however, this self-reflexive moment of consciousness decisively establishes 
the cognition of human beings as distinct from that of all other known organic entities. It is 
thinking that is aware of itself as such. There is no evidence that even the most intelligent and 
complex of non-human animals are able to conceive of themselves as both subject and object of 
their own consciousness. In the Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel writes, “it is his identity as 
consciousness of himself that distinguishes man from nature in general, and particularly from 
animals, which do not achieve a grasp of themselves as ‘I,’ i.e., as their pure self-unity” (Hegel 
1991, 181). This capacity is the foundation of what makes humans distinct from non-human 
nature. It also offers the opportunity to contemplate the specialness of human cognition, to be 
amazed by the sophistication of our consciousness.  
 Hegel 1977, §167.15
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Just as self-consciousness distinguishes humans from nature, it also allows them to 
further distinguish themselves through their labour. Self-consciousness eventually achieves 
mutual recognition in the self-consciousness of another human. This leads to what Hegel calls a 
‘life and death struggle.’ At this point self-consciousness tries to deny its need for an ‘other.’ The 
two selves struggle to show that they are pure freedom and have no attachments whatsoever. This 
is not, Houlgate notes, a struggle to stay alive, but an effort to show “just how little life matters 
to them” (Houlgate 2013, 94). Although only one of the selves can win this struggle, it lets the 
other self continue to live as its bondsperson. This stage is the ‘master-slave’ dialectic and is the 
subject of a great deal of Hegel scholarship, particularly Marxist. Indeed, it represents a key 
phase in subject-object dialectics, and by extension, human-ecological dialectics. Of particular 
interest for the present exposition is Hegel’s introduction of the category of labour. Although the 
slave is imprisoned, this self comes to enjoy greater freedom than the master (Hegel 1977, 
§193-194). The slave, as labouring craftsperson, comes to see its own negativity and freedom in 
the form of its objectified work. Hegel writes, 
For, in fashioning the thing, the bondsman’s own negativity, his being-for-self, 
becomes an object for him only through his setting at nought the existing shape 
confronting him. But this objective negative moment is none other than the alien 
being before which it has trembled. Now, however, he destroys this alien negative 
moment, posits himself as a negative in the permanent order of things, and thereby 
becomes for himself, someone existing on his own account.  16
In short, human consciousness comes to see its own independence and essential freedom only 
through the labour process (Hegel 1977, §195-197).  
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This development, and its human-ecological implications, require some unpacking. To 
put the issue in more straightforward terms, human beings consciously and deliberately 
transform elements of the natural, objective world — this is called labour. Their subjectivities 
enter the objective world, and change it, making it their own. In the things that they produce, 
human see not only the products of their own labour, but they see themselves objectified. 
Furthermore, they also hereby come to understand their essential freedom. This moment conveys 
some important facts about the human relationship to (and place within) nature. First, human 
subjectivity is able to self-consciously distinguish itself from its object, and therefore, from 
nature. This negative moment, in which the human self posits itself as both in the object of its 
labour and as radically free from it, is the province of no other animal. It is a uniquely human 
faculty. Interestingly, Hegel notes that this moment of the self-realization of human freedom 
requires that consciousness be both in its object and outside of it. By extension, it can be argued 
that humans are both inside, or a part of, nature, but also fundamentally separate from it — 
simultaneously. Second, although radical freedom is one side of human freedom, it can only be 
fully realized in connection with objectivity. The natural object is an essential condition for the 
recognition of our own creative, subjective capacities. As a negative moment, consciousness 
must posit itself as not something — nature — to realize that it is truly free. As such, the 
objectivity of the natural world provides the necessary ground for human being, and for the 
fulfillment of human freedom.  
In the foregoing the category of ‘nature’ is largely undefined. It is probably best 
understood in its most general sense as the entire objective world that includes both humanity 
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and all that is non-human. However, the purpose of this dissertation is to explore the human 
relationship to those parts of nature that are biological and ecological — the life that is in nature. 
Hegel’s attention to this aspect of nature is most evident in his discussion of the ‘observation of 
nature’ stage. Here, consciousness has progressed further toward absolute knowing and is called 
‘Reason.’ It is no longer focused on its difference from the world — as in self-consciousness — 
but now sees itself return into the world. Hegel writes, “Now that self-consciousness is Reason, 
its hitherto negative relation to otherness turns around into a positive relation” (Hegel 1977, 
§232). Reason, now seeing itself as part of the world, seeks to go out into and observe the world: 
“Reason now has… a universal interest in the world, because it is certain of its presence in the 
world, or that the world present to it is rational. It seeks its ‘other’, knowing that therein it 
possesses nothing else but itself: it seeks only its own infinitude” (Hegel 1977, §240).  
A key element of Reason’s observation of the world is its observation of nature. It is clear 
that nature — broadly conceived — provides the necessary grounding for the development of 
human consciousness, when it is taken up through labouring activity. However, Harris holds that 
at the level of observing Reason, when consciousness observes nature Hegel’s concern is 
specifically ecological. Harris writes that Reason “observes ‘Nature’… as a living system, not as 
a mechanical/chemistic system of forces…” (Harris 1995, 49). Furthermore, understanding that 
Hegel has in mind specifically what is alive about nature aids greatly in understanding the 
development of Reason. Harris writes, “But if we keep a tight hold on the fact that it is the ‘life’ 
of Nature as a whole that is the object of Rational Observation, we shall be able to understand 
what happens” (Harris 1995, 49). This is of crucial importance because it is not simply ‘nature,’ 
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broadly conceived, that acts as a critical stepping stone in the development of human 
consciousness. Rather, it is nature as an ecological totality — nature as a system of living, 
interconnected, biological entities. In other words, Hegel argues that the development of Reason 
requires more than exposure to nature as mere objectivity; it must observe nature as ecology.  
After passing through two more principal stages, Spirit and Religion, each of which has 
many sub-transitions, conscious reaches the culmination of its phenomenological development 
— Absolute Knowing. Human consciousness has now developed to the properly scientific 
standpoint, from which Hegel’s philosophy proper commences. Consciousness can now enter the 
realm of philosophical science because it understands its own categories to be the same as those 
of the objective world. Houlgate writes, “Absolute knowing… understands there to be an 
essential identity between human self-consciousness and absolute being” (Houlgate 2013, 186). 
Likewise, David Bedford holds, “Hegel tried to solve the Cartesian problem of how thought and 
extension are commensurate by a historical phenomenology of consciousness” (Bedford 1991, 
371). Hegel’s Phenomenology accomplishes precisely this through a phenomenological 
anthropology — a description of the historical development of human consciousness. In the final 
stage of this development, Absolute Knowing, consciousness reaches the level of philosophical 
science, and the concepts of thought are true to their objects. It is not the case, as is commonly 
asserted, that Hegel collapses the difference between subject and object, reducing them to an 
undifferentiated unity. His point, rather, is that subject and object share a fundamental identity. 
Hegel writes: 
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In this knowing, then, Spirit has concluded the movement in which it has shaped 
itself, in so far as this shaping was burdened with the difference of 
consciousness… a difference now overcome. Spirit has won the pure element of 
its existence, the Notion. The content, in accordance with the freedom of its being, 
is the self-alienating Self, or the immediate unity of self-knowledge. The pure 
movement of this alienation, considered in connection with the content, 
constitutes the necessity of the content.  17
The standpoint of Absolute Knowing is possible only through a partial transcendence of the 
alienation of thinking from the rest of nature. Bedford explains, “Hegel’s thought is a 
historicizing of Spinoza’s pantheism. As attributes of God-nature, thought and extension are 
ontologically similar and their commensurability is guaranteed by this fact. This unity provides 
the ground for philosophic thought and for practical human existence” (Bedford 1994, 372). In 
this view, Hegel’s phenomenology preserves both the freedom of the subject as described by 
Rousseau, and the objective totality of Greek cosmology.  
This picture is complicated by Hegel’s recognition that the subject is always mediated 
from its object; his view does not posit a simple unmediated unity. Absolute knowing is made 
possible because thought and being are, as Bedford notes, ontologically similar; but, more 
specifically, the two poles contain identical categories. Stated differently, the categories of 
knowing are identical to the categories of being. But the mediation of subject and object is still 
necessary because they are also different. Thus, in his Encyclopaedia Logic Hegel writes, “If… 
we say that ‘the Absolute is the unity of the subjective and the objective,’ that is certainly correct; 
but it is still one-sided, in that it expresses only the aspect of unity… whereas in fact… the 
subjective and objective are not only identical but also distinct” (Hegel 1991, §82). This notion, 
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an early echo of Adorno, is extremely illuminating for any theory of human ecology. Hegel is 
asserting the simultaneous identity of subject and object, while also avoiding the mistake of 
turning them into a single entity. They are separate things, that share an important equivalence. 
The same can be said of the relationship of humans to non-human nature: we are distinct from it, 
yet we share a fundamental identity with it.  
It is one of Hegel’s great strengths that he refuses to keep opposite categories too far 
apart. This has been shown in the foregoing with respect to the identity and distinction of subject 
and object. In a related sense, Hegel also posits a concurrence of mediation and immediacy. The 
Doctrine of Essence, as described in the Encyclopaedia Logic, proposes, in Hegel’s words, “the 
essential self-positing unity of immediacy and mediation” (Hegel 1991, §65). We may 
extrapolate from this that human being shares an immediacy with the natural world, but is also 
mediated from it. This eventually shows itself, once again, to be a synchronicity of identity and 
difference. Hegel writes: 
It is of great importance to reach an adequate understanding of the true 
significance of identity, and this means above all that it must not be interpreted 
merely as abstract identity, i.e., as identity that excludes distinction. This is the 
point that distinguishes all bad philosophy from what alone deserves the name of 
philosophy.  18
What Hegel calls ‘abstract identity’ refers to the notion of a simple unity of subject and object, 
thought and being, or humanity and nature. He is warning against adopting this point of view 
because the two sides are always distinct even if they have fundamental similarities. Here, Hegel 
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offers a valuable theoretical apparatus for understanding the complicated — even contradictory 
— relationship that humans share with the ecological world.  
His importance for ecological politics has been understudied because Hegel does not deal 
explicitly with the ecology, nor does he even seem — in his most widely read works — to be 
particularly concerned with the broader category of nature. For example, a superficial reading of 
the first pages of his Encyclopaedia Logic reveals an explicit anthropocentric prejudice. Here 
Hegel writes: 
To begin with, philosophy can be determined in general terms as a thinking 
consideration of ob-jects. But if it is correct (as indeed it is), that the human being 
distinguishes itself from the animals by thinking, then everything human is human 
because it is brought about through thinking, and for that reason alone.  19
Furthermore, Hegel’s work has been read as arrogating all meaning to the subject. More 
specifically, this refers to Theodor Adorno’s accusation that Hegel posits a ‘primacy of the 
subject,’ in which it is the thinking subject is the locus of all meaning and truth. This notion will 
be considered in more detail in a later chapter on Adorno. Despite these possible shortcomings, 
Hegel does, I hold, offer several important contributions to an adequate theory of human ecology.  
First, Hegel gives a very good foundation for appreciating the ‘specialness’ of human 
self-consciousness. Human cognition reaches heights to which no other natural entity may hope. 
Most importantly, human consciousness becomes aware of itself as both the subject and the 
object of its thinking. The subject infuses its own particularity and creativity into the objective 
world through its labour, and thereby develops itself — both at the level of the individual and the 
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species — much like Rousseau’s conception of perfectibility. Second, Hegel shows that one of 
the necessary conditions of human self-consciousness — and therefore of human specialness — 
is nature. This is not only the general category of objective nature, as is required for the 
labouring process. It is also the specifically living, or ecological, aspects of nature, which Hegel 
says are necessary for the development of reason. Third, it has been argued that by positing a 
fundamental identity between subject and object, Hegel encourages us to see nature as more than 
just the mere stuff by which we fashion ourselves. Harris writes: 
The threat to our living environment posed by the great increase in human 
technological power has necessitated a radical inversion of the traditional view of 
Nature as the stable backdrop of our lives. For the future, we must conceive our 
place in Nature as practical (i.e., morally responsible) terms, but it is still the 
‘identity theory’ of objective idealism that we require for the practical Philosophy 
of Nature that we must now construct. That “Concept” is articulated better in 
Hegel’s Phenomenology and Logic than anywhere else.  20
In other words, Hegel helps us to see that nature is not merely the ‘backdrop of our lives,’ but 
something with which we share an essential similarity and is therefore worth conserving.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is a key lesson about the human relationship 
with nature that is contained in the general movement of Hegel’s subject-object dialectics. As 
evidenced by his Philosophy of Right, there is a dialectical movement from immediacy, to 
alienation, to reconciliation. Rousseau shows, and Hegel does not disagree, that a return to pure 
immediacy is impossible. Humans cannot return to nature. However, it is currently the case that 
we are severely alienated from nature. ‘Nature’ in the most general sense is not a useful term 
here, because we are never more or less alienated from the objective world. Still, we are 
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undeniably alienated from the ‘ecology,’ with its myriad biological and ecological processes. In 
other words, it is the life in nature from which we are estranged. Hegel’s dialectical method 
suggests that by realizing our identity with the living parts of nature we can achieve some form 
of reconciliation. It is also the case that we will only fully appreciate the enchantment of the 
ecological world, and of our special place within it, when we understand this fundamental — but 
not abstract — identity.  
Karl Marx 
Despite his own insistence that identity not be ‘abstract,’ or one-sided, Hegel is frequently 
accused of favouring abstraction at the expense of the concrete, or of preferring the ideational to 
the material. Chief among his accusers is Karl Marx. A confused binary is often cited in relation 
to Hegel and Marx, in which the former is an idealist, the latter a materialist. Just as frequently, it 
is asserted ‘Marx stood Hegel’s dialectic on its head,’ by making the method materialist rather 
than idealist. The foregoing examination of Hegel’s subject-object theory has shown this 
simplistic characterization to be false. Hegel did devote considerable attention to objective 
nature, and especially its real, concrete, living, elements. However, on the whole in his social and 
political philosophy Marx does pay considerably more attention to historical specificities and the 
real conditions under which individuals live. Just as in Rousseau and Hegel, one of the key 
concepts in Marx’s thought is free, self-directed labour.  
Marx’s oeuvre is extensive, as is his influence on social and political thought. 
Accordingly, there is a vast secondary literature devoted to his work. More so than Rousseau and 
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Hegel, Marx’s work in many cases speaks directly to contemporary ecological issues. Ecological 
Marxism has become, since its inception in the 1980’s, an important subfield of Marxist 
scholarship. Writers such as James O’Connor, Ted Benton, and more recently John Bellamy 
Foster, have offered highly developed and sophisticated studies on all aspects of the ecological 
consequence of Marx’s work. A thorough analysis of all of the ecological implications of Marx’s 
thought, or even an overview of the field of ecological Marxism would be far outside the scope 
of this dissertation. Instead, the exposition focusses on three of Marx’s ‘early’ works: The 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, the Theses on Feuerbach, and The German 
Ideology. These works are of particular significance because in them Marx deals with the 
subject-object relationship, and often conceptualizes this relation explicitly as one between 
humanity and nature.  
Like Rousseau, Marx recognizes that the transformation of nature that engenders the 
historical process is both a natural and social phenomenon. It is a process that can only take place 
if active, conscious, human beings interact with an objective natural world. Marx’s contribution 
is to focus on the specifically material and concrete elements of that relationship. Marx 
recognizes the necessity of the natural world. However, his thought is humanist in a strict sense, 
because he restricts the creation of meaning to the human labouring process. Marx is critically 
important because he continues to develop the subject-object/human-nature dialectic described 
by Rousseau and Hegel. The embeddedness of human consciousness and labour within natural, 
ecological processes is a central part of this relationship. Marx’s early writings also offer a very 
convincing description of what makes humans qualitatively different from all other animals, and 
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thereby special, or even ‘enchanted.’ Where Marx falls short, it will be argued, is in his refusal to 
acknowledge the meaning or value that is to be found in those parts of nature that have not been 
manipulated by human labour.  
A final note concerns the status of Marx’s early works. Marx’s early writings, especially 
the 1844 Manuscripts, are often not taken seriously by Marxist scholars. There are, of course, 
notable exceptions. For example, Maximilien Rubel, argues in his essay “Socialism and Ethics” 
for the consistency of the early and later works, and the importance of Marx’s ethical outlook in 
his youthful writings (Rubel 1981). Bertell Ollman holds that the theory of alienation that 
grounds Marx’s early work is a central facet of his indictment of the degradation to which 
capitalism submits the labourer (Ollman 1973, 131). By and large however, Marxists insist that 
these works are part of an ‘immature’ phase in Marx’s philosophical development, and are 
‘idealist,’ or ‘pragmatist’ (Lee 1980, 4). Thankfully, ‘Marxological’ debates are neither 
interesting nor important. The congruence, or lack thereof, of the early writings with Marx’s 
later, ‘mature,’ ‘scientific,’ works, i.e. Captial, is of importance only to those who seek the word 
of God in the writing of the German philosopher. The uniquely humanist outlook presented in 
Marx’s early compositions is convincing in its own right, and is worth taking seriously whether 
or not it is entirely consistent with his later work. Donald C. Lee holds that this humanist side of 
Marx must be appreciated to bring forth his ecological insights. Lee writes, “the ‘orthodox’ 
Marxists have been extremely critical of the Marxist ‘humanists’ (such as Sartre, Garaudy and 
Marcuse) who have incorporated those early humanist works into their Marxism world view. 
My… position is that both Marxism and capitalism are greedy, violent, and destructive of nature 
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unless they are ameliorated by that humanistic view” (Lee 1980, 4). As always, the significance 
of any theoretical work must be judged on its explanatory potential as well as its logical and 
empirical validity, not whether it represents what Marx, or any other thinker, ‘actually thought.’  
The Paris Manuscripts are centrally important to the view offered by this dissertation 
because they establish a strong humanism, but one that sees our relationship to nature as being 
the essential facet of human being-in-the-world. That is, what makes humans special, unique 
amongst the higher animals, is the character of our interaction with nature. Before elaborating on 
this point, it is useful to begin with Marx’s description of humanity as embedded within the 
ecological world. In The German Ideology, Marx, with co-author Friedrich Engels, writes, “The 
production of life, both of one’s own labour and of fresh life in procreation, now appears as a 
twofold relation: on the one hand as a natural, on the other as a social relation…” (Marx and 
Engels 1998, 48-49). In this text, the notion of a relationship with nature is essential to Marx’s 
development of a materialist conception of history. The basic condition for the study of all 
history, hold Marx and Engels, is the relationship with non-human nature. They write, “Thus the 
first fact to be established is the physical organization of [human] individuals and their 
consequent relation to the rest of nature…. All historical writing must set out from these natural 
bases and their modification in the course of history through the action of men” (Marx and 
Engels 1998, 37). Physical nature, then, is both the primary basis and first determinant in the 
development of history. In other words, history unfolds as humans produce and reproduce their 
means of existence, but those means are in the first place determined by natural conditions. In the 
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Paris Manuscripts, Marx also describes natural material as a necessary condition for the 
reproduction of human existence: 
The worker can create nothing without nature, without the sensuous external 
world. It is the material in which his labour realizes itself, in which it is active and 
from which and by means of which it produces. But just as nature provides labour 
with the means of life in the sense that labour cannot live without objects on 
which to exercise itself, so also it provides the means of life in the narrower sense, 
namely the means of physical subsistence of the worker.  21
So Marx begins from the point of natural necessity. He has already introduced the category of 
labour, and made it clear that labour cannot occur without nature. Even more elementary than its 
role as the canvas of human labour, nature provides the actual physical basis for human 
existence. This is an obvious point: humans cannot live without nature.  
The dependence on physical nature is a character that humans share with all other non-
human species. What makes humans different from all other species, according to Marx, is that 
we are a ‘species-being,’ which means that we produce consciously and freely. Marx writes, 
“The whole character of a species, its species-character, resides in the nature of its life activity, 
and free conscious activity constitutes the species-character of man” (Marx 1992, 328). What 
Marx means by free, conscious activity is best understood by comparison to animals that do not 
possess this capacity: “The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It is not distinct from 
that activity; it is that activity” (Marx 1992, 328). In other words, the (non-human) animal is 
defined by how it interacts with nature. To be sure, many higher animals, particularly omnivores, 
interact with nature in a variety of ways. Still, such interaction is always governed by necessity. 
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In contrast, humans interact with nature consciously and freely. As Marx describes it, “Man 
makes his life activity itself an object of his will and consciousness. He has conscious life 
activity” (Marx 1992, 328). This is a difficult point with which to disagree, and establishes a 
special place for human being in the ecological world.  
The outcome of the ability to interact with nature freely and to produce consciously is 
that humans produce universally. They are not limited to one type of interaction with nature. 
Animals, holds Marx, 
produce one-sidedly, while man produces universally; they produce only when 
immediate physical need compels them to do so, while man produces even when 
he is free from physical need and truly produces only in freedom from such need; 
they produce only themselves, while man reproduces the whole of nature; their 
products belong immediately to their physical bodies, while man freely confronts 
his own product.  22
There is a basic commonality here with the ontologies of Rousseau and Hegel. Marx sees that 
humans hold the special capacity of self-consciousness. For Rousseau, this ability allowed 
humans to deny the call of nature, which is binding on all other animals. Marx has a much more 
specifically ecological and materialist angle; free, conscious labour allows humans to choose 
how the interact with nature, and therefore how they produce and reproduce themselves.  
For Hegel, labour is the process through which an individual subjectivity externalizes 
itself, or puts itself into the objective world. Marx borrows heavily from this conception of 
labour. He argues that through labouring activity, humans make nature their ‘inorganic’ bodies, 
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or an extension of their own bodies. This arises directly from the fact that humans can labour 
universally. Marx explains: 
The universality of man manifests itself in practice in that universality which 
makes the whole of nature his inorganic body, (1) as a direct means of life and (2) 
as the matter, the object and the tool of his life activity. Nature is man’s inorganic 
body, that is to say nature in so far as it is not the human body. Man lives from 
nature, i.e. nature is his body, and he must maintain a continuing dialogue with it 
if he is not to die. To say that man’s physical and mental life in linked to nature 
simply means that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature.  23
This passage is instructive because it describes, and brings together, both the deep embeddedness 
of humans within the ecology and their special place in it as universal, free, conscious, creative 
producers. That is, it is not a problem for Marx that humans beings are deeply physically linked 
to nature, but are also endowed with unique powers that distinguish them from all other species. 
However, it is crucial that we recognize this fact of our being, that we understand nature as our 
‘inorganic body.’ Lee holds, “This recognition of nature as our body will constitute the 
overcoming of the alienation of ourselves from nature, manifested in subject-object dualism. 
Thus, the identity between supposedly external nature and human nature will be established. To 
act upon nature will be correctly seen as acting upon ourselves” (Lee 1980, 8). Of course, for a 
variety of reasons, we are collectively unable to make this recognition, and continue to see nature 
as essentially ‘other.’  
Like Rousseau, Marx takes issue with the social reality with which he is confronted. 
Rousseau’s target was modernity, while Marx is more specifically critical of capitalism. In his 
earlier writings there is a strong sense of the difference between fact and truth — between the 
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facts of actually existing social conditions and the truth of human being in the world. The truth of 
human being, the essence of what it means to be human, is for Marx the capacity to freely and 
consciously interact with nature. The fact is that capitalist labour — because it is highly divided, 
both socially and technically — alienates humans from the truth of their being. He writes, “In 
tearing away the object of his production from man, estranged labour therefore tears away from 
him his species-life, his true species-objectivity, and transforms his advantage over animals into 
the disadvantage that his inorganic body, nature, is taken away from him” (Marx 1992, 329). For 
Rousseau the unique human capacity of perfectibility is the root of unequal and immoral social 
relations. It is also the only hope for restoring or recovering something free and authentic to 
human life. The same is true for Marx. Unjust social relations, and our alienation from our 
human essence, are possible only if humans are in someway radically separate from nature, if we 
enter the realm of history and are no longer bound by the laws of nature. The capacity to freely 
and consciously transform both nature and ourselves is the only hope for regaining control over 
our own destiny as a species. There is nothing natural or necessary about particular social 
relations, and they are therefore entirely changeable. Of course, as Marx reminds us in the 
“Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte” that history does “weigh on the brain of the 
living” (Marx 1973b, 398). Non-alienating labour, possible only in a post-capitalist society, 
would do away not only with deleterious social relations, but also allow humans to reconnect 
with their unique creative capacities. Indeed, it is a necessary condition for true human 
emancipation. Ted Benton writes, “The view of communism which structures the whole of the 
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Manuscripts gives a central place to a proper ethical, aesthetic and cognitive relationship to 
nature as inseparable to true human fulfilment” (Benton 1988, 4).  
For Marx, then, nature clearly has a central place in the material and social life of 
humans. However, it does not seem that it is the case for Marx that nature itself is alive, or 
permeated by activity. In the “Paris Manuscripts,” the noun ‘nature’ is frequently preceded by the 
adjective ‘inorganic,’ signifying an absence of life. To be sure, animals are described as active 
beings, but they too interact with “inorganic nature.” In Marx’s most explicit treatment of ‘the 
active side,’ in his “Theses on Feuerbach,” he derides materialist philosophy for failing to 
account for activity. He writes, “The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism… is that the 
thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but 
not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively” (Marx 1973a, 13). This has not been a 
problem, holds Marx, for idealist philosophy, which the above analysis of Hegel shows to be 
true. Nonetheless, idealism does not properly grasp human labouring activity. It is Marx’s aim in 
the theses to ground the active side of human being in material practice — labour. But ‘activity,’ 
the truly alive component, is ultimately confined to human consciousness for Marx. True, 
conscious labour may be a social activity, shared amongst multiple individuals. Still, the thinking 
side of substance is never extended beyond this form of activity into the rest of nature. 
Conclusion 
Building on Rousseau’s key insights, Hegel and Marx each present differing ways to 
conceptualize the subject-object relationship, as well as that between humans and nature. There 
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are divergences between the three thinkers, yet in many cases they are differences of emphasis 
and nuance. In all three cases, the category of self-conscious human labour is central. Each of 
these philosophers see humans as special animals, capable of transforming themselves through 
the historical process. This unique feature sets humans apart from all other species, which 
undergo only biological, evolutionary change. To be sure, this does not mean that humans do not 
need nature. Quite the opposite. Rousseau argues that we can never abandon biological 
foundations. Hegel sees nature as the necessary basis for the development of human 
consciousness. Marx argues that nature provides not only the bases for physical life, but the raw 
material with which humans can labour and generate meaning. Humans are in and of nature, yet 
they can go beyond it, transcend its laws, in important ways. The central theme developed in this 
chapter is that such powers arise from humans' faculty of self-consciousness, which allows them 
to interact with nature consciously, freely, creatively, and universally. On this matter, it might be 
observed that Hegel and Marx differ from Rousseau in one key way. While the latter saw human 
reason as largely disenchanting, the Germans often seem to succumb to a certain ‘enchantment of 
reason.’ With this comes a faith in progress and a dedication to the mastery of nature that 
Rousseau would have found distressing. As Donald C. Lee has noted, however, because we are 
conscious of our relationship with nature, we are also responsible for it. In the present 
conjuncture, in which our treatment of nature is remarkably destructive, we ought to think more 
about our responsibilities. While they do not give specific answers, these philosophers in the 
‘historical-dialectical’ tradition do encourage such a sense of responsibility by increasing our 
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understanding of our place in nature. This line of thinking will be carried even further by Adorno 
and Marcuse, the subjects of the following chapter.  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Chapter 4: Adorno, Marcuse, and Human Ecology 
Introduction 
To this point the analysis has focused on the subject-object problem to discuss the ways 
in which humans are both identical to and different from the rest of nature. Rousseau, Hegel, and 
Marx each look at the issue from a slightly different angle, and with differing emphasis. This 
chapter turns to some of the great 20th century inheritors of the historical-dialectical tradition: 
the Frankfurt School thinkers, specifically Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse. While they 
largely employ the same framework as the three thinkers discussed in the previous chapter, 
Adorno and Marcuse bring new ideas to the table. Adorno directly confronts the identity of 
subject (concept) and object, criticizing what he sees as a totalizing solution offered by Hegel. In 
his critique of Hegel, Adorno has much to offer human ecology. His concept of the ‘residue of 
the object’ points to something fundamentally ‘other’ in the non-human world, that which can 
never be fully covered under (human) conceptual categories. At the same time, the ‘distinct’ can 
‘participate in one another,’ suggesting forms of reconciliation between humans and nature. 
Meanwhile, Marcuse offers the theory that human separation from nature actually exists in 
degrees, determined in large part by the prevailing socio-economic system. Finally, I will discuss 
Marcuse’s work on art and aesthetics, particularly the notion that the work of art has 
revolutionary, emancipatory potential. Changing the analytical direction slightly, I show that the 
aesthetic experience of nature offers similar possibilities.  
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Adorno: The Preponderance of the Object 
Adorno, like Rousseau, Hegel and Marx, takes on the issue left by Descartes: the 
relationship of subjectivity to the objective world. Adorno’s method borrows substantially from 
Immanuel Kant and Hegel. In many ways his position occupies a sort of middle ground between 
the two greats of German idealism. Still, it will be obvious that Adorno comes to a position that 
is very much his own. While the analysis of the subject-object question has thus far used 
precisely that terminology — subject and object — Adorno is primarily interested in the 
relationship of concepts to their objects. To be sure, concepts are subjective categories and 
Adorno’s work therefore clearly falls into the class of subject-object dialectics. However, this 
terminological nuance indicates that in many ways Adorno’s concern is epistemological rather 
than ontological. Fortunately, this in no way diminishes Adorno’s importance for understanding 
the human relationship with nature. Adorno’s exploration of the relationship between 
subjectivity/concepts and objects yields two central theoretical formulations. First, the notion of 
the preponderance of the object means that objectivity, here conceived as nature, always comes 
before subjectivity and the categories of knowing.  Concepts may begin to describe their 24
objects, but they are never adequate to them. There is always something about the object that 
defies classification, that we cannot subsume under a concept. So, the natural/ecological world 
precedes human subjectivity epistemologically and ontologically. Furthermore, there are some 
 This leaves open the difficult question of the priority of ‘social’ or ‘historical’ objectivity. For example Marx 24
emphasizes the weight of the (historical) past on the present social reality, and Weber advances the idea of 
‘developmental tendencies,’ whereby historical formations or institutions assume a kind of social ‘objectivity.’
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things about nature that we can never grasp with our conceptual thinking. There is something 
beyond us, a part of nature that we must understand as fundamentally ‘other,’ if not enchanted. 
Second,  in his essay “Subject and Object” Adorno introduces the notion of “the distinct 
participating in each other” (Adorno 1982a, 500 ). This means that, contra George Lukács’s 
argument in History and Class Consciousness, subject and object never fully merge. They 
remain distinct, but mutually influence one another, just as do humans and the ecology.  
From the opening pages of their Dialectic of Enlightenment it is clear that the concept of 
nature is a key category for Horkheimer and Adorno. Looking back to Bacon, they show that 
enlightenment and scientific rationality have ‘disenchanted’ nature in their effort to control it 
(Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 2). They write, “The disenchantment of the world means the 
extirpation of animism” (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 2). This means not only that nature is 
increasingly understood as the mere ‘stuff’ of experience, as inert lifeless matter, but also that 
humans progressively distance themselves from it (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 2-7). In sum, 
for Horkheimer and Adorno the capacity for reason is responsible for the estrangement of 
humans from nature, and the goal of philosophy and politics should be some form of 
reconciliation. In her analysis of Dialectic of Enlightenment Deborah Cook emphasizes the 
phylogenetic importance of the capacity for reason. She holds that for Horkheimer and Adorno 
humans are never truly outside of nature, but they can assert themselves against it using reason 
(Cook 2011, 65; c.f. Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 42). The use of concepts is central both to 
understanding the world and dominating it (Cook 2011, 66-7). Concepts are human creations, 
and are therefore essentially ‘of nature,’ like humans. However, also like humans, they may have 
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an alienated, or reified existence. Adorno calls this ‘hypostasization’ (Adorno 2007, 140). Cook’s 
account evokes Rousseau’s description of the phylogenesis of the human species (Rousseau 
1987, 48-51; c.f. Horowitz 1987, 76). However, Cook remarks that in Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
analysis, there is a Freudian element that suggests that reason can also participate in the 
repression of internal nature, specifically instincts (Cook 2011, 66-7). Yet it is also this capacity 
that allows the domination of external nature and the development of civilization. The crucial 
point is that there is something that is fundamentally different about humans — the capacity for 
reason — that sets them against nature. Of course, Cook notes that for Adorno this special 
capacity does not mean that nature is ever left behind. Following Marx, Adorno argued for the 
entwinement of nature and history (Cook 2011, 10-24). Humans are, then, both inside and 
outside of nature. For Adorno, though, the extent of the human continuity with the ecology is 
derived from his materialism. That is, humans are continuous with nature because they are 
materially embedded within it. However, humans are more than material beings — they are 
spiritual beings as well. Without a more robust metaphysics, Adorno’s strongest claim about 
subject and object, and hence humans and their ecology, is that “Peace is the state of distinctness 
without domination, with the distinct participating in each other” (Adorno 1982a, 500). If the 
other, the object, is to actively participate in the subject, then it must be thoroughly ‘re-
enchanted,’ to use the terminology of Dialectic of Enlightenment. Unfortunately, Adorno does 
not describe such a re-enchantment.  
For Adorno the central ontological and epistemological problems are constitutive 
subjectivity (Kant) and identity thinking (Hegel). In the case of the former all meaning is 
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arrogated to the transcendental subject, which imposes its own categories on the objective world. 
This perspective necessarily descends into a form of relativism. Identity philosophy, on the other 
hand, attempts to subsume all objects under universal concepts, forgetting what is particular and 
unique about each individual. This, Adorno says, leads to totalizing thinking and totalitarian 
politics. Adorno's alternative is contained in his conceptions of preponderance of the object and 
non-identity philosophy. This approach seeks to avoid both the skepticism that characterizes 
Kant's epistemology, and the absolute certainly at which Hegel arrives. To be sure, Adorno 
proposes not merely a middle ground, but a proper synthesis of the two poles (Adorno 2007, 35). 
Importantly, this means a balancing of the identity and non-identity of subject and object. More 
specifically, Adorno’s thinking helps to bring together the categories mediation and immediacy. 
If such a compromise or synthesis characterizes Adorno's epistemological views, the same is true 
of his thinking on the possibility of normative claims. On the one hand, the terror of Auschwitz 
represents the pinnacle of identity thinking, of absolutism, for Adorno. But on the other hand, he 
wishes at all costs to avoid relativism. Adorno is often dismissed by today's radical left as being 
ultimately pessimistic about the prospects of progressive political transformation. However, the 
present analysis argues that his final claim concerning subject and object — namely, that “Peace 
is the state of distinctness without domination, with the distinct participating in each 
other” (Adorno 1982a, 500) — represents his commitment to a truly radical and progressive 
political project. This claim is substantiated with reference to some of Adorno’s more directly 
political works, in particular the posthumously released Towards a New Manifesto, which present 
a series of his political conversations with Max Horkheimer (Adorno and Horkheimer 2001). As 
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it concerns the present analysis, this means that like the thinkers discussed in the previous 
chapter, Adorno brings together the sameness of subject and object, while also acknowledging 
that they are distinct. However, Adorno offers new and important insights. It will be shown that 
his notion of the distinct participating in one another is a useful way to conceptualize human 
ecology and to think about ecological politics.  
This exposition here proceeds with a discussion of the problems as they are diagnosed by 
Adorno: the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity and identity thinking. It then moves to Adorno’s 
treatment of Kant and Hegel, with particular attention to the inadequacies he finds in each 
thinker’s system. Adorno’s two interrelated correctives — preponderance of the object and non-
identity thinking — are then discussed. Then, an important interpretive point is offered 
concerning the representation of Hegel by Adorno. In short, it is shown that Hegel does not 
simply collapse subject and object, as Adorno sometimes seems to argue. Rather, Hegel shows 
that through a dialectical progression the content of subject and object becomes identical. This 
corrective provides an extra layer through which to interpret Adorno’s philosophical 
commitments and sheds lights on his politics, which are subsequently examined. Adorno’s 
approach to the problem of truth — and thereby to the possible correspondence of subject and 
object — is difficult because he wants to simultaneously avoid both absolutism and relativism. 
Thus, he holds that the “form giving constitutive elements have social sources, but on the other 
hand… they are objectively valid” (Adorno 1982a, 510). Similarly, he writes, “To predicate them 
[form-giving elements] as absolute would absolutize the cognitive function, the subject; to 
relativize them would be a dogmatic retraction of the cognitive function” (Adorno 1982a, 510). 
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The course that Adorno navigates between these two oppositional errors will be revealed in the 
course of this section. The analysis begins with Adorno’s critique of the fallacy of constitutive 
subjectivity.  
A subject that alone constitutes, or organizes, the content of experience must be 
transcendental, holds Adorno. Although idealist philosophy in general is guilty of adhering to a 
conception of the transcendental subject, it is Kant in particular whom Adorno targets. In his 
lectures on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Adorno writes, “a transcendental enquiry is an 
enquiry of mind or consciousness from the standpoint of how far it is possible for this mind to 
posit valid synthetic a priori judgements, that is, judgements that are independent of 
experience” (Adorno 1995, 19). For Adorno, there is a strong element in Kant that rejects the 
possible inherent truth content of objective experience. Insofar, however, as inquiry and the 
transcendental subject descend to the realm of empirical experience, meaning is always located 
in the activities of the subject. Adorno writes, “According to idealist doctrine, it will either 
construct the objective world with raw material along Kantian lines or, since Fichte, engender 
that world itself” (Adorno 1982a, 500).  
For Adorno, however, the transcendental/constitutive subject is neither a possible nor 
desirable solution to the constitution problem. The first problem, he holds, is that the 
transcendental subject presupposes precisely what it aims to explain, namely empirical subjects; 
the theory of the transcendental subject abstracts from real, living, concrete human beings. 
Adorno writes: 
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[T]his transcendental subject constituting the substance of experience was 
abstracted from living individuals. It is evident that the abstract concept of the 
transcendental subject — its thought forms, their unity, and the original 
productivity of consciousness — presupposes what it aims to bring about: live 
individuals.  25
Kant’s efforts to manage the tension between the transcendental and empirical sides of 
subjectivity, along with similar attempts by Hegel, Fichte and Schopenhauer, are inadequate, 
holds Adorno. Their mistake is to posit the constituting subject as unconditional and primary, 
when in fact it is very much conditional (Adorno 1982a, 500-2). The analogous mistake in 
human ecology is to assume that humanity has entirely transcended objective nature and no 
longer needs an objective, ecological basis. The truth of the subject’s status is revealed in its 
relationship with the object. Against the tradition of idealism, Adorno argues that even if subject 
and object are dialectically intertwined, the former has no primacy over the latter. Adorno goes 
so far as to assert that “Potentially, even if not actually, objectivity can be conceived without a 
subject; not so subjectivity without an object” (Adorno 1982a, 502). Today, the idea of 
materiality that exists independently of human subjectivity is the focus of renewed interest from 
the school of thought known as ‘new materialism’ (see, for example, Coole and Frost, 2010). 
Adorno’s position on this matter, the primacy or preponderance of the object, will be discussed 
below. At this point, the key idea is that for Adorno the subject absolutely depends on the object 
in a way that is totally overlooked by the tradition of German idealism (Adorno 1982a, 502). 
Moreover, he believes that this philosophical error has a clear ideological component.  
 Adorno 1982a, 500.25
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It is only within the context of a set of social relations in which the individual is 
dehumanized that the notion of a transcendental subject is necessary. “The more individuals are 
really degraded to functions of the social totality as it becomes more systematized, the more will 
man… be consoled by the exaltation of the mind,” writes Adorno (Adorno 1982a, 500; c.f. 
Adorno 2007, 180). Here, Adorno’s materialism is evident. When the real material, physical 
conditions of existence — which have an importance for Adorno that he thinks is overlooked by 
idealism — are such that individuals, as empirical subjects, are immiserated, idealism’s solution 
is to falsely aggrandize the mind. In other words, the ideational realm is held as absolute and 
primary to compensate for the material impoverishment of individuals. Furthermore, the 
abstraction from material reality that is committed by idealism in the form of transcendental 
subjectivity mirrors the abstraction necessitated by exchange relations in capitalist society. 
Adorno writes: 
What shows up faithfully in the doctrine of the transcendental subject is the 
priority of relations — abstractly rational ones, detached from the human 
individuals and their relationships — that have their model in exchange. If the 
exchange form is the standard social structure, its rationality constitutes people; 
what they are for themselves, what they seem to be to themselves, is secondary. 
They are deformed beforehand by the mechanism that has been philosophically 
transfigured as transcendental.  26
By this Adorno demonstrates the extent to which the seemingly abstract postulations of 
philosophy have a concrete political, social, and historical character. Indeed, he asserts, “Social 
critique is a critique of knowledge, and vice versa” (Adorno 1982a, 503). More specifically, 
Adorno is here inviting his readers to see that the ‘exaltation’ of the mind, or of transcendental 
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subjectivity, is an immanent necessity of capitalist exchange relations. Further, over and above its 
ideological function, the principle of constitutive subjectivity is simply wrong because it fails to 
account for the independence — and even primacy — of the object. That this represents 
Adorno’s fundamentally materialist objection to idealism is clear; its latent realism will be 
explicated below.  
If Adorno is critical of the fetishization of the subjective moment in its self-reflection and 
constitutive possibilities, he is no less suspect about the adequacy of the (subjective) concepts 
that are used to classify external objects. The impulse towards total identity, to make any given 
object completely identical with the concept under which it falls, is rampant in the history of 
western philosophy, holds Adorno. This tendency, named the ‘principle of immanence’ in 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment and later referred to as identity thinking by 
Adorno, holds that an object can be known only when it is classified and subsumed under a 
concept (Cook 2011, 69). His critique is that this predilection not only does injustice to the 
objects of experience, but it also represents the attempts of scientific rationality to completely 
dominate nature.  
To be sure, Adorno recognizes that the activity of thinking itself involves conceptual 
identification: “To think is to identify” (Adorno 2007, 5). But conceptual thinking, or identity 
thinking, looks past what is unique about each object. For Adorno, such a philosophy can never 
be adequate because there is always a remnant of particularity in each object: a characteristic that 
does not conform to the concept. Alison Stone explains the limits of identity thinking as follows: 
“conceptual thinking gives me no knowledge about what is unique in a thing, for example, what 
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is special about this dog, as distinct from all other dogs. Having no access to what is unique, 
conceptual thinking sees it only as an instance of a kind” (Stone 2008, 54). The impulse to 
identify — akin to Nietzsche’s ‘will to power‘ —  is very much connected to the scientific 
enterprise of arranging all of nature according to conceptual and explanatory frameworks. But 
Adorno suggests that the objects, the particulars of cognition, always contain more than, as well 
as something that is other than, their concepts (Cook 2011, 70). As such, concepts can never fully 
describe objects, and ultimately this means that an identity of subject and object remains illusory 
(Adorno 2007, 12). Accordingly, so too is the Promethean promise of complete knowledge and 
mastery of nature.  
For Adorno, the philosophical critique of identity thinking is carried out alongside a 
social critique of domination. In other words, identitarian philosophy is about domination. 
According to Stone, “when we conceptualize things, we dominate them in thought” (Stone 2008, 
55). Each particular object is subsumed under a universal category, and each universal category 
can be understood as a concept. Therefore, holds Stone, identity thought insinuates that the 
objects themselves can be entirely reduced to the portions of them that we can understand (Stone 
2008, 55). The project of conceptually mastering objects in thought is driven by the desire to 
control and manipulate nature (Stone 2008, 55). That is, conceptual domination is the means for 
practical domination. As Deborah Cook writes, “Subsuming objects under concepts, identity 
thinking orders, organizes and arranges these concepts in systems that describe objects in terms 
of those features that make them controllable and amenable to manipulation” (Cook 2011, 69).  
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Because concepts can never be fully adequate to their objects, Adorno believes that 
scientific rationality’s quest to dominate nature is misguided and ill-fated. In Dialectic of 
Enlightenment Adorno and Horkheimer express a deep skepticism about the scientific project 
and its impulse to dominate nature. Adorno, in his Negative Dialectics, directly implicates 
identity thinking in the terror of the Holocaust. He writes, “Auschwitz confirmed the 
philosopheme of pure identity as death” (Adorno 2007, 362). Mass murder on the scale of 
Auschwitz required that all the individual victims be stripped of their particularity, that they be 
made into concepts. Adorno writes, “in the concentration camps it was no longer an individual 
who died, but a specimen…” (Adorno 2007, 362). For Adorno, then, there is no salvaging a 
philosophy of absolute identity after Auschwitz. Before turning to an analysis of his alternatives, 
it is instructive to consider Adorno’s treatment of both Kant and Hegel.  
Adorno makes it clear that the philosophical errors of constitutive subjectivity and 
identity thought are by no means restricted to Kant and Hegel, nor even to idealism. Nonetheless, 
it is in his engagement with these two thinkers that Adorno most fully develops his critique of the 
transcendental subject and of identity philosophy, as well as his own distinctive approach. To be 
sure, Adorno believes that Kant and Hegel each commit both the fallacy of constitutive 
subjectivity and identity thinking. However, Kant’s transcendental philosophy, with its emphasis 
on the subjective categories of apperception, is a better target for Adorno’s critique of 
constitutive subjectivity. Meanwhile, Hegel’s absolute idealism, which posits the identity of the 
subjective categories of knowing with the objective categories of being, is an archetypical form 
of identity philosophy. Drawing on Adorno’s lectures on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, as well 
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as the essays in Hegel: Three Studies, this section explores Adorno’s readings of these thinkers. 
While he is critical of them both, his reverence for the doyens of German idealism is clear.  
Adorno remarks that for Kant unified experience is possible only on the basis of a set of 
categories that transcend experience. He writes, “the transcendental in Kant represents the 
transcendent nature of our minds in the sense that it supplies the conditions that make something 
like experience possible, and in that sense may be said to go beyond experience…” (Adorno 
1995, 21). However, it is only insofar as they relate to experience that such conditions can be 
said to be valid. The categories, then, transcend experience, but are immanent to the human 
mind. Indeed, they are what Adorno calls a “principle of mind and an attribute of human 
consciousness…” (Adorno 1995, 21). More to the point, Kant himself explains the situation as 
follows: “But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it arises 
out of experience” (Kant 1928, 41). This is precisely the point that Adorno makes regarding the 
idea of constitutive subjectivity: for Kant knowledge itself may start from real experience, but it 
is ultimately formed by the transcendental subject, by means of the categories of apperception 
(Adorno 1995, 33).  
According to Adorno, this leads us to an important nuance in Kant’s system. Kant tries 
simultaneously to preserve a sense of the absolute, but also refuses to allow access to things as 
they really are. Adorno writes: 
So, on the one hand, he wishes to salvage the timeless, absolutely valid 
experience of independent truth…. But on the other hand, despite this rescue 
attempt his analysis does extend ultimately into the realm of concrete 
consciousness and therefore also assumes an element of experience. And he 
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cannot uphold these propositions because they can never be free of some 
substantive elements or other.  27
In several instances, Adorno refers to Kant’s epistemological project as a salvage operation 
(Adorno 1995, 31, 85). In Adorno’s words, Kant “wishes to salvage specific fundamental 
spiritual realties that can be said to be valid for all time…” (Adorno 1995, 85). While it may be 
possible to have unconditional knowledge of those transcendent elements that make experience 
possible, the objects of cognition themselves remain beyond our grasp. Indeed, according to 
Adorno, for Kant we are able to perceive merely appearances, and the things as they are in 
themselves is impossible (Adorno 1995, 103). Ultimately, all objectivity — and Kant does not 
deny that the objective world ‘really is’ there (Adorno 1995, 101) — passes through subjectivity 
in the formation of knowledge (Adorno 1995, 33). It is in this sense, then, that Kant’s 
transcendental subject can be said to constitute the objects of experience. Or that, in the human 
experience of nature, all meaning is arrogated to the thinking subject, rather than also being 
located in ecological processes.  
Kant held separate the spiritual elements that constitute experience from the objects of 
experience, and also, therefore, form from matter. Hegel, writes Adorno, wanted to do away with 
these rigid dichotomies. He thus posited that every existing object is at the same time spiritual, 
and that form and content are mediated by one another (Adorno 1993, 57, 66). Resisting Kant’s 
insistence on the impossibility of knowing the thing-in-itself, Hegel described his own system of 
absolute idealism that would allow truly valid knowledge of the objects of experience (Adorno 
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1993, 64). This idealism is ‘absolute’ because it overcomes the tension between subjective and 
objective idealism. Adorno describes this process as follows: 
If, as in Hegel, in the totality everything ultimately collapses into the subject as 
absolute spirit, idealism thereby cancels itself out, because no difference remains 
through which the subject would be identified as something distinct, as subject. 
Once the object has become subject in the absolute, the object is no longer 
inferior vis-à-vis the subject.  28
In other words, “the difference between subject and object disappears” (Adorno 1993, 72).  
Unfortunately, several nuances are lost in this rather blunt interpretation of Hegel. 
Elsewhere Adorno takes aim at Lukács for his Hegelianism, or more specifically for completely 
collapsing subject and object in the proletariat (e.g. Adorno 1982a). But this amalgamation may 
not be as Hegelian as Adorno believes. True, Hegel was influenced by the 19th century idea, or 
ideology, of progress and its teleological implications. He asserts that “The Idea is... the absolute 
unity of Concept and objectivity” (Hegel 1991, § 213). But this absolute unity does not mean that 
concept and object return to the stage of undifferentiated unity. Instead, it means that their 
content is identical and that they pass into one another: “truth in the deeper sense means that 
objectivity is identical with the Concept” (Hegel 1991, add. to § 213). In true dialectical unity, 
subject and object are both identical and non-identical, immediate and mediated. Contrary to the 
above-quoted passage, Adorno does seem to understand this nuance. In Hegel: Three Studies he 
writes that Hegel “does not set up an irrational unity of subject and object… but instead 
preserves the distinct moments of the subjective and the objective while grasping them as 
mediated by one another” (Adorno 1993, 7). It is unclear, then, why in most other instances he 
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adopts the more vulgar Lukácsian interpretation. Ultimately, the epistemological significance is 
that for Hegel the identity of subject and object means that the categories of knowing are the 
same as the categories of being. Thus, concepts are truly adequate to their objects and the things 
can be known in themselves.  
It is clear from Adorno’s critique of identity philosophy that he regards Hegel’s confident 
conclusion as hubristic. Moreover, on ideological grounds, Adorno takes Hegel to task for the 
inherent positivity of his thinking. That is to say, a dialectic of subject and object that culminates 
in absolute identity will necessarily lose its negative and critical force. Adorno writes, “In Hegel 
there was coincidence of identity and positivity; the inclusion of all nonidentical and objective 
things in a subjectivity expanded and exalted into an absolute spirit was to effect the 
reconcilement” (Adorno 2007, 141-2). Stone notes that the positivity of Hegel’s dialectics lies in 
the demonstration that a second item or determination is fundamentally the same as a first, and 
that the two depend equally on one another (Stone 2008, 53). The problem, for Adorno, is that in 
this reconcilement anything that is ‘other,’ as well as any contradiction at a higher level, is 
eliminated. Hegel, of course, does allow for contradiction, but his faith in progress and reason 
always leads him to resolve such contradiction at the higher stages. Non-contradiction is 
‘hypostasized,’ to use Adorno’s terminology (Adorno 2007, 140). However, contradiction and 
non-identity can never truly be eradicated (Adorno 2007, 160). What happens instead is that 
Hegel’s philosophy must do violence against them. According to Adorno, “It is precisely the 
insatiable identity principle that perpetuates antagonism by suppressing contradiction. What 
tolerates nothing that is not like itself thwarts the reconcilement for which it mistakes 
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itself” (Adorno 2007, 143). The other possibility, which Adorno explores, is to preserve — even 
emphasize — the non-identical.  
Just as Adorno’s conceptions of constitutive subjectivity and identity philosophy are 
intertwined, as well as his critique of each mode of thinking, so too do his alternative approaches 
— non-identity thinking and preponderance of the object — go hand in hand. Here, I explore 
these two philosophical ideas and show their interconnection and mutual support, commencing 
with non-identity thought. Non-identity philosophy begins from the premise that concepts are not 
adequate to objects, or that thought and things can never fully correspond. In Negative 
Dialectics, Adorno describes this as follows: 
The task of dialectical cognition is not, as its adversaries like to charge, to 
construe contradictions from above and to progress by resolving them — although 
Hegel’s logic, now and then, proceeds in this fashion. Instead, it is up to 
dialectical cognition to pursue the inadequacy of thought and thing, to experience 
it in the thing.  29
Whereas in Hegel concepts eventually become fully adequate to their objects, this point is never 
reached for Adorno. For Adorno, this is what makes his own dialectics negative, while Hegel’s is 
positive (Stone 2008, 53-4). The possibility of a full identity of concept and object suggests a full 
resolution that would be positive, but Adorno maintains that the drive to achieve complete 
identity actually distorts the human capacity to generate useful or valid knowledge (Cook 2011, 
67).  
Never abandoning the goal of establishing truth claims, Adorno’s dialectics, or his non-
identity philosophy are at their most basic a materialist turn towards non-conceptuality (Cook 
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2011, 74). In other words, he holds that there is an element of non-conceptuality that inheres in 
each concept (Adorno 2007, 137). Obviously this does not mean that Adorno wants to move 
beyond conceptuality. Instead, there comes to be a different role for both concepts and objects in 
their dialectical relationship. Cook argues that there are two sides to this. First, concepts 
fundamentally depend on the material, non-conceptual particulars. The non-conceptual provides 
the content that concepts use to name objects (Cook 2011, 75). Second, because they are abstract 
universals, concepts transcend objects. This transcendence is not complete subsumption, as in 
identity thought, but is in fact more constructive (Cook 2011, 75). For Cook, this constructive 
character arises from the possibility that concepts can match objects, but never the certainty. She 
writes, “Adorno alludes to this positive sense of transcendence when he writes… that negative 
dialectics grasps its object by means of possibility” (Cook 2011, 75; c.f. Adorno 2007, 52-3).  
Indeed, the notion of mere possibility plays a large role in Adorno’s dialectics. Stone 
remarks that this is another key difference between Hegel and Adorno: for Hegel the 
reconciliation is actual, while Adorno only hints at the possibility of an identity of concept and 
object (Stone 2008, 53). However, while Adorno is willing to abandon the certainty that is the 
ultimate conclusion of Hegel’s actual reconciliation, he will not let go of the general formula 
from which it arises. In fact, although Adorno consistently labels his philosophical paradigm 
‘non-identity’ thinking, he nonetheless holds firmly to the goal of identity: “the ideal of identity 
must not simply be discarded” (Adorno 2007, 149). As noted above, for Adorno, the activity of 
thinking itself is a process of identification (Adorno 2007, 149). More specifically, Adorno looks 
to the act of definition, which in his non-identity philosophy is a plane of more equal interaction 
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between the subjective and objective sides. He writes, “in placing its mark on the object, 
definition seeks to be marked by the object” (Adorno 2007, 149). In other words, the distinct 
participate in each other (c.f. Adorno 1982a, 500). Still, even though the concept and object may 
participate in one another, the concept still seeks to declare what the object ‘really is.’ However, 
Adorno insists that this is not the same as identity philosophy. He holds, “This [non-identity] 
cognition seeks to say what something is, while identitarian thinking says what something comes 
under… and what, accordingly, it is not itself. The more relentlessly our identitarian thinking 
besets its object, the farther it will take us from the identity of the object” (Adorno 2007, 149). 
Adorno is here arguing that non-identity philosophy can actually go further — in its definitional 
power — than identity philosophy, because the former does not ignore the non-conceptual, what 
‘is not itself.’ Still, he is very clear that the type of absolute knowing espoused by Hegel is an 
impossibility.  
Just as constitutive subjectivity arrogates all meaning to the subject, thus calling forth the 
object, so too does identitarian philosophy, which is always inherently subjectivistic according to 
Adorno (Adorno 2007, 183). Indeed, the preponderance of the object is the logical conclusion of 
the critiques of both identity philosophy and constitutive subjectivity. Non-identity philosophy 
suggests the importance of the non-conceptual within every concept. Preponderance of the 
object, however, takes the analysis a step further. Adorno’s epistemological assertions about the 
role of non-conceptuality/objectivity in conceptual thinking are followed out to ontological 
claims about the primacy of objects. In short, this means that although subject and object may be 
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dialectically intertwined, the latter does not require the former for its existence. In Negative 
Dialectics Adorno explains: 
Due to the inequality inherent in the concept of mediation, the subject enters into 
the object altogether differently from the way the object enters into the subject. 
An object can be conceived only by a subject but always remains something other 
than the subject, whereas a subject by its very nature is from the outset an object 
as well. Not even as an idea can we conceive a subject that is not an object; but 
we can conceive an object that is not a subject. To be an object also is part of the 
meaning of subjectivity; but it is not equally part of the meaning of objectivity to 
be a subject.  30
More to the point, Adorno means that the object is ontologically prior to the subject. The subject 
requires an object, but the inverse is not true. The assertion that the object does not require a 
subject may at first seem to have radical implications — for instance, that humans ought to leave 
nature completely alone. In fact this is not Adorno’s aim, and it would, of course, be practically 
impossible. Rather, Adorno is here constructing a materialist grounding of consciousness; he 
wishes to demonstrate that subjectivity is embedded in objective, material circumstances. As 
well, however, the notion of objective preponderance expresses a latent realism: the sovereignty 
of the object hints at a mind-independent reality. In “Subject and Object,” Adorno is more 
explicit about the object’s independence. Here, he writes, “objectivity can be conceived without a 
subject…” (Adorno 1982a, 502). However, once again, this is an assertion of possibility, not 
actuality (Adorno 1982a, 502). In actuality, the object — qua object of experience — always has 
subjective properties and cannot exist without the subject (Adorno 1982a, 502-9). The end result 
is that Adorno seems to hold to a theory of a mind-independent reality, but he also believes that 
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knowledge of the objects contained in this sphere are always mediated through the subject. A 
resulting and interesting question concerns the degree and quality of mediation. That humans 
have some control — socially and individually — over such mediation suggests the possibility of 
different ways of knowing. Broadening the scope beyond the relation between ‘concept and 
object’ to ‘subject and object,’ it also indicates different exchange and social relations beyond 
those of capitalist modernity, along with altered human relations with the ecology. 
Adorno is ultimately skeptical about the adequacy of subjective concepts to describe 
these objects. This leaves him in a place somewhere in between Kant’s skepticism and Hegel’s 
absolutism. Auschwitz was born out of a type of thinking that was completely certain that its 
concepts were adequate to its objects. The reformulated categorical imperative of Negative 
Dialectics is that Auschwitz may never occur again (Adorno 2007, 365). Accordingly, thinking 
that aims at the total identity of concepts and objects must be banished. On the other hand, 
Adorno is also deeply critical of modes of thinking that relegate the organization of truth and 
meaning to the subject. This results in epistemological skepticism and social disintegration. If 
Adorno ultimately agrees with Kant that all objectivity is filtered through subjectivity, he goes a 
decisive step further in according to objectivity a primacy over subjectivity. Furthermore, Adorno 
would also presumably argue that the realm of valid knowledge extends beyond the synthetic a 
priori. What he is searching for, then, is a solid and practical foundation for truth claims, which 
does not result in the timeless certainly of identity thinking. Unfortunately, Adorno is remarkably 
opaque in his descriptions of what such a compromise might entail. However, his suggestion that 
“the form-giving constitutive elements have social sources” is instructive (Adorno 2007, 510). 
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He is pointing towards a theory of truth that is historically contingent and socially embedded. 
Cook writes that for Adorno “our concepts are intersubjectively sustained constructs with 
socially conditioned and sedimented histories…” (Cook 2011, 91). In other words, truth is 
intersubjectively constituted. The complicated relation that this theory of truth has to Adorno’s 
politics will be discussed below.  
Analysing the content of Adorno’s politics is difficult because, disappointed by virtually 
every existing political project, he was extremely wary of making any positive and substantive 
programmatic claims. Still, the categories of class, freedom, education, individuality, and the 
state do animate his political discussions (Tettlebaum 2008, 131-46). Perhaps Adorno’s most 
famous directly political claim is that Auschwitz should never be allowed to occur again (Adorno 
2007, 365). This ‘new categorical imperative’ is related to Adorno’s analyses of both freedom 
and identity philosophy. Marianne Tettlebaum notes that for Adorno if the conditions that 
allowed Auschwitz to occur exist, human society is essentially unfree (Tettlebaum 2008, 133). 
This profound unfreedom is made possible, according to Adorno, by that mode of thinking that 
subsumes individuals under types and makes them abstract and exchangeable. He writes, “Even 
in his formal freedom, the individual is as fungible and replaceable as he will be under the 
liquidators’ boots” (Adorno 2007, 362). It is clear that freedom is important to Adorno in a 
positive and substantial sense. However, the imperative here is decidedly negative — namely, 
that Auschwitz cannot be allowed to happen again. This is, certainly, not an imperative against 
which one would wish to argue. It presents a difficulty within Adorno’s system, however, 
because it is a categorical imperative. In other words, Adorno is making an absolute and 
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unconditional claim. The difficulty, or contradiction, then, is that Adorno has gone to great 
lengths to make the case that this type of absolute statement is not the desirable goal of political 
and philosophical thought. On the one hand, the whole project of Negative Dialectics is aimed at 
making this categorical imperative. On the other hand, the purpose of non-identity philosophy is 
to reject this type of normative claim.  
While Adorno was both tentative and vague in the vast majority of his political writings, 
the transcript of a series of conversations he had with Max Horkheimer in 1956 reveals a much 
more animated — and radical — political agenda. The two founders of Critical Theory met 
several times in the spring of that year to discuss the writing of a new and updated Communist 
Manifesto. That such a type of discussion even took place should indicate the degree to which 
Adorno adhered to a truly radical politics. Even more surprising is the degree to which Adorno’s 
radicalism eclipses Horkheimer’s. For example, at one point Adorno says, “If people want to 
persuade us that the conditional nature of man sets limits to utopia, that is simply untrue. The 
possibility of a completely unshackled reality remains valid” (Adorno and Horkheimer 2001, 
20-1). To this, Horkheimer responds, “In the long run things cannot change. The possibility of 
regression is always there. […] We can expect nothing more from mankind than a more or less 
worn-out version of the American system” (Adorno and Horkheimer 2001, 21). Given 
Horkheimer’s attitude, it is unclear why he would want to participate in the composition of a new 
Communist Manifesto. More importantly for the present analysis, however, these conversations 
show Adorno’s commitment to a genuinely socialist politics. Indeed, he announces that the new 
manifesto should be “strictly Leninist” (Adorno and Horkheimer 2001, 94). More specifically, 
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Adorno wants to write a new manifesto that would include an analysis of culture and avoid all 
hypostatization, while staying true to the spirit of socialist revolution. He writes, “Thinking in 
their [the Russians’] writings is more reified than in the most advanced bourgeois thought. I have 
always wanted to rectify that and develop a theory that remains faithful to Marx, Engels and 
Lenin, while keeping up with culture at its most advanced” (Adorno and Horkheimer 2001, 103). 
It is clear, then, that Adorno does have strong political commitments. An extended exploration of 
the relationship between his socialism and his philosophical foundations are outside the scope of 
this chapter. It is important to note, however, that although there is a tentative political and 
philosophical tone in much of Adorno’s works, he remained dedicated to a genuinely radical 
political program.  
The foregoing has sought to explore the broad contours of Adorno’s system of thought, 
with particular attention to the formation of his concepts of non-identity philosophy and 
preponderance of the object. The analysis now turns to an evaluation of the merits and 
shortcomings of Adorno’s positions. First, the notion of preponderance of the object, or that the 
object does not depend on the subject for its existence, points toward a realism that is essential to 
a sufficient philosophy of science. Bertell Ollman hints at this in his assertion that determination 
in dialectical relationships may not be symmetrical (Ollman 2003, 71). However, Roy Bhaskar 
takes the analysis further. Bhaskar is the founder of the post-positivist school of philosophy of 
science known as Critical Realism, the subject of the final substantive chapter of this 
dissertation. He proposes a ‘depth ontology,’ in which there are domains of the Real (generative 
mechanisms), Actual (events), and Empirical (experiences) (Bhaskar 2008a 56). For Bhaskar, the 
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generative mechanisms that structure our experience are really existing, and are 
epistemologically discoverable to a certain degree. He writes: 
Any adequate philosophy of science must find a way of grappling with this 
central paradox of science: that men in their social activity produce knowledge 
which is a social product much like any other, which is no more independent of its 
production and the men who produce it than motor cars, armchairs or books…. 
This is one side of ‘knowledge’. The other is that knowledge is ‘of’ things which 
are not produced by men at all: the specific gravity of mercury, the process of 
electrolysis, the mechanism of light propagation. None of these ‘objects of 
knowledge’ depend upon human activity.  31
In “Subject and Object” and in the section of Negative Dialectics titled “The Object’s 
Preponderance” (Adorno 2007, 183-6) Adorno is confronting this very problem, albeit from a 
different angle. Adorno’s approach may not be strictly ‘realist,’ because it does not directly posit 
a mind-independent reality. Instead, he suggests a subject-independent object. Implicit in this is a 
theory of the primacy of the material over consciousness. While Adorno recognizes both the 
independence of objects of knowledge as well as the socially mediated character of knowledge, 
he is far less optimistic than Bhaskar about the possibilities of truly knowing these objects. As 
has been argued above, Adorno ultimately rejects the idea that things can be known in 
themselves.  
This leads to the true shortcoming of Adorno’s thought: concepts are, for him, never 
adequate to their objects. While his objections to the complete subsumption of objects under their 
concepts, as in identity philosophy, are noteworthy, the fundamental inadequacy of concepts 
places all knowledge on unstable ground. To be sure, the notion that there is always particularity 
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within universality, and that there is something unique about each individual is important. 
However, Adorno does not need to abolish the identity of concept and object to preserve 
individuality. Indeed, Hegel himself offered a theory of uniqueness that would accomplish 
exactly that. Stone writes that Hegel’s theory “states that a thing’s uniqueness consists in its 
distinctive way of instantiating a universal kind. A thing cannot instantiate a universal unless it 
does so in some particular way, and this way of instantiating a universal is what makes each 
thing a ‘singular individual’” (Stone 2008, 55). The particularity of an object, or how it 
represents a universal cannot be apprehended simply by reference to the universal (Stone 2008, 
55). In broad terms, Hegel manages the tension between particular and universal while 
maintaining a commitment to the absolute. Like Hegel, Adorno wishes to preserve the particular, 
but in the end he denies the identity of concept and object. The present analysis has argued that 
this epistemological uncertainty is connected to a deep hesitancy and irresolution in Adorno’s 
politics.  
A final critique concerns the practicality of Adorno’s reconciliation of subject and object. 
Where Adorno does hint at such a possible reunion, it often takes the form of mere realization. In 
other words, an acknowledgement in thought ostensibly results in a reconciliation in practice. 
For example, Cook holds that for Adorno the subject’s self-realization that it is dependent on 
nature (the object) can lead to reconciliation. She writes, “reflection on the self as a part of nature 
may enable us to reconcile ourselves with, and accommodate ourselves to, our underground 
instinctual life” (Cook 2011, 108; c.f. Stone 2008, 56-57). A materialist critique of this view 
challenges the extent to which a revelation in the sphere of thought and reflection can precipitate 
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substantial change in what is a fundamentally material relationship. As he was tentative about 
making strong political statements — the exception of his conversations with Horkheimer 
notwithstanding — this emphasis on reflection over action is perhaps not surprising. In fact, in 
his lectures on moral philosophy, Adorno explicitly states that there are times in which theory 
must take precedence over practice (Adorno 2001, 4; c.f. Tettlebaum 2008, 140-1). This is ironic 
considering Adorno’s strong materialism, as evidenced by his insistence on the primacy of the 
object. Still, the idea that real change can begin with, or is ultimately located in, the movement of 
thoughts, recalls Marx’s criticism of idealism in The German Ideology. Here, Marx admonishes 
Hegel and his followers for forgetting the connection between philosophy and reality (Marx and 
Engels 1998, 33-6). In fact, Adorno would most likely agree with Marx that “The premises from 
which we begin are not arbitrary ones, but real premises…. They are real individuals, their 
activity and the material conditions of their life, both those which they find already existing and 
those produced by their activity” (Marx and Engels 1998, 36-7). If this is the case, however, 
Adorno’s privileging of reflection over practice certainly sits at odds with his materialism.  
In this section I have sought to describe the essential components of Adorno’s ontology 
and epistemology. It has been shown that Adorno develops his own position in the course of his 
engagements with both Kant and Hegel. Adorno rejects Kant’s transcendental subject as 
bourgeois ideology — a theory that relegates the formation of all meaning to the individual 
subject. However, he also cannot accept Hegel’s absolute idealism, by which concepts come to 
be identical to their objects. In the end, Adorno falls somewhere in between Kant and Hegel. He 
agrees with the former that objects cannot really be known in themselves. However, he also 
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argues that concepts can potentially say what an object ‘really is,’ even if they can never be fully 
adequate to the object. Adorno’s position is robust and tightly argued. However, from the 
perspective of moral and political philosophy, Adorno fails to provide a strong enough 
foundation for explicit positive and substantial normative claims. For this reason there are several 
awkward and problematic incongruences in his political writings. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
Adorno does adhere to a genuinely radical and progressive political agenda, although his critique 
of identity philosophy prevents him from making strong political claims. In addition, his 
conception of the primacy of the object is an important contribution to materialist thinking and 
contains a latent realism that adds depth and nuance to Adorno’s philosophy. 
Despite certain difficulties, it is useful to examine Adorno conception of the human 
relationship with nature, which has direct lines to his ontological foundations. If it was clear to 
Adorno during his lifetime that in modernity the human relationship with nature takes very 
destructive forms, the point is even more obvious today. Cook shows that for Adorno the 
organization of a more rational society includes developing a different relationship with nature 
(Cook 2011, 113-20). Adorno holds that approaches that seek to unconditionally dominate nature 
are bound up with identity thinking (Adorno 2007, 11). If he is critical of the wholesale 
domination and destruction of nature, Adorno wants to avoid the opposite mistake of vulgar 
naturalism. In other words, Adorno recognizes, like Rousseau and many others, that there is no 
going ‘back to nature’ (Adorno 2007, 147; c.f. Cook 2011, 87). Instead of arguing that that nature 
and society are ultimately identical, Adorno holds that they are intertwined, deeply connected, 
and yet also distinct (Cook 2011, 17).  
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Cook argues that just as the state of peace between subject and object is that of the 
distinct participating in one another, the same is true of human subjects with objective nature 
(Cook 2011, 119). In a society built upon more rational lines, this would mean several things. 
First, humans would recognize that nature predominates over them (primacy of the object) and 
that they are dependent on nature for their survival. At the same time, instead of instrumentally 
dominating nature, society would respect its “independent purposiveness” (Cook 2011, 110). In 
addition, Cook notes that for Adorno when this state of non-domination is reached and labour is 
reduced to a minimum, the possibilities for greater aesthetic experiences of nature will be vastly 
expanded (Cook 2011, 110).  
Thus, it is clear that the implications of Adorno’s philosophy for ecological politics and 
radical ecology are immense. The category of aesthetic experience will be revisited, in more 
detail and in relation to Marcuse, later in this chapter. At this point, I want to focus on the human 
ecological importance of the notion of the preponderance of the object. The idea of the primacy 
of the object reminds us that the object comes before the subject, ontologically. Nature, likewise, 
precedes humanity. Furthermore, the subject is itself an object: humans are themselves nature. 
Even more importantly, there is always a part of the object that cannot be covered by subjective 
concepts. In other words, there are elements of nature that cannot be covered by conceptual 
thinking. This does not imply supernatural causation, or that scientific inquiry is unneeded. But it 
does encourage us to ponder those elements of the ecology that are not easily understood, and do 
not easily come under human control. Of course, even those parts of the object that can be 
covered by concepts can inspire a sense of enchantment. On the other hand, we must also 
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appreciate what Adorno call the ‘residue of the object,’ what is left over when our concepts and 
our scientific understanding is exhausted. This helps extend our feeling of amazement of and 
reverence for nature, and reminds us of the individuality of each organism, each ecological 
relationship and process, each ecosystem.  
Marcuse: Basic and Excess Denaturation  
With Rousseau, Hegel, Marx and Adorno we saw that while humans are fundamentally a 
part of nature, they are also separated from it in important ways. Marcuse, we will see, expands 
on that basic insight to show that the separation from nature that we experience exists in degrees. 
What he gives us is a theory of “basic” and “surplus” alienation from nature. As is typical of 
Critical Theory, Marcuse combines elements of psychoanalytic theory, Marxism, and German 
idealism. It is the former that provides the initial inspiration for Marcuse's theory of basic and 
excess denaturation. As such this section commences with a broad look at Marcuse’s 
interpretation of Freud's theory of repression. The analysis then turns to one of Marcuse's main 
ecological interpreters, Andrew Biro, who draws out the full environmental implications of 
Marcuse's theory. Biro argues convincingly that Marcuse provides a strong theory of human 
ecology, and one that is indispensable to contemporary ecological politics. To wrap up the 
discussion of basic and excess alienation, and by way of transition to the next section on 
aesthetics, I provide some thoughts on what Marcuse's theory tell us about the enchantment of 
humans and nature.  
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The discussion of alienation, denaturation, and ecology — as they pertain to Marcuse — 
must commence with the concept of repression. In his seminal work on Freud and 
psychoanalysis, Eros and Civilization, Marcuse says the following about the repression of the 
instincts as a precondition of civilization: “Sigmund Freud's proposition that civilization is based 
on the permanent subjugation of the human instincts has been taken for granted” (Marcuse 1955, 
3). In essence, the idea is that for humans to live together in complex communities, with high 
degrees of social, political and economic organization, we must renounce the instant, instinctual 
gratification of our needs. The ‘pleasure principle’ (immediate satisfaction, pleasure, joy, 
receptiveness, absence of repression) has been replaced by the ‘reality principle’ (delayed 
satisfaction, restraint of pleasure, toil, productiveness, security) (Marcuse 1955, 12). Repression 
has allowed a great amount of technical progress, domination of nature, and production of 
material goods. Marcuse argues, however, that this progress has come at the price of ever 
increasing unfreedom. He writes: 
Throughout the world of industrial civilization, the domination of man by man is 
growing in scope and efficiency. Nor does this trend appear to be an incidental, 
transitory regression on the road to progress. Concentration camps, mass 
exterminations, world wars, and atom bombs are no ‘relapse into barbarism,’ but 
the unrepressed implementation of the achievements of modern science 
technology and domination.  32
Rather than delve into the interstices of Freud's theory of repression and civilization, Marcuse 
aims to use Freud's though to ask whether a less repressive form of civilization is possible. Freud 
believes firmly that it is not (Marcuse 1955, 17). But Marcuse questions whether the conflict 
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between the pleasure principle and the reality principle is so extensive that the entire ‘instinctual 
structure’ of human beings must be repressed. Perhaps, if the prevailing reality principle (the 
‘performance principle’) is not the necessary one, the only possible one, a different reality is 
possible. Marcuse posits a ‘non-repressive civilization, based on a fundamentally different 
experience of being, a fundamentally different relation between man and nature, and 
fundamentally different existential relations…” (Marcuse 1955, 5).  
This is Marcuse’s larger project in Eros and Civilization. Along the way he introduces a 
key concept that will be the focus of the present analysis: the distinction between basic and 
surplus repression. ‘Basic repression,’ in Marcuse’s words, constitutes “the ‘modifications’ of the 
instincts necessary for the perpetuation of the human race in civilization” (Marcuse 1955, 35). In 
other words, there is a basic level of repression that must take place for us to live together in 
civilized society. The unrestrained satisfaction of every libidinal instinct is simply not compatible 
with sustained social harmony. On the other hand, Marcuse holds that there is also ‘surplus 
repression’: “the restrictions necessitated by social domination” (Marcuse 1955, 35). This means 
that in some social formations — he is especially interested in advanced capitalist society — 
repression extends beyond the basic level necessary for civilization. This is unnecessary 
repression and represents superfluous restriction of human instincts and desires. The important 
point is that basic repression is common to all societies, while surplus repression varies in quality 
and magnitude within various socio-economic formations.  
Showing his Marxist influence, Marcuse proceeds to incorporate the concept of 
alienation. Describing capitalist labour, he writes: 
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For the vast majority of the population, the scope and mode of satisfaction are 
determined by their own labour; but their labour is work for an apparatus which 
they do not control, which operates as an independent power to which individuals 
must submit if they want to live. And it becomes the more alien the more 
specialized the division of labour becomes. Men do not live their own lives but 
perform pre-established functions. While they work, they do not fulfill their own 
needs and faculties, but work in alienation. Work has now become general, and 
so have the restrictions placed upon the libido: labor time, which is the largest 
part of the individual’s life time, is painful time, for alienated labor is absence of 
gratification, negation of the pleasure principle. Libido is diverted for socially 
useful performances in which the individual works for himself only insofar as he 
works for the apparatus, engaged in activities that mostly do not coincide with his 
own faculties and desires.  33
Here Freudian concepts — repression, gratification, libido, instinct — come together with 
Marxist one such as labour and alienation. Marcuse sees capitalist labour, alienated labour, as a 
historically specific form of Freudian repression. But it is not a necessary repression; alienated 
labour is an example of surplus repression, over and above the amount which is required for 
social organization. As such, Marcuse sees this form of repression as unwarranted and 
undesirable.  
To this point, the distinction between basic and surplus repression has been applied to 
psychological repression. Even capitalist labour, in Marcuse’s analysis, is a form of repression, 
as it modifies our core instinctual structure. Following Andrew Biro, we can now begin to use the 
distinction between basic (necessary for human existence) and surplus (excess and specific to 
historical situations) to understand alienation from nature (Biro 2005, 160). For example, 
repression, which is a restriction of our fundamental instincts, can been seen as a form of 
 Marcuse 1955, 45.33
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alienation from our internal nature. But the analysis can be enlarged to include alienation from 
external nature, or the ecology, as well.  
As Biro describes it, “We can thus extend Marcuse’s distinction between basic and 
surplus repression to include a distinction between alienation from nature that is biologically 
necessary for human life and alienation from nature that is only made necessary by particular 
forms of social organization” (Biro 2005, 168). Biro notes astutely that Marcuse’s distinction is 
closely based on Marx’s differentiation between objectification (labour) and alienation (alienated 
labour). The former is the basic subject-object separation that allows us to labour freely on 
objective nature. The latter is estranged, alienated, unfree labour, specific to historical conditions. 
According to Biro, Marcuse takes the analysis further than Marx by giving the basic/surplus 
trope a biological underpinning with the injection of psychoanalytic theory (Brio 2005, 168-69).  
It is worth taking a step back at this point and summing up what Marx, Freud, Marcuse 
and Biro give us on humans, nature, and alienation — that is, a theory of basic and excess 
denaturation. The concept of basic denaturation suggests, as we have seen in Rousseau, that there 
is a separation from nature that is constitutive to human being. There is no ‘going back’ to a state 
of perfect harmony with the natural world. Without the subject-object division there would be no 
humanity as such. This fundamental — although not total — alienation from nature is true of all 
humans, in all places, and at all times. But this does not mean that the relationship we have to 
nature in modern capitalism is at all necessary. The concept of excess denaturation shows that 
human alienation from nature takes diverse forms, and exists to varying degrees, in different 
socio-historical situations. In other words, the quality and quantity of excess denaturation is 
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largely socially determined. This has important consequences for contemporary ecological 
politics.  
First, Marcuse’s schema gives us a way out of what Biro call “the antinomies of 
ecocentrism and postmodernism” (Biro 2005, 161). This requires a bit of unpacking. 
Ecocentrism, or biocentrism, simply put, is the notion that there are no major ontological or 
moral differences between humans and the rest of nature. It is a naturalist position, meaning that 
it takes all entities to be natural, or wholly part of nature. In this view, humans occupy no special 
strata in the ontological order. Biro writes, “For ecocentrists, the fact that there are no ‘absolute 
dividing lines’ in the (natural) world, or, in other words, that any such dividing lines are 
inventions — that they are the product of culture or language — suggests that such lines are 
ethically indefensible…” (Biro 2005, 17). Ecocentrist arguments are often employed in the 
defence of nature, calls for the protection of natural spaces and ecological systems. This is not 
inherently problematic. However, the underlying assumption is troublesome. If everything is 
natural, then so too are humans and their social processes. Naturalizing social phenomena 
undermines the basis for social critique, as “nature” is often taken as beyond judgement. In 
addition, the supposed moral equality of all species suggests the frightening conclusion that the 
interests of even lower, more simple organisms is equal to that of human beings. Thankfully, 
Biro shows that there is, in fact, an ‘absolute dividing line’ between human and other natural 
species. Marcuse’s notion of basic denaturation demonstrates an essential separation from nature, 
made possible by instinctual repression (Biro 2005, 30). This repression in turn allows for the 
capacity to freely and self-consciously manipulate nature, a capacity no other higher animal is 
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known to possess. We have already seen this basic alienation expressed in various ways in the 
works of Rousseau, Hegel, Marx and Adorno. Through Marcuse, Biro emphasizes that human 
existence is fundamentally historical and therefore cannot be analyzed with the reductionist lens 
of naturalism. 
On the other hand, there is postmodernism. This outlook sees the world — or at least our 
experience of it — as discursively or socially constructed. Even nature, postmodernists often 
argue, is merely a cultural construction. In this “postmodern condition,” Biro holds, there is no 
longer any “permanent ground” for definitions (Biro 2005, 34). Worse still, postmodernism has 
progressively eroded the bases for truth, normativity, and judgement, effectively destabilizing the 
ontological foundation of any political action. As it concerns the present investigation, the danger 
of postmodernism is that it socializes the natural, essentially criticizing away the biological, 
material, and other natural bases of human life. This move is anti-scientific and irrationalist. To 
be sure, we are separate from nature, and our experience of the natural world will always be 
socially mediated to some degree (as per the theory of basic alienation). But it is absurd to deny 
both the non-social existence of nature itself as well as the natural bases of human being (see 
Antonio 2000, 52-55). Thankfully, the notion of surplus denaturation allows us to keep both sides 
of the argument in play. That is, it preserves the concept of nature, even as a regulative ideal, but 
also allows for the variation of human mediation/alienation from nature in differing historical 
circumstances. Marcuse sees alienation/repression/denaturation as normatively problematic. 
They should be alleviated to the greatest possible degree to allow for human happiness and 
  !131
flourishing. The theory of basic and excess denaturation allows Marcuse to make such 
prescriptive claims without de-historicizing the human condition.  
Marcuse’s theory has much to offer the study of human ecology. Without abstracting 
from the real embeddedness of humans within nature, Marcuse’s concept of basic denaturation 
shows that instinctual repression and the faculty of self-consciousness create an important 
dividing line between humans and non-human nature. This accords well with the observations of 
Rousseau, Hegel, Marx and Adorno. Even more importantly, Marcuse contributes the idea that 
there is another category of unnecessary, excess alienation from nature. This denaturation is 
contingent on social and historical conditions. Therefore, humans as a species both create and 
determine this type of alienation. Furthermore, it is also in our capacity to alleviate unnecessary 
denaturation. This is important because while the reality of basic alienation precludes any ‘return 
to nature,’ along with the theorizing or institution of any ‘perfect’ or ‘natural’ state of human 
being, the concept of excess denaturation allows the possibility of a critical stance toward the 
existing state of affairs. That is, we can locate those forms of alienation or denaturation that are 
not necessary and which cause unneeded repression and human suffering. More to the point of 
human ecology, Marcuse’s theory suggests that while the human condition will never be one of 
immediate unity with the ecology, some of the separation from nature that we experience in 
modern capitalist society could be palliated. If we cannot ‘go back to nature, then we might at 
least get closer to it; we can and should modify the quantity and quality of our mediation from 
nature. Getting closer to nature can mean many different things, including rethinking the amount 
of technological intensity that mediates our relationship to the ecological world. As well, it 
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would require making room in everyday life for appreciating the wildness, complexity, and 
enchantment of the natural world. This appreciation is the main focus of the next section.  
The Aesthetic Dimension: Nature and Meaning 
To this point, the discussion has largely centred around the related problematics of 
subject-object, identity-non-identity, as well as alienation. Now, I want to switch gears a little bit 
to discuss the human-ecological relationship as an aesthetic one. This shift from ontology to 
aesthetics supports the overall goal of this dissertation, that is, a reevaluation of the human 
relationship with nature. Here I want to suggest, against the dominant tradition in western 
philosophy, that meaning can be produced in the aesthetic reception of nature, rather than solely 
in its transformation by human labour. To do so, I draw heavily on Herbert Marcuse’s writing on 
art, particularly in his book The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics, 
which was written in 1977, close to the end of his career and life. Contra didactic Marxist 
realism, Marcuse argues that the proper aesthetic moment is to be found in the unity of the art 
form and its content, not merely in the latter. Marcuse’s intervention occurs in the context of 
many longstanding aesthetic debates in Critical Theory (see, for example, Adorno 1977; Adorno 
1982b; Benjamin 2008; Brecht 1977). Marcuse’s contribution is to the effect that art can be 
revolutionary because by its nature it posits a different way of being, and points to the possible 
transcendence of capitalist social relations. The aesthetic experience of nature differs from the art 
form in that it is a more passive reception, rather than a deliberate transformation of nature. 
Nonetheless, I will argue here that much of what Marcuse asserts concerning the experience of 
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art can be extended to an analysis of exposure to the ecological world. They are both important 
aesthetic experiences. Just as the work of art points to a better social reality, the reception of 
nature can point towards a better ecological reality.  
Marcuse’s point of departure, in The Aesthetic Dimension, is a critique of traditional 
realist Marxist aesthetics. This view, exemplified by Lukacs, concentrates on the content of 
artistic works. In Marcuse’s words, this approach is characterized by the insistence that “The 
only authentic, true, progressive art is the art of an ascending class” (Marcuse 1978, 2). 
Consequently, “The writer has an obligation to articulate and express the interests and needs of 
the ascending class” (Marcuse 1978, 2). Marcuse disagrees with the view that artwork must be 
made by the working class, represent the working class experience, and instruct the working 
class how to act. To be sure, he acknowledges that all works of art arise from a certain historical 
situation, and that they can and should have revolutionary potential (Marcuse 1978, ix). It is the 
didacticism of Marxist realism with which he takes issue. In a very real way, this type of edifying  
and over-simplistic artwork condescends to the working class, and obscures as much as it 
reveals. As opposed to the prevailing Marxist orthodoxy, Marcuse holds that it is the art form 
itself, the aesthetic form, that gives works of art their political and revolutionary power (Marcuse 
1978, ix). He also takes issue with the vulgar reflection theory of traditional Marxist aesthetics, 
which sees the content of art as being conditioned more or less directly by the prevailing social 
relations. In contrast, Marcuse argues that aesthetic expression enjoys a relative autonomy from 
existing social conditions (Marcuse 1978, ix). It is this comparative sovereignty, we will see, that 
allows artwork to transcend the existing reality and posit a different way of being.  
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Rather than being entirely determined by prevailing social conditions, Marcuse argues, 
art has the capability of breaking free of historical determination. It is in this breaking free, this 
transcendence, that art finds its revolutionary potential. In his own words: 
[T]he radical qualities of art, that is to say, its indictment of the established reality 
and its invocation of the beautiful image (schöner Schein) of liberation are 
grounded precisely in the dimensions where art transcends its social 
determination and emancipates itself from the given universe of discourse and 
behavior while preserving its overwhelming presence.  34
The Marxist, realist conception of aesthetics — in which there is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ art — 
misses this truly revolutionary aspect of art because it focusses too narrowly on the content, and 
the message, of the work of art. Against this orthodoxy, Marcuse shows that by its very nature, 
its very form, art is able to rise above the existing conditions and point toward a possible better 
future. He writes, “art creates the realm in which the subversion of experience proper to art 
becomes possible: the world formed by art is recognized as a reality which is suppressed and 
distorted in the given reality” (Marcuse 1978, 6). The work of art, by its very nature, shows that 
the existing reality principle is not the only or necessary one and that any number of other 
realities are possible (Marcuse 1978, 7). By demonstrating the possibility of another reality 
principle, art implicitly contradicts the existing principle. Marcuse holds, “The world of art is 
that of another Reality Principle, of estrangement — and only as estrangement does art fulfill a 
cognitive function: it communicates truths not communicable in any other language; it 
contradicts” (Marcuse 1978, 10).  
 Marcuse 1978, 6.34
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Thus, by creating another world, or reminding us that another world is possible, art calls 
into question the truth of the existing state of affairs. But what is the other world represented in 
art? And how does it effectively problematize the prevailing reality principle? According to 
Marcuse, the work of art is politically effectual because it invokes a remembrance of life past. He 
writes, “The revolution finds its limits and residue in the permanence which is preserved in art… 
as a remembrance of life past: remembrance of a life between illusion and reality, falsehood and 
truth, joy and death” (Marcuse 1978, 23). In other words, art can bring to mind former ways of 
social organization, and of interaction with nature. Marcuse notes that these images are between 
reality and illusion. He thus implicitly suggests that the strict, realist, empirical truth of these 
images is not centrally important. They have revolutionary potential because they rise above the 
particular, historical, social conditions to reveal the universality that inheres in the living, feeling 
human subject. “Dostoyevsky’s The Humiliated and the Offended, Victor Hugo’s Les 
Misérables,” writes Marcuse, “suffer not only the injustice of a particular class society, they 
suffer the inhumanity of all times; they stand for humanity as such. The universal that appears in 
their fate is beyond that of class society” (Marcuse 1978, 23-4). Unlike realism, which argues 
that it is the content of the work of art that makes it true or untrue, Marcuse shows that the truth 
contained in art lies in its portrayal of what is universal about human life.  
In portraying this partly-illusory image, or representation, of past ways of being, art 
offers a certain ‘unreality.’ It is an unreality in the sense that it is different from and opposed to 
the prevailing reality. But Marcuse holds that this image is actually more true than the existing 
conditions. In a brilliant passage, he argues that: 
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The world intended in art is never and nowhere merely the given world of 
everyday reality, but neither is it a world of mere fantasy, illusion, and so on. It 
contains nothing that does not also exist in the given reality… Nevertheless, the 
world of a work of art is “unreal” in the ordinary sense of this word: it is a 
fictitious reality. But it is “unreal” not because it is less, but because it is more as 
well and qualitatively “other” than the established reality. As fictitious world, as 
illusion (Schein), it contains more truth than does everyday reality. For the latter is 
mystified in its institutions and relationships… Only in the “illusory world” do 
things appear as what they are and what they can be. By virtue of this truth (which 
art alone can express in sensuous representation) the world is inverted — it is the 
given reality, the ordinary world which now appears as untrue, as false, as 
deceptive reality.  35
Marcuse is able to offer this reasoning because he holds to the traditional distinction between 
appearance and reality, fact and truth. In his case, the appearance, the bare facts of social 
existence take the form of capitalist one-dimensional society. In his famous One-Dimensional 
Man, Marcuse makes the argument that modern capitalist society effects a sort of ‘levelling’ of 
the world of discourse and experience. This one-dimensional world permits no alternative, 
negative, or critical side (Marcuse 1964). Obscured by these social relations is a truth to what it 
means to be human and how we ought to live — a ‘real’ reality. Interestingly, however, Marcuse 
breaks with tradition by arguing that it is art, the aesthetic form — not philosophy — that offers 
the clearest view into the truth of our social being. His argument might be supplemented by the 
observation that philosophy and science strive to uncover specific, and also universal, truths. As 
such, they can describe the conditions upon which meaning and human freedom are founded. But 
the truth of meaning and freedom is that they are universal, essentially outward-looking. The 
aesthetic form, which is also fundamentally outward-looking, is adequate to the task of 
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illustrating the full truth of human experience and potential. All this begs the question: for 
whom? That is, can all members of society — even those from marginalized classes that are 
barred access to aesthetic training or acculturation — have this experience of art? It is an 
interesting question because whereas the realist art proposed by Lukacs is didactic and easily 
understood, the implications of Marcuse’s schöner Schein may be less readily intelligible. 
Marcuse offers no clear answer to this question. Perhaps, Marcuse’s ideal type of artwork is not 
so opaque that lay interpreters, especially in the social activity of aesthetic reception, could not 
uncover its universal meaning. However, it may be that there is a certain elitism at work in 
Marcuse’s aesthetic theory. The full reception of art may not be a door open to everyone. The 
aesthetic appreciation of nature, I will argue below, can be more democratic.  
Like Adorno, Marcuse is skeptical of claims about the complete identity of concept and 
object. He is sure that the truth exists and that we must endeavour to bring light to it. But our 
access to the truth is always partial, not complete. Nonetheless, he is quite clear the goal of 
revolutionary political activity is to make real the truth, to bring the facts of existence as close as 
possible to the underlying truth of being. As such, the beautiful image created by art must serve 
as a regulative ideal, toward which politics ought to move (Marcuse 1978, 69). This begs the 
question of an implicit, or ‘hidden,’ teleology in Marcuse’s philosophy. He writes, “Against all 
fetishism… art represents the ultimate goal of all revolutions: the freedom and happiness of the 
individual” (Marcuse 1978, 69). In representing and striving for freedom and happiness, art not 
only describes the truth of our being, it also opens the path to different forms of existence. It 
points beyond the singular plane of one-dimensional society, towards other ways of being. 
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Marcuse writes, “Art breaks open a dimension inaccessible to other experience, a dimension in 
which human beings, nature, and things no longer stand under the law of the established reality 
principle” (Marcuse 1978, 72).  
It is my intention here to show that nature can do precisely the same thing: open another 
dimension of experience and offer the possibility of another reality. To be sure, the aesthetic 
moment of experiencing nature differs quite significantly from the work of art. The former is 
often passive reception, and can potentially be more democratic. The latter is the outcome of 
deliberate manipulation of raw materials. It is a product of creative human labour. It may 
reference or invoke non-social elements, but it is a social product through and through. 
Experiencing nature — hiking in the deep woods, enjoying a park, even watching birds in one’s 
backyard — is meaningful because of the components that are non-social. Of course, our 
experience of nature is always socially affected to some extent; we bring our social history and 
determination with us everywhere. As well, almost all contemporary ecosystems have been 
impacted in some way by human activity, imbuing them with sociality and calling into question 
the concept of ‘pristine nature.’ But we lose much nuance in adopting such an all-or-nothing 
outlook. A much more interesting way to understand the problem is to see that naturalness and 
sociality both exist in degrees, on a spectrum. The downtown core of a major city might fall on 
one end of the scale, and a remote, largely untouched wilderness lake on the other. The issue at 
hand is the degree to which transformative human labour has penetrated these spaces. By and 
large, the less that it has, the more intact are its ecological processes. It is these ecological 
processes that offer the type of aesthetic moment I wish to here describe. These processes carry 
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on with and without human involvement, creating complexity and beauty, and sustaining life. 
They are self-directional and command moral value independent of that assigned by humans for 
instrumental purposes. Our aesthetic exposure to ecological systems is passive, because it does 
not require the infusion of transformative labour. Of course, we must immerse ourselves in 
nature for this to take place, but the meaning that we derive from such experiences is possible 
because of what we do not do to these spaces. The human experience of nature is significantly 
different, then, from the creation and reception of artwork. They are both, however, aesthetic 
moments. Marcuse’s work on aesthetics explicitly describes the political potential of artwork, but 
it is my argument here that much of his analysis also applies to the aesthetic experience of 
nature. Most importantly, nature offers a beautiful image (schöner Schein) that invokes and 
suggests new and different possibilities.  
To begin, it has been noted that Marcuse brings to our attention the fact that artwork is 
not entirely socially determined. Of course, works of art arise from particular social formations. 
But they also contain something other than the social situation — something that is not 
determined by the social forces. This is true of all facets of human life. Otherwise we would be 
faced with utter determination, and left with no hope of revolutionary change. So, there is an 
autonomous element to art. Likewise, I hold that the prevailing social reality does not entirely 
determine our reception of the ecological world. To be sure, the instrumental rationality of 
modern capitalism does in many ways cause us to see and experience nature as something that is 
‘other’ — formless, valueless ‘stuff’ that has been furnished solely for the attainment of human 
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ends. But it is also always possible to see elements of the ecological world as having value, 
beauty, and meaning that is independent of human ends.  
Marcuse argues that art invokes a memory of past ways of being. In The Aesthetic 
Dimension he is largely referring to modes of social being. Here, I propose that the aesthetic 
experience of nature can inspire a remembrance of past ways of ecological being. It only when 
we access those natural places that have suffered less human intervention that we also access the 
truth about the beauty and complexity of the ecological world. In One-Dimensional society, the 
prevailing principle of human ecology is that nature is simply the stuff for instrumental 
exploitation. There is an overwhelming sense of this, perhaps not in the mind of every individual, 
but certainly in the general outlook and economic activities of one-dimensional society as a 
whole. But in the aesthetic reception of minimally damaged ecological processes, we see that 
there is much more to nature than mere substrate. We remember that nature has not always been 
so manipulated, controlled and damaged by human activity, that there have been other ways of 
being in, and interacting with the ecological world. This does not mean romanticizing former 
ways of life, but realizing that the way we currently live is not the only way. In fact, there is a 
deep untruth to the prevailing conditions. Marcuse saw this in relation to social conditions. But it 
is equally true of human-ecological relations. By simply dominating nature, exploiting it 
endlessly, we obscure the truth of its many wonders. As such, we deny ourselves the possibility 
of meaningful activity, and a sense of integration and connection with the natural world. When 
we immerse ourselves in natural spaces and experience their aesthetic possibilities, we are able 
to ponder the untruth of our dominant way of interacting with the ecology.  
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Finally, just like art, the reception of nature can break open a new dimension of 
experience. In this moment, we realize that our relationship with nature as it exists presently is 
not necessary or transhistorical. We can and must interact with and understand nature differently, 
and this experience can take many forms. Just as Marcuse would not argue that there is a single 
perfect social formation, I hold that there is no single true or right way to interact with or 
experience the ecological world. What is important is that we recognize that other dimensions of 
experience are possible. 
Conclusion 
Today the Frankfurt School is the subject of a growing and compelling ecological 
literature. The last true “Renaissance” thinkers — in that they were proficient in a variety of 
fields — the Critical Theorists were experts in and published on a wide range of topics. The 
foregoing discussion has focussed on only a narrow selection of the works of Adorno and 
Marcuse: their positions on subject-object dialectics, alienation, and aesthetics. While it is clear 
from the outset that Adorno and Marcuse inherit the ‘historical-dialectical’ tradition passed on by 
Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, and others, they also take the analysis in new and interesting directions. 
Adorno argues that there is something fundamental about the object. That is, it is ontologically 
prior to the subject — just as nature is the ontological precursor of humanity. Relatedly, objects 
can never be fully subsumed by subjective concepts, never totally described by human cognition. 
Obviously, then, this means that the ecology cannot be fully brought under human concepts. This 
leaves an element of ‘enchantedness,’ something essentially ‘other,’ and unknowable about the 
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ecological world. While Adorno never entertains the possibility of a reconciliation of subject and 
object, he describes their association as ‘the distinct participating in each other.’ This is a 
relationship of mutual determination and involvement. It is also a compelling way to think about 
the human relationship with nature. The Marcusuean angle emphasized here is a little bit 
different. Marcuse does not seem to disagree substantially with any of Adorno’s positions. 
However, while Adorno uses the categories of identity and non-identity, Marcuse takes the 
analysis further by introducing the possibility that identity and non-identity exist to varying 
degrees. Thereby, human alienation from nature exists also by degree and some forms of 
alienation are non-necessary. This formulation opens the possibility of some form of 
reconciliation between subject and object (humanity and nature), or at least a measure of 
disalienation. Presumably such an alienation would allow the distinct to better participate in one 
another. Of course, Marcuse is sure to assert a level of basic or fundamental alienation from 
nature, putting an end to any sort of ‘going back to nature.’ It is this fundamental alienation from 
nature that marks our species differentia: self-consciousness, objectification (in Hegel’s sense), 
and the capacity to labour freely. Along with this capacity comes the create art and appreciate 
beauty. Marcuse’s aesthetic theory points to the work of art as having important revolutionary 
potential as it reminds us of other dimensions of experience and ways of being. I have here 
argued that the aesthetic appreciation of natural beauty and complexity provides similar 
potential.  
There are several things in Marcuse and Adorno that bring the ‘enchantment’ of human 
ecology to a new level. First, they both elaborate on the special quality of human beings, the 
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uniqueness of our species within the ecological world. This is largely, of course, self-
consciousness. But with this faculty come many others. Marcuse’s emphasis on art and aesthetic 
appreciation remind us that humans are special in their creation and awareness of beauty. With 
his notion of the distinct participating in each other, Adorno creates a dialectic in which both 
poles are active and capable of determining the other. Subject and object, humans and nature, co-
determine one another. Additionally, Adorno tells us that there is always an element of objective 
nature that will elude us. The residue of the object cannot be brought under our conceptual 
knowledge. That is not to say that it is supernatural or theoretically unknowable. But there are 
simply parts of nature that cannot be made to conform to our concepts. Their otherness remains 
and it is herein that we find their enchantment.  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Chapter 5: Process Metaphysics and the Enchantment of Complexity 
Introduction 
The foregoing has shown that the ‘historical-dialectical’ understanding of the human-
nature relationship is correct in its positing of humans as simultaneously part of and distinct from 
nature. The difficulty with this approach is that the qualitative assertion is made without 
specifying the real content of the identity and non-identity. This chapter seeks to provide a more 
solid foundation for the qualitative distinction between humans and the rest of nature by means 
of a quantitative measure. It will be argued that the fundamental human difference from non-
human nature arises from their vastly greater degree of internal sensitivity. Natural entities have 
internal process that are complex to varying degrees, and are therefore sensitive to varying 
degrees. It is here argued that the quantitatively greater magnitude of sensitivity possessed by 
humans as essence-bearing entities passes over into qualitative distinction. However, this process 
view also provides the basis for a more complete conception of the identity of humans with 
nature. That is, although humans are more sensitive, all natural entities are sensitive to some 
degree. Thus, when human consciousness recognizes sensitivity in other entities, it sees a 
metaphysical identity. This approach adds important nuance to the picture of the human-nature 
relationship sketched in the foregoing chapters. The present analysis uses the work of Charles 
Hartshorne to articulate this process-oriented method.  
Process philosophy is significantly different from the other schools of thought I have 
considered thus far. The issue of processual complexity appears to play no significant role in the 
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thinking of Rousseau, Hegel, Marx or the Frankfurt School. It is unclear, and unlikely, if any of 
them would accept process philosophy’s fundamental commitment to process as ontology. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the intersection of ‘historical-dialectical' thinking and process thought 
is fertile theoretical ground for the philosophy of human ecology. This chapter seeks to engage 
process thinking in discussion with ecological political theory as well as Critical Theory, in a 
way that enriches all these approaches to human ecology. Process philosophy brings important 
questions to light, and bolsters the claims for both the identity and difference of humans and 
nature. While the preceding three chapters have laid out the uniqueness of humans and self-
consciousness — while also maintaining the dependence and rootedness of human within nature 
— process philosophy can begin to answer important questions about origins. For example: how 
does self-consciousness originate from biology? The concepts of process and internal complexity 
have much to offer this inquiry. Rather than give an ‘alternative view,’ process thought enters 
into discussion with the ‘historical-dialectical’ outlook and deepens its understanding of human 
ecology.  
This chapter begins by introducing the central ideas and concepts that characterize the 
process-oriented approach. With this foundation set, the exposition then turns to Hartshorne’s 
critiques of both humanism and supernaturalism. His alternative, a form of panpsychism called 
‘surrelativism,’ is then analysed. Next, process-inspired ethical writings are explicated, and 
shown to be superior to the dichotomous views of anthropocentrism and ecocentrism. Some brief 
concluding remarks explain the significance of the process view for understanding the place of 
humanity within nature, as well as its contributions to the enchantment of human ecology.  
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Process Metaphysics: Process and Complexity 
In contemporary academic discourse, the term ‘process philosophy’ is overwhelmingly 
associated with one figure: the 20th century British philosopher Alfred North Whitehead. 
Nicholas Rescher argues, however, that there is much more to this outlook than Whitehead’s 
work. Rescher holds that in fact, Heraclitus is the true originator of process thinking, and that 
there are many other important contributors before Whitehead. These include Leibniz, Hegel, 
William James, Henri Bergson, as well as John Dewey (Rescher 1996, 1-20). Whitehead’s 
writings are rich, yet dense and technical, with highly specific terminology and many 
neologisms. This would make the task of explaining his significance for contemporary ecological 
political theory difficult work. Thankfully, as Rescher notes, process philosophy is not the 
doctrine of a single philosopher, but a general outlook. In the next section, the analysis will shift 
to focus more specifically on the works of a single philosopher: Charles Hartshorne, who was 
strongly influenced by Whitehead. Hartshorne’s writings speak more directly to the ecological 
concerns of this dissertation. First, however, it is necessary to outline the general standpoint that 
characterizes process philosophy.  
Rescher holds that process philosophy, at its core, is a conventional exercise in 
metaphysics. That is, it is a “general theory of reality,” an account of what exists, and a theory of 
how it can best be explained (Rescher 1996, 7). The bulk of traditional metaphysics since 
Aristotle has been primarily concerned with substances and things (Rescher 1996, 29). This is 
not so with process metaphysics; as its name suggests, process thinking is concerned with 
processes. Rescher writes that while traditional metaphysics has been preoccupied with 
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substance, product, persistence and continuity, process thinking prefers the categories of activity, 
process, change and novelty. This is not to say that process philosophers deny the existence of 
substances or things. As Rescher notes, it is often a matter of emphasis (Rescher 1996, 31). 
Processists hold to the idea that processes are more analytically important than things for two 
reasons. First, “In a dynamic world, things cannot do without processes. Since substantial things 
change, their nature must encompass some impetus to internal development” (Rescher 1996, 28). 
Second, “Since substantial things emerge in and from the world’s course of changes, processes 
have priority over things” (Rescher 1996, 28). So, what sets apart process thinkers is their 
contention that processes are analytically primary — both ontologically and epistemologically. 
Rescher writes that the process thinker is “one who holds that what exists in nature is not just 
originated and sustained by process, but is in fact ongoingly and inexorably characterized by 
them. On such a view, process is both pervasive in nature and fundamental for its understanding” 
(Rescher 1996, 8). Instead of trying to pin down fixed, stable entities, process thinkers see 
dynamism and perpetual change.  
Already process metaphysics offers this dissertation a picture of the ecology, and all its 
constituent parts, that are alive, energetic and constantly moving. Of course, the myriad 
processes that make up the intelligible world are not unconnected. This introduces another key 
component of process thought: interconnectedness. In other words, the world in which we live is 
one that is deeply integrated. The various processes that compose the physical and organic 
world, including human consciousness, exist in complex and intertwined relationships. These 
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components do not, and could not, exist independently of one another. C. Robert Mesle describes 
this view as follows: 
Process philosophy is an effort to think clearly and deeply about the obvious truth 
that our world and our lives are dynamic, interrelated processes and to challenge 
the apparently obvious, but fundamentally mistaken, idea that the world 
(including ourselves) is made of things that exist independently of such 
relationships and that seem to endure unchanged through all the processes of 
change.  36
This outlook concerns all natural relationships, including that between humans and the rest of 
nature. The challenge, as it has been all along, is to see humanity — especially human 
consciousness — as integrated into the ecological world, without collapsing the qualitative 
distinction between humans and nature. Of course, with humanity as a component, there is also 
the introjection of historical factors as well as unintended consequences with in turn shape 
natural processes. With its focus on dynamism and continual change, process thinking easily 
accounts for this factor. At this point, then, it is useful to draw out how process philosophy treats 
both nature and humanity.  
Process metaphysics sees the whole of nature as a vast, interconnected system. According 
to Rescher, the entire world is one “unified macroprocess” (Rescher 1996, 84). That is, nature is 
a single, unified, dynamic system. This is not to say that it is undifferentiated; the macroprocess 
is composed of “duly coordinated subordinate microprocesses” (Rescher 1996, 84). In other 
words, nature is an ordered, hierarchical series of processes that together form a grand totalizing 
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‘macroprocess.’ Importantly, Rescher holds that these processes are largely self-organizing and 
are therefore easily understood as organic. He writes: 
Natural processes this organize one another into larger interconnected clusters — 
process organisms of sorts. Accordingly, process metaphysicians are given to 
conceptualizing nature in general — and physical nature in particular — in 
organic terms, owing to the tendency at work everywhere in nature, for processes 
to cluster together in self-perpetuating systemic wholes. The world’s processes are 
thus interconnected.  37
Like the Ancients, process thought sees the world as hierarchically ordered. But in the process 
view, there does not exist the same form of teleology. Importantly, process philosophy in no way 
attempt to justify the domination of humans by humans in natural terms. In this way, its outlook 
is compatible with the Critical Theorists, who were strongly suspicious of rationalizations for 
domination. As will be shown below, process thinking also places limits on the domination of 
nature by humans, attempting to restrict it to reasonable amounts. Another important point is that 
process philosophy sees nature as fundamentally alive. Its activities are self-directed and self-
organizing. In no way is it simply ‘inert matter.’ Nature itself in constantly in motion, and so too 
are its organizing principles. The process idea of nature owes a great deal to Darwin’s theory of 
evolution by natural selection. No longer are species — or the processes that constitute species 
— fixed and unmoving. “Not only do the world’s phenomena change but so do the natural laws 
that govern their modus operandi,” holds Rescher (1996, 91). Nature is alive, moving, changing, 
dynamic at every level.  
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Like the previously discussed thinkers, process philosophy is also interested in the place 
of human persons — specifically self-hood, or the ego — in the natural order. Rescher maintains 
that despite its best efforts, traditional metaphysics has failed to understand adequately the 
human self. The ego — and with it those unique human capacities, such as self-consciousness — 
resists the framework of substance metaphysics and therefore presents a distinct “stumbling 
block” (Rescher 1996, 105). This is because, Rescher maintains, human experience is essentially 
dynamic: “a static thing-oriented perspective is naturally distasteful to us, seeing that its stolid 
substantiality makes for a fixity that simply does not square with the character of our experience” 
(Rescher 1996, 107). In other words, the flux of experience is not easily contained in an ontology 
that prioritizes substance and fixity over process and dynamism. To be fair, this is not necessarily 
a completely even-handed critique to mount against the philosophers discussed in the foregoing 
chapters. From Rousseau to Marcuse, there is an unmistakable appreciation for the dynamism of 
human experience as well as the historicity of the human location in the natural world. Still, there 
is clearly something to be gained by taking seriously the process method. While the ‘historical-
dialectical’ thinkers and the Critical Theorists do acknowledge the dynamic nature of human 
being-in-the-world, the physical and non-physical elements of human existence do sometimes 
appear as distinct categories. That is, while it is permitted that mind and matter co-exist, they are 
often ultimately understood as two fundamentally difference entities. Process thinking abandons 
the terminology of Western philosophy, and does away with the emphasis on matter and mind, 
substance and consciousness. The human self thereby becomes “simply a megaprocess, a 
structured system of processes, a cohesive and (relatively) stable center of activity 
  !151
agency” (Rescher 1996, 108). In other words, self-hood is neither a substance nor a thing. It is, 
rather, a life process (Rescher 1996, 116).  
This view effectively illustrates the integration of humans within other complex processes 
and therefore within the ecology as a whole. That is, human being is identical to the ecology 
insofar as it is fundamentally processual. Mesle writes, “The world is like us because we are like 
the world, part of the world, reflecting the same basic principles and rules as the world” (Mesle 
2008, 24). Not only are we the same as these ecological processes, we are interconnected with 
them, dependent on them. This is a very powerful way to think about the human place in nature. 
We need to think more carefully about our unity with nature. Only thus might we begin to treat 
the ecological world with the respect that it deserves and secure the continued conditions for our 
own existence. However, this type of thinking can go too far, erasing the qualitative divergence 
that separates humanity from nature. As Mesle has it, “We are unique in some ways, but not in 
others, and our uniqueness is a matter of degree rather than of kind” (Mesle 2008, 24). The 
principal aim of this dissertation is to articulate a theory of human ecology in which human 
beings are simultaneously embedded in nature and qualitatively different from it. To this effect, 
the analysis now turns to Charles Hartshorne, whose (much more sophisticated) approach helps 
to develop the present account of human ecology.  
Charles Hartshorne: Surrelativism and Human Ecology 
In Beyond Humanism: Essays in the New Philosophy of Nature, published in 1937, 
Hartshorne expounds a theory of ‘theistic naturalism,’ whereby the divine is understood as nature 
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itself. One need not adopt Hartshorne’s theological perspective to find useful the notion that what 
is absolute is found in nature as a whole. A necessary corollary to this view is that humanity is 
displaced from its position as the supreme form of entity. Meanwhile, Hartshorne also rejects any 
form of supernaturalism, which he argues posits a divine entity wholly outside of nature. In 
Hartshorne’s words: 
Supernaturalism and humanism are, I hold, two aspects of the same error, the 
mistaken notion that nature, in her non-human portions and characters, is wholly 
subhuman. Not finding the superhuman in nature, the supernaturalist seeks it 
“beyond” nature; the humanist, in the unrealized potentialities of man. Could both 
perceive the living divinity which in a sense is nature, the one would cease to 
locate the object of his worship in a vacuum, and the other would cease to deify 
man and romantically to exaggerate the good and underestimate the evil in man.  38
The present analysis will make use of Hartshorne’s critique of humanism as ‘disintegration.’ In 
arguing for a holistic naturalism, though, the metaphysical difference of humans from nature is 
not meant to be downplayed. Instead, Hartshorne’s pantheistic naturalism is understood as 
compatible with the ontological continuity and discontinuity of humans and nature.  
Hartshorne’s term ‘surrelativism’ is an amalgam of the words ‘supreme’ and 
‘relative’ (Hartshorne 1948, ix). It is his contention that the absolute can be understood as what is 
‘supremely relative.’ In the discussion that follows, each side of Hartshorne’s supreme relativity 
will be explored. With regards to what is supreme, Hartshorne argues that this is nature as a 
whole. Such a conception rejects a supernatural theory of what is absolute, while maintaining the 
necessity of a being that is supreme or divine (Hartshorne 1937, 57). Nature, taken as an 
integrated whole, is that supreme individual, or ‘maximal being.’ This conception of nature 
 Hartshorne 1937, 3.38
  !153
accomplishes two things. First, it displaces humans from the centre of analysis. For Hartshorne 
the human species is at best transitory (Hartshorne 1937, 12). Doomed to eventual extinction, the 
human race cannot match nature in its timelessness and inclusivity. Indeed, Hartshorne writes 
that nature is “supreme in temporal endurance and in power to embrace within itself the content 
and value of other beings” (Hartshorne 1937, 57). Of course, nature cannot do so consciously. 
Humanity, meanwhile, is — or can be — conscious of its place in nature, and intervenes in the 
natural order, often with far-reaching consequences. Second, it opens the possibility of 
considering nature as an active entity — a sort of supra-human agency — that commands ethical 
respect and is the source of great beauty and wonder (Hartshorne 1937, 56).  
Hartshorne does not want to place humans outside of nature, but nor does he pretend that 
the individual entities within nature are all of equal status. He writes, “As man looks out upon 
the world, he sees entities which he regards as ‘below’ but akin to himself…” (Hartshorne 1937, 
111). Here develops the side of his analysis that takes into account the relativity of 
‘surrelativism.’ Hartshorne arrives at the assumption that all the entities of being could be 
organized on a scale: “it is a reasonable view that all things, so far as they are individuals rather 
than aggregates, fall upon a single scale… running from the least particle of inorganic matter to 
the great universe itself” (Hartshorne 1937, 112). Hartshorne’s main concern is with the qualities 
of the variables on this scale. He first claims that such variables can be both ‘local’ — applying 
to certain parts the of scale and not others — and ‘cosmic’ — applying to the entire scale of 
being. He is much more interested in the cosmic variables because he is concerned with a 
quantitative comparison of all being. He writes: 
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The idea that quality need not be comparative is really the idea that it may be an 
absolutely private, local affair. But the fact that in a given locale of the cosmos 
there is a given quality is a public and cosmic fact, not a merely private one. Fact 
is by definition public, hence whatever can be a fact is comparative, and the 
cosmic variables are the measures of all fact, the definition of “being.”  39
The broadest and most obvious of these cosmic variables is what Hartshorne refers to as 
“complexity of spatio-temporal structure” (Hartshorne 1937, 115). Simply put, some entities are 
more complex than others.  
It is clear, then, that the issue of quantity — quantity of complexity — plays a key role in 
Hartshorne’s view. In contrast to other theorists who tackle the relationship of nature, science and 
quantification, Hartshorne does not see the latter as necessarily dis-enchanting. This is in sharp 
contrast to Weber. In his famous 1917 lecture “Science as a Vocation,” Weber asserts that modern 
science’s incredible capacity for calculation, which implies quantification,’ thoroughly 
disenchants the world. He writes that ‘intellectualization’ means that “we can in principle control 
everything by means of calculation. That in turn means the disenchantment of the world” (Weber 
2004, 13). Here, again, the process of disenchantment is connected to the domination of nature. 
In his One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse makes a very similar point about the modernizing 
project. He holds, “universal quantifiability is the prerequisite for the domination of nature. 
Individual, non-quantifiable qualities stand in the way of an organization of men and things in 
accordance with the measurable power to be extracted from them” (Marcuse 1964, 164). Thom 
Workman describes this brilliantly: “Marcuse stresses that the modern scientific carving up of 
matter elevates secondary qualities — especially measurable ones — to primary 
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qualities” (Workman 2017, 31). Thus, Marcuse draws out another important possibility: that in 
the quest for quantifiability, quality is forgotten. Hartshorne is very much focussed on quantity, 
specifically the degree of complexity. However, for Hartshorne the issue of quality is never 
forgotten. Furthermore, the careful examination of quantifiable variables becomes the window 
into an enchantment of nature, rather than a repudiation of it. For Weber and Marcuse, 
disenchantment occurs as an inevitable result of scientific progress. For Hartshorne, our sense of 
the enchantment of nature happens only through scientific discovery.  
Hartshorne posits that at some point along the scale of being, the issue of psychological 
complexity arises. This means “complexity of feeling, volition, and thought” (Hartshorne 1937, 
116). Eventually, of course, this means consciousness, and self-consciousness. According to 
Hartshorne, the values of the variables of physiological complexity are infinite in range. That is, 
the quality of psychological sensitivity can be perceived in everything from the “subanimal 
elements” to the “superhuman segments” (Hartshorne 1937, 116). Naturally, though, the quantity 
of sensitivity varies widely. Hartshorne writes, “The ‘psychic’ variables, in short, are simply all 
the variables with an unlimited range, the concepts with supreme flexibility or 
breadth” (Hartshorne 1937, 121). For ecological thinking, there are two important notions that 
can be derived from Hartshorne’s theory of psychical variables. First, he holds that from the 
finite position of human consciousness, it is possible to imagine an infinite being. He writes, “we 
can conceive in principal an indefinite extension of the consciousness which in us is finite. […] 
The infinite possibilities of experience are derived from the infinite power of God, in whom are 
realized the supreme values of the cosmic variables” (Hartshorne 1937, 122). For a more secular 
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reading it is important to keep in mind that for Hartshorne nature as a whole can stand in for 
God. The key point here, then, is that the ‘supreme values’ of the cosmic and psychic variables 
are manifested in nature as a whole. Nature — or, for the present analysis, the ecology — is the 
most complex and sensitive entity. Second, Hartshorne’s scale of psychic values is one in which 
there is a distinct hierarchy. However, this hierarchy, or order of being, is characterized by 
radical inclusivity, rather than exclusivity. He explains: 
[S]uperiority in the scale of beings implies inclusiveness, not exclusiveness, of 
individuals of lower levels, the latter not sacrificing all of their independence in 
being so included (e.g., electrons in a cell, cells in a vertebrate). The higher 
include lower individuals as such — i.e., without reducing them to the role of 
mere “matter” for the higher “form,” as Aristotle would have thought….   40
This notion of a scale of being opens the possibility of a more specific account of the human 
identity with the ecology. If nature as a whole is the most sensitive entity, all those entities that 
are part of nature are also sensitive to some degree. In other words, as part of the supreme entity, 
all individual entities are in some way supreme in themselves. Thus, as this analysis concerns 
human ecology, individual humans are identical with all of nature to the extent that their being is 
sensitive.  
It could also be argued that humans differ from the non-human parts of nature insofar as 
their internal complexity is of far greater magnitude than, for example, even the most intelligent 
animals. This would be one approach to making the argument of human difference from the 
ecology. However, this is still a non-ontological, and merely quantitative, argument. In his 
interpretation of Hartshorne, David Bedford seeks to advance a form of pantheism, while making 
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the case that what is human and what is divine or supreme do differ ontologically (Bedford 1994, 
373). The question then is: “Can we accept the pantheistic idea of unity of all beings in the divine 
being but keep separate the differing ontological statuses of divine and human, animate and 
inanimate?” (Bedford 1994, 373). According to Bedford, St. Augustine, Descartes, Leibniz and 
Berkeley all approach this problem by ascribing to the divine a separate order of being (Bedford 
1994, 373). However, a pantheistic — or more generally, a naturalistic — view would reject the 
supernaturalism inherent in the notion of distinct orders of being. Bedford solves the issue by 
making the argument that the single order of being exists, but in different degrees within 
different entities. Aristotelian and modern logic, as well as the majority of western thought, are 
based on the idea that being simply is or is not. However, Bedford writes, “If the divine and the 
human are the same and different ontologically, as Hartshorne’s relativity argument implies, then 
they must be of the same ontological order yet different in degree” (Bedford 1994, 373).  
Taking the argument even further, Bedford applies the notion of differing ‘degrees of 
being’ to the individuation and essence-bearing characteristics of specific entities (Bedford 1994, 
374). Individual entities can have more or less defined insides and outsides. Entities that are 
more individuated have more clearly defined boundaries between their insides and outsides. As 
well, entities — individuals or systems — that present more internal complexity are 
ontologically superior (Bedford 1994, 374). Bedford writes: 
[I]ndividuation and essence-bearing can be more or less. Some entities which are, 
are more individual and have more complex, defined essences than others. The 
highest being, the most real, will have these properties more than any other. That 
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which is most fully real, is most sensitive and responsive. The existential formula 
is, “to be is to be sensitive.”  41
Insofar as the present analysis is concerned with uncovering a specific foundation for the human 
difference from the rest of nature, Bedford’s explication of the intersection of processual 
sensitivity and essence-bearing characteristics is incredibly helpful. It can be adapted to show 
that human beings are metaphysically distinct from other natural entities by virtue of their greater 
sensitivity. The difference is not merely quantitative; instead, the essential qualities of human 
being can be argued to have a quantitative underpinning. Put succinctly, humans have ‘being,’ or 
are ‘real,’ to an ontologically different degree than both nature as a totality (the supreme) as well 
as the individual sub-human parts of nature. All the while, what is essentially the same about 
humans and nature (both as a whole and its parts) never leaves the analysis: in their sensitivity 
humans are fundamentally identical to all being.  
Process Metaphysics and Ecological Ethics 
Shifting focus slightly, it is now useful to consider ecological ethics that draw on 
panpsychism and process philosophy. Ecological, or environmental, ethics is a relatively new 
subfield, born in the 20th century out of a recognition of the increasing human impact on the 
ecological world. It is centred on the question of reasonable human use of natural resources. 
Ecological ethics asks how, and to what degree, humans may interfere with nature for their own 
ends. Process thinkers have been involved in these academic debates since their inception. For 
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example, Hartshorne himself contributed an article to the founding issue of the Environmental 
Ethics journal in 1979. In his piece, “The Rights of the Subhuman World,” Hartshorne challenges 
the anthropocentric notion that only rationality confers ethical value. Kant holds “that only a 
rational will that acts according to its rationality is intrinsically or unqualifiedly good,” writes 
Hartshorne (Hartshorne 1979, 50). Although Kant admits that even humans exercise rationality 
only imperfectly, this notion is one that has inspired many ethical theories. On this outlook, 
Hartshorne warns, the value of a human infant is “purely potential or instrumental” (Hartshorne 
1979, 51). In other words, this ethical theory is at odds with how most people see the world and 
act in it.  
While he does not deny that humans are supreme amongst natural species, Hartshorne 
builds his ethical perspective on the identity that humans share with the rest of nature, rather than 
what sets them apart from it. What results is a type of anthropocentrism, but a highly nuanced 
one, “which attributes to other creatures neither the duplication, nor the total absence, but lesser 
degrees and more primitive forms, of those properties exhibited in high degree, and more refined 
or complex forms, of those in us…” (Hartshorne 1979, 52). Becoming more specific, Hartshorne 
holds that humans share a significant identity with other higher animals — primates, whales, and 
even wolves, horses and elephants — in terms of neural structure (Hartshorne 1979, 51). It is 
easy to understand that such animals are similar to human beings with their complex 
neurological systems; they are sentient in many of the same ways that we are. But even one-
celled plants, believes Hartshorne, share important similarities with all of nature, including 
human beings. How can this be? The answer is process. Even tiny one-celled organisms contain 
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some level of processual complexity. Hartshorne holds that all process is aware to some degree, 
and with sentience — even non-conscious sentience — comes memory and expectation. This in 
turn confers moral value: “I hold… that where there is feeling there is value in a more than 
instrumental sense” (Hartshorne 1979, 54). Susan Armstrong-Buck holds that in the Western 
tradition the denial of the value of non-human nature goes hand in hand with the denial of its 
experience. She writes, “Our Western culture does not accord intrinsic value to natural entities 
because it does not believe they experience anything; they have value only for us, for our 
purposes; we think of them as means only, as resources” (Armstrong-Buck 1986, 245). Affirming 
the ‘experience’ or ‘feeling’ of non-human entities extends ethical rights into the ecological 
world. However, it seems to do so at the expense of adopting a nonsensical view. That is, it has 
the appearance of holding to the notion that all natural entities are sentient, have experience, and 
possess memories in the same way that humans do. Hartshorne affirms that this is not the case: 
“we need not give up the common-sense view that vegetables, rivers, mountains, and other 
visible objects other than animals are insentient. It is only their invisibly small constituents that 
are to be understood finally through a remote analogy to our own inner life and 
activity” (Hartshorne 1979, 54). Although ‘sentience’ is granted, in this view, only by analogy, 
Hartshorne maintains that living entities all have feeling to some degree, and this is rooted in 
their being composed of processes. There are two important points that can follow from this. 
First, human beings have an identity with non-human nature insofar as they share a common root 
in process. Second, entities are endowed with moral value to the degree to which they display 
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processual complexity. Human beings remain the most important natural species, but they do not 
hold the monopoly on moral value.  
Further developing this line of thought is Frederick Ferré. Interjecting more explicitly 
into existing debates in ecological ethics, Ferré sets himself against both Aldo Leopold and 
Holmes Rolston. Leopold argues, in his Sand Country Almanac, a classic text in the 
environmental movement, that social ethics ought to be extended to the entire biotic sphere. 
Conversely, Holmes advocates a rigid distinction between ecological and social ethics (Ferré 
157). The former sees the biological sphere as a single unity, while the latter posits a strict 
demarcation between humans and the rest of nature. Using a process oriented approach, Ferré 
maintains that what is natural and what is artificial must be understood in degrees. He writes, 
“An apple orchard is more artificial than a forest, but a plastic apple is more artificial yet. 
‘Natural,’ by inversion, is also a relative term — and nature, containing many degrees of 
naturalness, from penguins to people, and even plastics, is none the less still natural…” (Ferré 
159). Adopting an ‘architecture’ — similar to that found in Hartshorne and Bedford — in which 
entities have insides and outsides, Ferré also applies the argument to a grand scale of being. 
According to him, this scale extends along lines of internal complexity and also corresponds to a 
spectrum of intrinsic and instrumental values (160). This implies that organisms that are 
minimally complex generally command less intrinsic and more instrumental value, while the 
relation is reversed in increasingly complex entities. Additionally, Ferré is careful to note that all 
of nature commands some form of value: 
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[W]here intrinsic values become negligible, if they do, our inorganic environment 
can and should still be cherished for its wondrous instrumental values: not just for 
its abilities to sustain a huge community of valuers who constitute our 
interconnected biosphere, but also for its miraculous capacities to refresh and 
renew — both in us and, I believe, in myriad other centres of appreciation — the 
aesthetic delights we perpetually value in and for themselves.  42
Ferré’s is not a complete or ready-to-use ethics. However, it advances far beyond the impractical 
and hollow opposition between anthropocentrism and ecocentrism. While situating human 
beings within the ecology, it does not deny them instrumental use of other parts of nature for the 
satisfaction of their needs (material, aesthetic, and otherwise). Meanwhile, the total value of 
nature as a complete system is always in sight. More specifically, the ethical question becomes: 
what are the limits to the instrumental use of the lower orders of nature, and how can this usage 
be regulated so that it achieves a balance with the ecology, and does not become exploitative and 
destructive? In fact, Ferré’s line of thought recalls Marcuse’s distinction between basic and 
surplus. Marcuse describes a level of repression, or alienation from nature, that is basic, 
necessary for human being. However, he also notes that some forms of alienation are 
unnecessary, excessive, and injurious. We might extend this argument to ecological ethics, 
declaring that there are some uses of the natural world that are necessary for our survival and 
flourishing. On the other hand there are other uses that are surplus, which do not contribute to 
our growth, and are deleterious to us as well as the ecology.   
At this point it is useful to explore, with some more specificity, the hierarchy of being — 
and therefore of ethics — that is proposed by the process ontology. Armstrong-Buck has 
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described this system in a convenient way, using Whitehead’s terminology of ‘actual occasions.’ 
To begin, Whitehead’s actual occasions are “the final real things of which the world is made 
up… drops of experience, complex and interdependent” (Whitehead 1978, 18). Whitehead 
differs slightly from Hartshorne here, but the central ideas are substantially the same. Armstrong-
Buck writes, “The world is not a collection of separate things or substances, but a process of 
fluent energy, a creative advance, constituted by the coming into being of actual 
occasions…” (Armstrong-Buck 1986, 243). Whitehead isolates the moments of processual 
change and makes them his ontological building blocks. The world is formed of these ‘actual 
occasions,’ organized in myriad ways and interacting at various levels. Complexity comes with 
the level of organization of the actual occasions. Inorganic matter represents the basic level of 
organizational complexity. Single living cells constitute a higher level because the actual 
occasions are organized to a greater degree. Plants represent the next level of intricacy, followed 
by animals, “in which there is at least one personally ordered society, made up of actual 
occasions inheriting from each other in serial order” (Armstrong-Buck 1986, 248). Of course 
humans occupy the highest end of this spectrum of entities. They have the highest level of 
organizational complexity, and the actual occasions of which they are composed reach the level 
of reflective experience and rationality. We are also capable of universality: “Human 
consciousness is able to grasp the universal nature of ideals and symbols, whereas animal 
consciousness is more closely tied to the physical pole” (Armstrong-Buck 1986, 248). This 
rather simple schematic of inorganic material, cells, plants, animals and humans, obscures much 
of the variety and complexity of the natural world. Still, it does offer an interesting way to think 
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about the differing quantities of processual complexity that make up the world in which we 
reside.  
Interestingly, Armstrong-Buck acknowledges that the supreme quantity of complexity 
displayed by human beings is not wholly positive. Echoing some of the ideas proposed by the 
Frankfurt thinkers, she argues that the capacity for reason sets humans apart from nature in ways 
that are often destructive. She writes, “Yet this same capacity of abstraction from the actual 
world allows human beings to forget their rootedness in their bodies and the world, as well as 
their kinship with non-human life. This distinction results in the cruel and destructive behaviour 
which human beings sometimes exhibit” (Armstrong-Buck 1986, 248). In other words, we are 
often guilty of overstepping our bounds, because the same characteristics that grant us so much 
power over the world also lead us to misunderstand our place within it. Taking the analysis even 
further, Armstrong-Buck holds that there may be elements of non-human experience that are 
richer than human experience, even if they are less complex (Armstrong-Buck 1986, 249). She 
cites the following passage from Whitehead: 
Without doubt higher animals entertain notions, hopes, and fears. And yet they 
lack civilization by reason of the deficient generality of their mental functioning. 
Their love, their devotion, their beauty of performance, rightly claim our love and 
our tenderness in return. Civilization is more than all these; and in moral worth it 
can be less than all these.  43
There is an interesting conclusion to be drawn from this. As entities humans are more complex 
and deserving of more moral consideration than higher animals. But in the context of 
civilization, not only can the richness of our experience become diminished, but those truly 
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human qualities — those which entitle us to special moral worth — can also decline. This does 
not necessarily mean, for example, that a dog can hold more moral worth than a human. It does, 
however, call to our attention the moral qualities of higher animals. Moreover, it evokes the 
sense that in many of our behaviours and actions, especially as a species, we fail to meet a 
reasonable standard for beings with such complexity and capability for reflection.  
Bringing the analysis back to Hartshorne, I would now like to draw some connections 
between process philosophy’s emphasis on the complexity of nature and natural entities, the 
treatment of nature by humans, and the central thread in this dissertation, enchantment. Although 
Hartshorne has a theistic approach, he strives to make his perspective accord with modern 
natural science. A sense of enchantment, he maintains, does not need to be rooted in religious 
sentiment. Scientists, “if not religious,” he writes, “will probably have some vague feeling for 
nature as a wondrous whole to the beauty of which every species makes its contribution, 
including humanity as… supreme but far from sole example” (Hartshorne 1979, 51). Of course, 
while this view is inspired by scientific understanding, it need not be limited to scientists. As I 
have argued in the Introduction, an appreciation of natural enchantment, and a firmer grasp of the 
human location within the natural world, can contribute to a widely held sense of the ‘political,’ 
and serve as a foundation for ecological politics and ethics. Returning to the ethical question of 
reasonable use, Hartshorne acknowledges that it is a difficult one. Human ends have ethical 
priority over non-human ones, and it is reasonable to instrumentalize nature to some degree. But 
Hartshorne, even in the late 1970’s, saw that things had gone too far. Himself a great naturalist 
and a leading expert on birdsongs, Hartshorne asserts that simple human conveniences should 
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not take precedence over the preservation of natural beauty and the richness of its forms 
(Hartshorne 1979, 57-58). A change in outlook would require that “the tiny minority of adults 
who have the sense, shared between small children and adult nature lovers, of the fascination and 
beauty of all the forms of life… be turned into a majority” (Hartshorne 1979, 57). This change in 
popular attitude is not necessary merely for the conservation on natural complexity; it is also to 
our great benefit. By learning to preserve and appreciate natural beauty, we also make our own 
lives more rich. As Hartshorne notes, “We are the only animals capable of being interested in, 
finding some use for, taking some delight in, all the forms of life” (Hartshorne 1979, 59). As the 
most complex beings, we have the most to lose from the destruction of ecological richness: “If 
we are merely selfish towards our fellow creatures, we shall probably, like all merely selfish 
persons, not do justice even to our own selfish interest” (Hartshorne 1979, 59). This also means 
that we have to most to gain from its conservation.  
Conclusion 
The overarching theme of this dissertation is the enchantment of nature, humans, and the 
human place in nature. From Rousseau to the Frankfurt thinkers, there developed a strong 
humanism, a sense of the specialness of human beings. This was not an entirely uncritical 
humanism. In various moments it challenges the supremacy of reason, and compels us to 
acknowledge our integration in the natural world. In the end, however, the specialness, the 
enchantment, begins with humanity and — in places — extends downward to other natural 
beings. On the other hand, with process metaphysics that specialness begins with nature — even 
  !167
its inorganic components — and culminates in human beings. More so than the ‘historical-
dialectical’ thinkers, process philosophy demands a recognition of the interconnectedness of the 
entire ecological world. As a result, we are obliged to acknowledge our own integration, as 
entities composed of processes, in the ecology. Most importantly, by emphasizing process, 
complexity, novelty, and creativity, rather than fixed stable objects, process metaphysics makes 
all of nature significant. It draws our attention to natural beauty at every level of complexity and 
the richness of the entire ecological world. Not only does this strengthen our understanding of 
our own place in nature, it also inspires an ethic of conservation of natural richness, which 
thereby enriches and illuminates our own lives and experience.  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Chapter 6: Critical Realism, Stratification, and Emergence in Human Ecology 
Introduction 
In this final substantive chapter, I consider more carefully the moment in which quantity 
passes over into quality. That is, I investigate the point at which the increasing complexity of a 
biological organism turns into the qualitatively different level of self-consciousness that defines 
human being. As process philosophy has suggested, between organisms there are vast differences 
in the complexity of internal processes. In this paradigm the difference — for example, between 
a human and a rabbit — is expressed as one of degree. A human is more internally complex, 
contains more processes, than a rabbit. Here I will maintain the position that the difference is a 
matter of degree and of quality. To do so I will articulate a theory of reality that sees it as 
stratified — that is, composed of qualitatively different, yet interdependent, levels — and which 
displays at these various levels the character of emergent properties, attributes not reducible to 
those contained in lower, less complex levels. Emergentism and theories of stratification are 
relatively common in the philosophy of science, yet generally unknown in political and critical 
theory. There are many adherents to these positions. The analysis here will centre on the ‘Critical 
Realist’ approach offered by Roy Bhaskar. In addition to being a robust and defensible account 
of emergence and stratification, Bhaskar’s writings are more likely to be familiar to those who 
also have an interest in Marxism, social theory, or Critical Theory. This chapter begins with a 
brief summary of the ontological problem as I see it, and an explanation as to why emergentism 
and stratification help to solve it. It then offers a brief introduction to Critical Realism. This is 
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followed by a discussion of Bhaskar’s theory of stratification and emergence, with an 
explanation of how they elevate our understanding of the ecology and our place within in. 
Becoming more specific, the exploration then turns to Bhaskar’s theory of mind, or ‘synchronic 
emergent powers materialism.’ The chapter finishes with some remarks on our deepened 
understanding of our place in nature, as well as the ways in which emergentist philosophy 
contributes to a sense of enchantment — of ourselves and of the natural world.  
The Problem So Far  
In the foregoing chapters I have tried to articulate a theory of human ecology in which 
(human) self-consciousness is understood as both inside and outside of nature, or rather, as 
simultaneously identical and non-identical with nature. To sum up briefly, what has been termed 
the ‘historical dialectical’ tradition, which extends from Rousseau to the Frankfurt School, 
emphasizes the interpenetration and interdependence of nature and history. The examples of 
Rousseau, Marx and Adorno are instructive. Rousseau recognizes that special human capacity of 
‘perfectibility,’ which permits humans to disobey the ‘laws of nature,’ and therefore to create 
their own history through the self-conscious transformation of nature. However, Rousseau also 
sees that there are immutable biological necessities that are not historically surmountable 
(Horowitz 1987, 80). History, then, is the complex interpenetration of the natural and the social. 
Marx, using a more explicitly dialectical approach, locates the unity of mind and nature in 
practical sensuous human activity (Marx 1973, 13-15). In other words, the special ‘power’ of 
self-consciousness is located in the practical manipulation of nature for real human needs and 
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wants. Adorno, drawing extensively from both Rousseau and Marx, stresses the interpenetration 
of nature and history: human history is (partially) natural history and the extra-human parts of 
nature are always shaped by human interaction (Cook 2011, 1). Each in their own ways, 
Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, and the first generation Frankfurt School theorists articulate a unity of 
the identity and non-identity of history and nature, or of humanity and the ecology. 
Notwithstanding this unity, the poles of the dialectic also retain theoretical — if not some degree 
of practical — independence.  
While the various ‘historical dialectical’ approaches help to articulate an adequate theory 
of human ecology, they also present several aporia. First, without a sufficient account of the 
common ontological ground between self-consciousness and nature, the former is often treated 
simply as ‘mind’ and the latter as ‘matter.’ Second, the specific mechanisms or processes that 
give rise to self-consciousness are under-theorized. It is the intention of this chapter to address 
these absences. What is required, it seems, is a polyvalent ontological monism. That is, a 
conception of a singular ontological sphere that contains multiple levels able to contain — at a 
minimum — a differentiation between mind and matter. One approach to this issue is to be found 
in process metaphysics. While there is considerable diversity within this tradition, a key theme is 
the replacement of substance ontology with a process ontology. In other words, process is being. 
On questions of ecology and biology, Charles Hartshorne is particularly useful. Hartshorne, as 
has been articulated in the foregoing chapter, uses the concept of ‘psychic’ variables to order the 
individuated entities of a unified being according to internal complexity. He also posits that at 
some point along the scale of being, the issue of psychological complexity arises. This means 
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“complexity of feeling, volition, and thought” (Hartshorne 1937, 116). According to Hartshorne, 
the values of the variables of physiological complexity are infinite in range. That is, the quality 
of psychological sensitivity can be perceived in everything from the “subanimal elements” to the 
“superhuman segments” (Hartshorne 1937, 116). Naturally, though, the quantity of sensitivity 
varies widely. Hartshorne writes, “The ‘psychic’ variables, in short, are simply all the variables 
with an unlimited range, the concepts with supreme flexibility or breadth” (Hartshorne 1937, 
121). 
This notion of a scale of being opens the possibility of a more specific account of the 
human identity with the ecology. If nature as a whole is the most sensitive entity, all those 
entities that are part of nature are also sensitive to some degree. In other words, as part of the 
supreme entity, all individual entities are in some way supreme in themselves. Thus, as this 
analysis concerns human ecology, individual humans are identical with all of nature to the extent 
that their being is sensitive. It could also be argued that humans differ from the non-human parts 
of nature insofar as their internal complexity is of far greater magnitude than, for example, even 
the most intelligent animals. This would be one approach to making the argument of human 
difference from the ecology. However, this is still ultimately a quantitative argument. What is 
needed is a way of demonstrating how the quantitative variances in sensitivity and complexity 
pass over into qualitative differences. In other words, what is needed is stratificationist and 
emergentist theory of human ecology. In this chapter, I draw on the Critical Realist philosophy of 
Roy Bhaskar to elucidate such a view.  
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A Brief Introduction to Critical Realism 
The late Roy Bhaskar is an interesting and controversial figure in contemporary critical 
social thought and philosophy of science. Although he is the originator of the school of thought 
know as Critical Realism, it is a diverse paradigm with a variety of important contributors. The 
assessment of Bhaskar’s legacy is made difficult by an unfortunate trajectory taken by his work 
over the course of his career. His early works, especially A Realist Theory of Science and The 
Possibility of Naturalism are examples of clear, effective, and logical, if not difficult, 
composition. Sadly, his later works became increasingly dense, incomprehensible, and rife with 
awkward mysticism. This has been called Bhaskar’s ‘idealist’ or ‘spiritualist’ turn. Some scholars 
of Critical Realism hold that Bhaskar is only useful up to this point (see Creaven 2007, 6). 
Luckily, Bhaskar’s excellent conceptions of realism and naturalism — along with stratification 
and emergence — in the social and natural sciences are contained in his more readily 
understandable earlier works. His first major work, A Realist Theory of Science, was published in 
1975 amid a flurry of activity in positivist and post-positivist philosophy of science (Bhaskar and 
Lawson 1998, 3). Bhaskar’s intent was to find a solution to the problem that knowledge is of the 
real world, yet it is also socially produced. As he puts it: 
Any adequate philosophy of science must find a way of grappling with this 
central paradox of science: that men in their social activity produce knowledge 
which is a social product much like any other, which is no more independent of its 
production and the men who produce it than motor cars, armchairs or books, 
which has its own craftsmen, technicians, publicists, standards and skills and 
which is no less subject to change than any other commodity. This is one side of 
‘knowledge’. The other is that knowledge is ‘of’ things which are not produced by 
men at all: the specific gravity of mercury, the process of electrolysis, the 
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mechanism of light propagation. None of these ‘objects of knowledge’ depend 
upon human activity.  44
Bhaskar holds that this view calls forth a non-anthropocentric view of humanity’s location in 
nature (Bhaskar and Lawson 1998, 3). We are not wholly within nature (or culture), as the 
deniers of science maintain, yet we are also not totally outside of it, as the positivist outlook 
requires.  
According to Andrew Collier, one of Bhaskar’s most important interpreters, the term 
Critical Realism is an amalgam of the names of the two main components of Bhaskar’s early 
philosophy: ‘transcendental realism’ and ‘critical naturalism’ (Collier 1994, ix-xi). 
Transcendental realism is realist because, in short, it holds that the world ‘really is’ there and that 
is it, partially at least, scientifically discoverable. These positions represent ontological and 
epistemological realism, respectively. Transcendental realism is transcendental because it 
employs, following Kant, a transcendental deduction. Collier writes, “In such arguments, we ask 
‘what must be true in order for x to be possible?’… (Collier 1994, 20). In this case the question 
is: what must be true for science to be possible (for it to work)? Bhaskar answers that the world 
must be ordered for science to work. Given that science does work, the world must be ordered. 
But transcendental realism, unlike positivism, is also a form of ‘depth’ realism. Collier offers 
three main ways in which transcendental realism conveys depth. First, it upholds the principle of 
‘intransitivity,’ which means a separation of the ontological and the epistemological. What 
Bhaskar call the ‘epistemic fallacy’ is the mistaken conflation of what is with what can be known 
 Bhaskar 2008a, 21.44
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(Bhaskar 2008a, 36). These must be distinguished. As Collier puts it: “The domain of the real is 
distinct from and greater than the domain of the empirical” (Collier 1998, xii). Second, and very 
much connected to the first point, transcendental realism maintains ‘transfactuality.’ This is the 
position that the laws of nature, or generative mechanisms, exist and operate independently of 
the systems that they condition (Collier 1998, xii-xiii). Third, this type of realism provides for 
depth because it sees the world as ‘stratified,’ into ordered, hierarchical and interdependent 
layers. The forms of knowing that correspond to these layers are also stratified (Collier 1998, 
xiii). I will return to this idea below.   
In a recent intervention on Marcuse, Thom Workman has illuminated the importance of 
‘depth ontologies’ in the philosophy of science as well as critical social science. Marcuse’s 
seminal One-Dimensional Man was fiercely critical of modern scientific methodology. Workman 
notes, “Marcuse indicted science for its repressive ideological function, that is, for its complicity 
in flattening out culture and narrowing the universe of political and social discourse” (Workman 
2017, 20). Using Critical Realism, Workman shows that science is not fundamentally one-
dimensional. That is, it does not necessarily reduce reality to appearance, and constant 
conjunctions to generative mechanisms. In fact, it is only positivist science that does this. Buried 
in Marcuse’s critique of positivism, Workman finds a vindication of realist science. Central to 
this excavation is the differentiation of ‘nomothetic’ and ‘retroductive’ visions of scientific 
explanation. The former is concerned merely with “correlative facts and causes, and… constant 
conjunctions or Humean laws that help to predict outcomes” (Workman 2017, 33). It is, in short, 
positivist science. Meanwhile, the retroductive model, of which Critical Realism is an example, 
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posits “an ontology of depth replete with judgments about a determinative and relatively 
impermeable core, sometimes regarded as the essence of the thing in question, an essence which 
then generates outward or phenomenal appearances. This is a model of scientific explanation 
which posits contestable claims about reality at the heart of its theoretical 
explanations” (Workman 2017, 33). Incisively, Workman exposes Marcuse’s insistence on two-
dimensionality, his dialectical refusal to elide reality into appearance, as a form of retroductive 
science.  
‘Critical naturalism’ originates in Bhaskar’s second major work, The Possibility of 
Naturalism. The aim of this work, and of ‘critical naturalism,’ is to overcome several persistent 
and problematic dichotomies in social science: positivism/hermeneutics, individualism/
collectivism, voluntarism/reification, facts/values, reasons/causes, and mind/body (Collier 1998, 
xiii-xiv). The main pillar of Bhaskar’s social ontology is called the ‘Transformational Model of 
Social Activity,’ or TMSA. Here, he places himself against Weberian, Durkheimian, and 
‘Dialectical,’ or Marxist, conceptions of the relationship between individuals and society 
(Bhaskar 1998, 32). The TMSA maintains that individuals and the social whole occupy different 
ontological strata, but holds that they are nonetheless deeply interconnected, mutually 
determining one another. In his own words: 
The model of the society/person connection I am proposing could be summarized 
as follows: people do not create society. For it always pre-exists them and is a 
necessary condition of their activity. Rather, society must be regarded as an 
ensemble of structures, practices and conventions, which individuals reproduce or 
transform, but which would not exists unless they did so. Society does not exist 
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independently of social activity (the error of reification). But it is not the product 
of it (the error of voluntarism).  45
This is the critical element of critical naturalism. The naturalist element advances the position 
that social science shares with the natural sciences a fundamental unity of method (Bhaskar 
1998, 2). This is in contrast to a long standing counter view, first advanced by Weber, that the 
natural and social sciences must be sharply distinguished methodologically. Terry Maley writes, 
“Weber argued that the social sciences required a method of historical understanding that 
differentiated them from the natural sciences. He called this method… deutendes Verstehen… a 
method of interpretive understanding whereby the social scientist understands subjects 
empathetically and not in a disinterested, purely objective way” (Maley 2011, 154). Bhaskar 
recognizes that knowledge (even in the natural sciences) is produced in a social environment, 
subject to social determinants, and is therefore unable to claim total objectivity. He nonetheless 
proposes a heavily qualified form of naturalism. The difference hinges on his ontological 
commitments: Bhaskar understands that at the social and psychological levels there is far more 
complexity than at lower levels, such as physics or chemistry. This makes obtaining an 
experimental closure impossible, along with predictability. However, there are laws and 
generative mechanisms at work at these higher levels, and they are theoretically discoverable. It 
is in this way that Bhaskar deals with the ‘break,’ between the natural and the social: that is, by 
holding that they are both possible objects of scientific knowledge, but maintaining a 
methodological variation that corresponds to ontological stratification, discussed below.   
 Bhaskar 1998, 36.45
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Critical Realism on Stratification and Emergence 
In what follows it will be argued that the concepts of stratification and emergence present 
the most adequate manner of theorizing the complex and differentiated unity that is the ecology 
(organic as well as inorganic nature). Whereas in Roy Bhaskar’s earlier work, especially A 
Realist Theory of Science, part of the emphasis is on the epistemological stratification of the 
sciences, here the focus is mostly on the ontological stratification of reality.  Subsequently, the 46
analysis shifts to Bhaskar’s ‘Synchronic Emergent Powers Materialism,’ or SEPM, which is one 
specific yet important type of emergence. SEPM explains the emergence of thinking from matter 
and therefore offers precisely the polyvalent ontological monism sought by the present 
investigation.  
In Critical Realism, stratification — or depth — occurs in three ways. First, between the 
transitive and intransitive dimensions of science. Second, between the empirical, the actual and 
the real, as levels of epistemological depth. And finally, at the real, between the various causal 
mechanisms that operate at that level (Collier 1994, 42-51). It is this third type of depth that 
interests us here. Most basically, the concept of a stratification of generative mechanisms 
suggests that being itself consists in multiple levels. These correspond roughly, although they do 
not match perfectly, to the different levels at which science investigates the world: physical, 
chemical, biological, psychological, sociological, etc. (Collier 1994, 107). In other words, a 
multiplicity of mechanisms necessitates a multiplicity of sciences.  
 Of course, in Bhaskar’s transcendental analysis of scientific activity, the epistemological differentiation amongst 46
the sciences results from the ontological stratification of reality (Bhaskar 2008a, 170). 
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At this point, the conception of a singular yet multi-layered reality accords well with the 
theory of human ecology sought in this paper. However, an unqualified stratificationism leaves 
itself open to two detrimental errors concerning the relationship between the strata: reductionism 
and pluralism. In the reductionist fallacy, mechanisms at higher strata are completely reduced to, 
and thus explained by, mechanisms at lower strata. For example, biology would be reducible to 
physics. On the other hand, pluralism asserts the complete independence of higher strata from 
lower. Sociological analysis, thereby, could have no biological foundations. From a human 
ecological point of view, reductionism completely and falsely abrogates what is special about life 
— at both the levels of ecological complexity and human consciousness — by explaining their 
existence in purely physicalist or vulgar materialist terms. Pluralism, in making human 
consciousness and its related faculties (self-reflection, conscious transformation of nature) totally 
independent of lower strata, denies the embeddedness of humanity within nature and the 
necessary material and biological underpinnings of individual and social life.  
Rejecting both the reductionist and pluralist fallacies, Roy Bhaskar advances a 
stratificationist theory that is emergentist: the mechanisms and events occurring in higher strata 
are emergent from the lower strata. On this account, the relationship between strata is understood 
as one of rootedness and irreducibility. This means that higher strata are rooted in and dependent 
upon, yet cannot be reduced to, lower strata. Andrew Collier offers an instructive account of 
emergence theories: 
Emergence theories are those that, while recognizing that the more complex 
aspects of reality (e.g. life, mind) presuppose the less complex (e.g. matter), also 
insist that they have features which are irreducible, i.e. cannot be thought in 
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concepts appropriate to the less complex levels — and that not because of any 
subjective constraints on our thought, but because of the inherent nature of the 
emergent strata.   47
Two points are important here. First, Collier’s implication that higher level strata are more 
complex that lower level ones indicates a possible affinity with a process conception of the 
world, whereby the scale of being is ordered in terms of increasing complexity. Second, from the 
perspective of human ecology, emergence seems to balance the tension between the identity and 
non-identity of humans and nature. Clearly, human being (including mind) is rooted in, and 
fundamentally dependent on, lower levels of reality (biology, etc). But emergence does not 
necessitate a false naturalism: humanity is allowed to occupy its own unique strata, irreducible to 
the less complex levels in which it is rooted. This particular instance of emergence will be 
discussed in greater detail below, with reference to ‘synchronic emergent powers materialism.’  
Usefully, Collier delineates three specific types of relationship that may hold between 
strata. The first consists of what he calls ‘ontological presupposition.’ In short, some strata are 
not conceivable without others. In a basic sense, biology presupposes chemistry, which 
presupposes physics. In more complex cases, ontological presupposition is not necessarily 
chronological: two levels of being may come into existence at the same time, yet one may 
ontologically pre-suppose the other (Collier 1994, 131). The second type of relation is the 
epistemological corollary of the first: mechanisms at a lower (ontologically presupposed) stratum 
explain mechanisms at higher strata. This is called vertical explanation (Collier 1994, 131-132). 
Finally, relations between strata imply composition. The qualities of being at one stratum are 
 Collier 1994, 110-111.47
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composed of the qualities inherent in lower strata (Collier 1994, 132). For example, biological 
life is made up of of chemical components. Thus we might argue that the psychological existence 
of the individual ontologically presupposes and is composed of biological life, and can also be 
(at least partially) explained by biology.  
In Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom Bhaskar explains that emergence signifies the 
possibility of genuine novelty and irreducibility. He writes, “In emergence, generally, new beings 
(entities, structures, totalities, concepts) are generated out of pre-existing material from which 
they could have been neither induced nor deduced” (Bhaskar 2008b, 49). With its very specific 
account of the relationship between levels of being emergence — as noted above — is able to do 
away with the tension between reductionism, and pluralism (or dualism). It is therefore able to 
explain real novelty without recourse to transcendent causes (Bhaskar 2008b, 49-50). In the 
absence of such causes, however, what is required is a conception of matter as immanently 
creative. Bhaskar holds that in emergence matter is conceived as “creative, as 
autopoietic” (Bhaskar 2008b, 49). In other words, there is an ‘active side,’ or an element of self-
direction that exists as in inherent potentiality of matter. To put the issue in ‘Adornian' terms, this 
means that we ought to respect the primacy of the object. This power can give rise to life, and 
even mind. This special property will be explored more fully in the next section, on emergent 
powers materialism.  
Before turning to the specific account of SEPM, however, it is useful to consider the 
ways in which Bhaskar’s ‘autopoietic’ account of matter and emergence helps to formulate an 
adequate theory of the ecology. Indeed, the ecology is a stratified reality with emergent levels, 
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presenting genuine novelty. The Critical Realist account of emergence allows the ecology to be 
fundamentally scientifically discoverable, and yet does not reduce biological, ecological or even 
sociological complexity to vulgar mechanistic terms. Emergence and novelty are explained in 
immanent rather than transcendent terms. As well, stratification and emergence provide a 
(partial) answer to the constitutive ontological problem of identity and non-identity in a 
differentiated unity. As Sean Creaven notes, the levels are all identical insofar are they are part of 
the same ordered hierarchy, yet they are different in that they have a variety of properties and 
generative mechanisms that are not reducible to one another (Creaven 2007, 21).  
Synchronic Emergent Powers Materialism and Human Ecology 
In this section the philosophy of mind is brought to bear on the problem of human and 
ecology. While philosophy of mind is generally concerned with the relation of mind to matter, 
human ecology asks the broader (but directly related) question of the relationship of 
consciousness to nature. Here, Bhaskar’s philosophy of mind, the “unpronounceable 
tetragrammaton” (Collier 1994, 156) ‘synchronic emergent powers materialism’ is described and 
critically assessed as to its utility for understanding the human relationship with nature.  
Quite simply, ‘synchronic emergent powers materialism’ is the notion that mind emerges 
from matter. In The Possibility of Naturalism, where SEPM is first introduced, Bhaskar explains 
that it is an explicitly metaphysical position (Bhaskar 1998, 97). However, in Dialectic: The 
Pulse of Freedom SEPM receives a more comprehensive explanation: 
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To comprehend human agency as a causally and taxonomically irreducible mode 
of matter is not to posit a distinct substance ‘mind’ endowed with reason for 
acting apart from the causal network, but to credit intentional embodied agency 
with distinct (emergent) causal powers from the biological matter out which 
agents were formed….  48
As in his other work, Bhaskar is here striving to formulate a theory that resists both reductionism 
and dualism. SEPM rejects dualism by insisting that it is from distinctly biological foundation 
that mind emerges. On the other hand, contra reductionism, it asserts that consciousness cannot 
be reduced to those biological bases (Bhaskar 2008b, 51). Here, Bhaskar is arguing specifically 
against what he calls a ‘rigorous’ form of reductionism known as ‘central state materialism,’ 
which posits the reducibility of people and their powers to matter (Bhaskar 1998, 97).  
Still, as Collier notes, SEPM is a remarkably ‘permissive’ theory, in that it leaves open 
the answers to several important questions (Collier 1994, 156). The first central equivocation in 
SEPM concerns its synchronicity. According to Collier, in opting for a synchronic, rather than 
diachronic, theory of mind, Bhaskar is ‘bracketing off’ a set of questions (Collier 1994, 157). 
The first of these questions concerns, obviously, temporal priority. For Bhaskar different strata 
may ontologically presuppose one another, and yet have come into existence simultaneously 
(Collier 1994, 157). Another question that is left unanswered concerns the actual causes of 
emergence. Bhaskar is essentially silent on this matter (Collier 1994, 157). Creaven is sharply 
critical of these twin reticences, which he sees as interconnected. He writes,  
Bhaskar does not explain how this emergent structure [mind] arose from its root 
structure. For that we need evolutionary (‘diachronic’) theories of mind (which 
theorize the selective mechanisms and pressures and advantages behind cognitive 
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development)…. Such naturalistic theories also need to be linked to theories of 
the socio-cultural evolution of archaic and early modern Homo Sapiens.  49
In essence, by leaving out the categories of time and history, SEPM fails to supply an adequate 
explanation of the specific causes of the emergence of mind from matter. 
Additionally, Bhaskar refuses to commit to any position on the ultimate nature of 
‘substance.’ He writes that mind may be a complex arrangement of powers emergent from and 
dependent on a material substance, and yet irreducible to matter. However, he argues that mind 
may also be the powers of a hitherto undiscovered immaterial substance (Bhaskar 1998, 98). In 
this case it is left to Bhaskar’s interpreter Collier to explain what is actually materialist about 
‘synchronic emergent powers materialism.’ Collier writes, “SEPM is materialist only in the sense 
that, while it does not rule out mind as an immaterial substance, it would insist that any such 
substance ontologically presupposed material substances” (Collier 1994, 156). By refusing to 
make an ontological commitment on this matter, Bhaskar seems to be allowing the possibility of 
precisely the type of dualism he has worked so hard to dismiss. Further, while he insists in The 
Possibility of Naturalism that his aim is not to “comfort any sort of spiritualism…” (Bhaskar 
1998, 97) this ontological ambiguity concerning an immaterial substance leaves the door open to 
just such a situation.  
SEPM, despite these shortcomings, can still be useful for a human-ecological theory. In 
what follows, the ‘historical dialectical’ and process-oriented approaches are brought back into 
the dialogue, as necessary correctives to SEPM’s ambiguities. In this creative encounter, Critical 
 Creaven 2007, 40.49
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Realism is strengthened and made adequate to human ecology. On the matter of diachrony, 
synchrony, history and explanation, Creaven is surely correct that theories of mind must take into 
consideration modern theories of cognitive development. Emergentist neuroscience presents 
important non-reductionist theories of mind that cannot be ignored (see, for example, Deacon 
2012). Yet the imperative to consider history when studying the development of mind from 
matter, or humans from nature, long precedes modern science. Although he admitted that 
inquiries into our ultimate origins are necessarily conjectural, Rousseau described the emergence 
of humans from the ecology, as well as language, mind and society from individuals, as historical 
processes (Rousseau 1987, 39-60). Likewise, in Hegel’s phenomenological anthropology the 
development of consciousness and eventually (self-negating) self-consciousness is a historical 
process (see Hegel 1977).  
Bhaskar’s reluctance to admit that ontological and temporal priority go together seems to 
stem from concerns that this would also entail causal priority. This is, fortunately, not the case. 
For example, although individuals are temporally and ontologically prior to society (and thus 
society is an emergent property of individuals), it is still entirely possible that society determines 
individuals to some degree. In fact, this is a central feature of Bhaskar’s sociological theory: the 
transformational model of social activity (Bhaskar 1998, 31-37). In other emergentist literature 
this phenomenon is called “downward causation” and implies that the higher ‘emergent’ strata 
determine lower levels (Bedau 2008, 175). In this way, it is possible to have a historically 
sensitive, diachronic theory of emergence (and mind), which nonetheless admits of multiple 
directions of causation. Indeed, the example of human ecology is instructive. If one accepts the 
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findings of modern science and the theory of evolution, then nature must be understood as 
temporally and ontologically antecedent to humans, with their special powers of self-
consciousness and praxical labour. Meanwhile, through these special emergent powers, humans 
exert causal influence downward, upon nature.  
So much for Bhaskar’s treatment of emergence and temporality. His ambiguities 
concerning substance and matter are not so easily reformed. By leaving open the potential for an 
as yet undiscovered immaterial substance Bhaskar enters the dangerous territory of ontological 
dualism. Here it will be argued that there are two, perhaps not mutually contradictory, solutions 
to this problem. The first consists of a stronger, yet still non-reductive, materialism. John Searle 
suggests that there are two types of emergence. In ‘emergence1’ the emergent features of a 
system are explainable in terms of the causal interactions between its constituent features. Searle 
favours this type of emergence to explain mind (Searle 2008, 69-70). Ultimately, this approach is 
still reductionist, as ultimately mind is causally (although not ontologically) reducible to brain 
states, and so on down to the atomic level. However, in ‘emergence2,’ which Searle rejects as 
fanciful, emergent properties are understood to have causal powers that cannot be deduced from 
or explained by the interaction of the causal powers of their components (Searle 2008, 70). 
Despite his own reductionist tendencies, Searle’s ‘emergence2’ provides a theory of emergence, 
and of the genesis of consciousness, that seem to satisfy the criteria of a polyvalent ontological 
monism. The special status of the emergent causal powers of human consciousness are affirmed 
without recourse to ontological dualism. Instead, the metaphysical difference between strata is 
attributed to the emergence of causally irreducible causal powers.  
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The second option, suggested by process philosophy, is to simply move beyond a 
substance ontology, towards one focussed on process, complexity and sensitivity. Because 
Critical Realism is not ultimately materialist — the real, for Bhaskar, consists in transfactually 
active, supramaterial causal mechanisms — it may indeed be compatible with a process 
ontology. On this view being exists in degrees and an entity has being to the extent that it is 
internally complex and therefore externally sensitive. However, something akin to Hartshorne’s 
scale of being might usefully be applied to understand stratification and the emergence of 
novelty. Of course, this is not to deny that there is a fundamental material substrate. But 
considering the failure — impossibility — to perform an ontological or causal reduction of mind, 
or even biology, to matter, the irreducibility of complexity and process at higher levels ought to 
be taken seriously. Bedford has already argued that a process conception allows us to see the 
world in such a way that being is unified, yet differentiated; to the extent that they are complex 
entities have being to ontologically different degrees (Bedford 1994, 372-374). The question 
remains, though, as to what gives rise to such differentiation. What is the moment of origin? 
Here, emergence and process metaphysics can come together: emergent phenomena are so 
because their process are causally and ontologically irreducible to the processes of the levels 
which constitute them. Complexity is what exists, in varying degrees, at both the levels of 
concrete experience and generative mechanisms (the real).  
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Conclusion 
What, then, does this mean for human ecology? To begin, it is now clear that the 
emergentist philosophy of mind proposed here reaches deep into the origination of mind. The 
stratified ontology that has been demonstrated shows that the foundations of mind are more than 
simply material: they are simultaneously biological, neurophysiological and ecological. Dewey 
hints that this type of differentiation in his sequence of interactions between qualitative relations: 
physical, psycho-physical, and mental. For Dewey the relationship is of increasing complexity 
and intimacy of interaction among natural events (Dallmayr 2002, 92-93). In his stratified model 
of the self, Bhaskar suggests a similar hierarchy, ranging from the biological foundations, to the 
unconscious, preconscious and eventually consciousness and self-consciousness (Bhaskar 2008b, 
149). What is clear is that the special human power of self-consciousness does not arise directly 
out of matter. Nor can the foundations of mind be reduced to matter. In the hierarchy of being 
mind finds itself emerging from many layers, each one rooted in the ones below it, and yet 
irreducible to them. They are irreducible because their quantitative increases in complexity pass 
over into qualitative — metaphysical — differences, which are manifested in the emergence of 
novel and causally irreducible powers. So, we have a theory whereby humans are ontologically 
continuous with nature, and with the ecology specifically. But within the order of being, we also 
have a special strata for what is human, or more specifically for the special power self 
consciousness, which permits downward causation upon the rest of nature. Most importantly, this 
power is rooted in and composed of the interactions causal mechanisms and process at lower 
levels, yet cannot be causally reduced from our knowledge of their structure. 
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Like process philosophy and the more attuned historical-dialectical thinkers, emergentism 
reserves a unique and privileged place for human beings, without separating them too much from 
the rest of the ecological world. For the emergentist, humans occupy their special strata because 
their unique powers — self consciousness, free labour, etc. — are causally irreducible to their 
biological and physiological foundations. We are, ultimately, rooted in natural processes. Yet 
human activity, individual as well as social, cannot be fully explained with reference to the 
causal mechanisms at work in the compositional levels. We ‘emerge’ from the natural world, and 
are conditioned by laws that the ecological world is not. Events at this strata are partially 
explainable by modern science. But the incredible levels of processual complexity along with 
causal irreducibility inspire a genuine sense of awe. So too for other ecological organisms and 
processes. While they do not inhabit the ultimate ontological layer along with humans, they do 
display many attributes of self-organizing complexity and causal irreducibility.  
Now, out of the discussion of Process and Emergentist thinking, a certain tension arises 
with the Frankfurt theorists covered in the third chapter. For Adorno in particular ‘enchantment’ 
is largely a pre-rational phenomenon. Modern scientific enquiry disenchants the world through 
its mechanistic reduction of quality to quantity, and its preoccupation with concepts. 
Enchantment is more aesthetic than rational. On the other hand, the process and emergentist 
outlooks do not hold that scientific enquiry necessarily disenchants the world. In fact, these two 
schools derive their sense of enchantment from the process of scientific discovery. These are 
indeed two very different ways of looking at the enchantment of nature. They appear on the 
surface to be incompatible. Workman’s excellent differentiation between positivist and 
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‘retroductive’ models of science points the way toward reconciliation. The Frankfurt theorists 
were critical of positivist, ‘nomothetic’ science. But Workman shows that Critical Realism — 
along with Process Philosophy, I hold — are not this type of science. They are ‘retroductive,’ in 
that they aim to discover the essence of things. They do not aim to mechanize, reduce, or 
disenchant nature they way that positivism does. In this way they share with Critical Theory a 
fundamental interest in discovering the inner truth of things. The divergence in outlook, then, 
comes down to a different matter. I have noted that for the Frankfurt thinkers, especially 
Marcuse, the moment of enchantment is the aesthetic one. It is ultimately a matter of passive 
reception. By contrast, the enchantment of nature is discoverable to the emergentist through the 
activity of scientific discovery. For the process thinkers, it seems to be some combination of both 
moments. All these ways of looking at science, human ecology, and the enchantment of nature 
have their virtues, and all contribute to the intellectual project proposed by this dissertation.  
  !190
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
From Plato to Bhaskar, this dissertation has covered a great deal of material, along with 
essentially the entire timespan of Western philosophy. Some of the key thinkers are often 
considered together by critical social theorists and scientists: Hegel, Marx, Adorno, and Marcuse. 
Meanwhile, Rousseau, Hegel, and Marx are all well known to students of the history of political 
thought. However, likely less familiar are the process philosophers and Critical Realists. It has 
been one of the underlying intentions of this dissertation to bring these diverse schools of 
thought together into a productive dialogue — a sort of creative synthesis. Each approach, I have 
shown, has something important to teach us about the human place in nature, or human ecology. 
Each, in their own way, can contribute to a sense of ‘secular enchantment’ of ourselves, nature, 
and our relationship to it. Of course, at this point it is clear that this is not a pre-philosophical or 
anti-scientific form of enchantment. The illogic, as well as the social and political dangers of an 
unqualified ‘re-enchantment’ are clear (see, for example, Antonio 2000, 57). The form of re-
enchantment described here does not refer to any sort of magical, or supernatural force that 
inheres in the world. Rather, it is the sense that we get when we are able to fully contemplate the 
complexity and wonder of the ecological world, and along with it our own incredible capacity of 
self-consciousness. This form of enchantment may ultimately be a subjective phenomenon; in the 
end, it is in our minds, and is not a property of the physical world. However, it is evident that it 
does require an object, and not any object — an ecological one. Furthermore, it is important to 
restate that this is a form of enchantment that occurs because of modern science. While Weber, 
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the Frankfurt thinkers, and others rightly saw that science could thoroughly disenchant the 
natural world, its methods also bring light to all the breathtaking miracles of the ecological world 
— from the replication of DNA within the cell, to the innumerable relationships and process that 
make up any given ecosystem, to our own ability to conceive of ourselves as both subject and 
object. These are marvellous phenomena that can be explained — at least in part — by a 
scientific framework, and should also engender a sense of enchantment. 
In this concluding section, I will bring together some of the main theoretical ideas that 
have animated this dissertation, and comment on their significance. The central analytical thread 
— the situation of self-consciousness in the larger ecological order — makes the project 
fundamentally an ontological one. But its contribution is not merely philosophical. As noted in 
the introduction, another key element is the ‘political.’ Not only does a more complete 
knowledge of our place in nature inform ecological politics, it also can be the foundation for a 
sense of the ‘political’ — a moment of commonality in which are laid political foundations. As 
highlighted in the chapter on process philosophy, the ontological discussion of human ecology 
also contributes to discussions of reasonable use of natural resources, and appropriate human 
infringement on the ecological world. However, it is not only process philosophy that describes 
such an ethic of responsibility; it can be derived from all the thinkers considered here. As well, a 
new and important analytical thread that was uncovered during the course of this research was 
that of aesthetic appreciation of nature. This appeared first in the section on Marcuse, but its full 
significance only comes to light when taking into account the analysis as a whole.  
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The Ontological 
Although the discussion has taken many forms, the core theoretical issue in this 
dissertation is the relationship of subject to object. Here, the main focus is the place of human/
self-consciousness/subjectivity within nature/objectivity. I should reiterate here that the term 
‘nature’ has here been used to refer specifically to the biological, ecological world. Ultimately, 
the picture that has been created is of a ‘polyvalent ontological monism,’ in which subjectivity 
occupies one — highly advanced — level. From Rousseau to Bhaskar, it has been clear that the 
subject shares many important identities with the object, while diverging from it in key ways as 
well. I have worked to show that this way of conceptualizing subject/object relations is also 
useful for understanding human ecology. While humans — and particularly their species 
differentia, self-consciousness — are embedded in and identical to nature, or the ecology, they 
are also, in Rousseau’s terms, not bound by (all of) its laws, and are therefore non-identical to it. 
Self-consciousness makes humans special — even enchanted. The notion that this makes humans 
unique, historical, labouring, and self-transforming beings is a key theme in the work of 
Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, Adorno, and Marcuse. But these thinkers were selected because they do 
not make the mistake of imagining humans to be completely outside of nature, or free of its 
determination. To the contrary, they all emphasize our dependence on the object/nature. History, 
then, is the story of our self-transformation in the context of a mutually determining relationship 
with the natural world. The relation is neither pure immediacy nor total detachment. It is one of 
mediation. Because we are self-conscious we are able to choose — to a certain degree — the 
character of our relationship with the ecological world.  
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In the emerging field of Ecological Political Theory, Andrew Biro has done important 
work illustrating the identity and difference of humans and nature. Biro’s analysis points to the 
pitfalls of appeals to ‘nature,’ and calls for a ‘denaturalizing’ of ecological thought. With the shift 
of focus to process philosophy and Critical Realism, the understanding of this relationship is 
deepened. Building on key work already done by Biro and other ecological political theorists, I 
have incorporated the notions of process and emergence/stratification to introduce new lines of 
analysis into ecological thinking. The inclusion of these schools of thought was meant to 
supplement the outlook provided by the ‘historical-dialectical’ thinkers. The latter see correctly 
that humans are qualitatively different from other ecological organisms. Process thinking, along 
with theories of stratification and emergence derived from Critical Realism, delve into the 
question of how self-consciousness arose from ecological processes and systems. It is an open 
question whether the fundamental process ontology — specifically its rejection of substance 
ontology — is compatible with the other schools of thought here discussed. Regardless, process 
philosophy helps us to order entities by their degree of internal complexity, and this seems 
perfectly in agreement with much of the historical-dialectical outlook. Importantly, humans can 
be understood as an example of a highly complex entity. We are identical to the rest of nature in 
that we are constituted by processes — or even, substance in motion. But we are different insofar 
as our internal process, the motions of the compositional substance, are much more complex. 
Where, though, do we draw the line between humanity and other biological life, or between the 
biological and the chemical, for that matter? Process thinking is unclear on where the qualitative 
distinctions lie. Here, Critical Realism, which is emergentist and stratificationist, enters the 
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conversation. It sees the world as composed of qualitatively different layers, ordered by 
complexity. Higher, more complex levels, ‘emerge’ from lower, less complex ones. But they are 
not separate. For example, biological entities are more complicated that chemical ones, but are 
still rooted in chemical processes, which are in turn more complicated than, but rooted in 
physical processes. In this configuration, we can see humans as occupying a high — perhaps the 
highest — ontological strata. In this way we are qualitatively different from the ecology. Yet, we 
are always composed of and dependent on the ecological, biological, chemical, physical, etc, 
levels. And in this manner we are fundamentally embedded in nature — identical to it.  
The ontological project delineated here, what I have called ‘polyvalent ontological 
monism,’ might best be grasped as a response to three other understandings of the human 
relationship with nature, and thereby of the subject’s relation to the object/scientific knowledge. 
The first is exemplified by Marcuse and Adorno. It reserves a place for the primacy of the object, 
but also acknowledges the role of human labour/intervention in the ecology. Here, humans are 
both different from and identical to the ecology. Employing a critique of modern capitalism, this 
view seeks a future in which the human/nature dialectic is rebalanced so as to eliminate 
unnecessary forms of domination and repression. Adorno and Marcuse seem to deny the 
objectivity and neutrality of modern science; it can never claim a perfectly clear view of the 
objects of knowledge and it is furthermore implicated in the rationalizing, dominating project of 
modern capitalism. Second, there is Weber’s view that there is a fundamental division between 
natural and the social science. Knowledge of the natural world can claim the status of objectivity, 
but social scientific knowledge is alway necessarily defined by the values of researchers (Maley 
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2011, 154). The third view is what Robert Antonio has called ‘strong-program’ postmodernism, a 
dangerous form of skepticism and misology. Antonio writes that this outlook “abandons all 
‘truth’ claims, viewing social theory and science exclusively as narratives, rejecting references to 
‘realities’ external to the theoretical text, and dismissing ‘objective’ inquiry about the ‘validity’ of 
theories or how well they represent ‘reality’” (Antonio 2000, 52-53). On this view not only is 
science impossible, but objectivity, nature, can be nothing more than subjective creation.  
However, this is not to say that humans have perfect, unhindered access to the natural 
world. Indeed, we ought to be skeptical of many of the categories used to understand natural 
phenomena and experiences. For example, in his seminal essay “The Trouble with Wilderness,” 
William Cronon argues that the concept of ‘wilderness’ is socially constructed. He writes, 
“wilderness embodies a dualistic vision in which the human is entirely outside the natural. If we 
allow ourselves to believe that nature, to be true, must also be wild, then our very presence in 
nature represents its fall” (Cronon 1996, 80-81). Cronon in no way denies the realness of the 
external world, and argues that there is something “irreducibly nonhuman” in our subjective 
experience of nature (Cronon 1996, 70). It is simply that some categories, such as the idea of 
“pristine, untouched wilderness,” are not particularly useful, and may in fact be unattainable. 
Cronon holds that by abandoning the futile quest to connect with a singular, true wilderness, we 
can start to see the wonders of nature much closer to home (Cronon 1996, 86).  
The entirety of this dissertation has been an attempt to provide reasonable and defensible 
ontological foundations for understanding the truth of the human place in nature, as well as for 
political and ethical judgement. As such, it entails a wholesale rejection of strong-program 
  !196
postmodernism. Even if our knowledge of social and natural phenomena are necessarily 
circumscribed, as thinkers ranging from Adorno to Bhaskar have shown, it is simply 
intellectually dishonest to deny the epistemological privilege and explanatory power of modern 
science. For science to work, the world must be structured according to knowable laws or 
tendencies. Science, by any reasonable account, does work, and therefore there must be some 
discoverable laws underlying the workings of the world. The response to Weber is a more 
complicated and interesting one. Siding with Weber, I have sought to defend the — partial — 
objective validity of natural science. On the other hand, the foregoing analysis has marshalled a 
variety of ontological positions supporting the notion that the natural and the social are deeply 
intertwined rather than simply dichotomous. Bhaskar astutely notes that the causative 
mechanisms at work at the level of the social are much more difficult to uncover than those 
which are the objects of natural science. However, this does not preclude some reasonably 
objective knowledge of social phenomena. Just as it has been consistently shown that humans 
and nature are simultaneously identical and different, natural and social science must share 
important commonalities — a basic unity of method — while still diverging in important ways.  
Additionally, I have substantially accepted the general ontological outlook offered by the 
Critical Theorists: the preponderance of the object, the distinction between basic and surplus 
alienation, as well as the social corollary of aiming to find a state of balance, or peace, between 
subject and object, or between humanity and nature. However, I have taken issue with their 
characterization of science as ipso facto dominating and disenchanting. In his incisive excavation 
of Marcuse’s critique of science, Workman shows that in general the type of science targeted by 
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the Frankfurt thinkers is positivism. Indeed, the bland and mechanistic outlook offered by 
positivistic methodology does reduce quality into quantity, and elides causation into constant 
conjunction. This tells us little about the real workings of the natural or social worlds, and, as 
Marcuse shows brilliantly in his One-Dimensional Man, is complicit in the domination of 
humanity and nature. However, not all science is positivism. Workman’s ‘retroductive’ science, 
exemplified by Bhaskar’s Critical Realism, commits none of the ontological or methodological 
errors of positivism. Because science does not necessarily fetishize quantification and 
mechanistic understanding, if used correctly, it can describe nature in a way that inspires a sense 
of complexity, beauty, and enchantment.  
The Political (and The Ethical) 
In his pithy and incisive article, “The Political,” Jeremy Valentine describes the 
challenges posed to ‘political’ thinking in the postmodern condition. He takes issue with various 
foundational approaches, which he divides into two categories. On one hand, Rawls and 
Habermas “attempt to ground the political in a type of deliberation that secures the 
polity…” (Valentine 2006, 508). One the other, Schmitt, Strauss, and Arendt all “propose a 
concept of the political in response to what they take to be the denial of it within modernity. They 
thus subscribe to the epochality of modernity in order to affirm some authentic ‘originary’ 
moment of the political against it from a position external to it” (Valentine 2006, 509). In each 
case, Valentine finds that these foundational moments are ultimately illusory. Seeing the 
difficulties posed by foundations, Valentine turns to ‘post-foundational’ approaches to the 
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‘political.’ He describes three: the thoroughly postmodern view of Jean-Luc Nancy, the slightly 
less anti-foundationalist approach of Laclau and Mouffe, and the radical-democratic outlook of 
Sheldon Wolin (Valentine 2006, 510). As I have argued, attempts to do away with the ontological 
foundations of social and political action are both futile and ill-conceived. They offer no possible 
way forward, no progressive solution, to the immense political conundrums of late modernity. 
They are wrong-headed in their denial of an essential human commonality. Nonetheless, I find 
something salvageable — something, in fact, quite useful — in Wolin’s political theory.  
 Wolin makes an important distinction between politics and ‘the political.’ The former 
constitute the everyday activity of the distribution of power and resources, both within and 
outside the formal, legalistic, procedural realms. In Sheldon Wolin’s formulation, the ‘political,’ 
on the other hand, is a rupture, an exceptional moment, in which the grounding and direction of 
everyday politics is renegotiated. We live in extraordinary times that call for extraordinary 
measures. There is a profound crisis in the human relation with the rest of the ecological world, 
and the future of life on this planet is under a very real threat. Now is the time for a collective 
moment in which we acknowledge that politics as it has been must change direction. Importantly, 
Wolin brings to the table a strong radical-democratic outlook. This means that the ‘moment’ of 
‘the political’ must be an open, collective, and democratic one. One of the principal intentions of 
this dissertation has been to offer an ontological underpinning for a renewed and democratic 
sense of ‘the political,’ as described by Wolin. Just as meta-ethics describes the foundations of 
ethical thinking, this project might be best described as ‘meta-political,’ insofar as it seeks to give 
philosophical grounding for a moment of ‘the political.’ The unique relationship to nature 
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described here is universal to all humans and is also fundamentally democratic in its 
accessibility. This makes it an ideal underpinning for a democratic and universal sense of ‘the 
political.’  
It must be noted, however, that such foundations have in the past been used to perpetuate 
hierarchical and dominating social relations. This is a warning that the present analysis must 
heed. Following Aristotle, I have described an ordered, hierarchical, organic unity that can serve 
as the foundation for a sense of the ‘political.’ For Aristotle, and many other conservative 
thinkers, the idea of nature as an organic unity served to justify unequal social relations, and even 
slavery. However, I have here also shown that philosophers from Rousseau onwards warn us 
against naturalizing social phenomena. Nature itself is never the regulative ideal for social and 
political life. However, what I have here called a ‘polyvalent ontological monism’ locates 
humans in nature in such a way as to be useful to social and political thought. While nature as a 
whole may be hierarchical, it in no way follows logically that social and political relations should 
be such.  
The foundation, the basic premiss, of this moment of ‘the political’ would be greatly 
served by two things. First, it must admit that despite postmodern/post-foundationalist denials, 
there is something universal to all human beings — an essence of what it means to be human. All 
the thinkers discussed in this dissertation point to the faculty of self-consciousness as 
fundamental to human being. Only on such a communal recognition of this basic identity can a 
truly collective politics proceed. Second, because the goal of this moment of ‘the political’ is to 
reform our common relation with the ecological world, its foundations must describe the truth of 
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our relationship to it. This means the necessity of recognizing that while we are outside of nature 
in significant ways, we are also deeply embedded in it, and dependent on it for our continued 
existence. Furthermore, ecological life not only sustains human life, it is worthy of protection for 
its own sake. Indeed, as the exploration of aesthetics suggests, it is the source of great meaning 
and a profound sense of wonderment. With this base, the description of which has been the chief 
objective of this dissertation, may be supported a moment of ‘the political’ that is adequate to the 
political and ecological tasks at hand.  
While the foregoing analysis has been mainly meta-theoretical, it still begs the question 
of practicality. That is: what does all of this mean for everyday politics and political institutions? 
While I have largely bracketed the issue of specificity, the project still clearly points to a few 
conclusions. It is evident that the reconfiguration of human-ecological relations demanded by 
this dissertation also require as a necessary condition the transcendence of capitalist modernity. 
As Hegel, Marx and the Frankfurt thinkers have shown, capitalism foists an unwarranted amount 
of alienation from nature upon the subject. To fully appreciate the ecological world, and our 
special place within it, all humans must be able to freely interact and experience with nature. 
This means overcoming the excessive division of labour engendered by capitalist production. 
Capitalism, as a set of socio-economic relations, is only the beginning of the problem, however. 
What I have tried to call into question is the larger problem of how we, as modern subjects, see 
our own place in nature. By and large, modernity characterizes the human-ecological relationship 
as one of radical separation, which has been shown to be untrue. It does so to validate myths 
about progress, productivism, and ‘economic growth,’ which have also been called into question. 
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It is my hope that this work can lend theoretical support to movements for ‘degrowth.’ This 
outlook sees that economic ‘growth’ and continually expanding production are incompatible with 
the ecology, and furthermore that they do nothing to increase human happiness and fulfillment.  
Additionally, the ontological exploration here contained can help to clarify a longstanding 
issue in ecological ethics: the debate between anthropocentrism and ecocentrism. I have 
endeavoured to show that this is a false dichotomy. Humans do, as the historical dialectical 
thinkers consistently show, occupy a rank of special moral privilege. This means that our needs 
take precedence over those of other species. Specifically, this refers to the use of natural 
resources. However, as process thinking has shown, by virtue of their inherent complexity, other 
organisms and ecosystems also command moral value. Their needs and requirements must also 
be taken into consideration. This opens the door for a discussion about the reasonable use of 
natural resources. To what extent is it reasonable to interfere with natural spaces for our own 
ends? The answer is that we must do so to some degree. But it is also the case that many of the 
material superfluities that characterize modern life do nothing to contribute to the ‘good life,’ or 
the development of our most human and creative capacities. This indicates that we should seek to 
preserve wilderness areas, natural spaces, and biodiversity as much as possible. We have more to 




In Chapter III, using Marcuse’s aesthetic theory, I made the case that the appreciation of 
nature can, like the work of art, be a revolutionary moment. It creates a ‘negative,’ critical 
moment, showing the untruth of the current state of affairs and opening up new possibilities. It 
points to the truth beyond the facticity of everyday reality. The key theoretical observation of The 
Aesthetic Dimension is the following: “Art breaks open a dimension inaccessible to other 
experience, a dimension in which human beings, nature, and things no longer stand under the law 
of the established reality principle” (Marcuse 1978, 72; c.f. Marcuse 1972, 87). The point here is 
that art is able the show that the given reality is not the only possible reality. The potential exists 
for other ways for humans to organize themselves, and to interact with each other and with 
nature. I have argued that the idea of nature — as aesthetic representation more so than a concept 
that perfectly matches its object — serves this function as a tool to combat capitalist modernity’s 
degradation of nature. Above and beyond its negation of the established reality, art is also able to 
create a “beautiful image” (schöner Schein) of another possible reality. Marcuse writes: 
[T]he radical qualities of art, that is to say, its indictment of the established reality 
and its invocation of the beautiful image… of liberation are grounded precisely in 
the dimensions where art transcends its social determination and emancipates 
itself from the given universe of discourse and behavior while preserving its 
overwhelming presence.  50
The shattering of the given reality and the creation of a beautiful, alternative image can pave the 
way for the development of a new and liberated sensibility (Marcuse 1978, 7).  
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But what is the specific content of this image? Quoting from his friend Leo Lowenthal, 
Marcuse writes that art can represent an entirely different world, which is fictitious and yet 
simultaneously “more real than reality itself” (Marcuse 1978, 22). He is suggesting that the 
fictional world of art can represent the truth of human being that is denied by the established 
reality. In this way, art is contradictory, negative, and properly two-dimensional. In a brilliant 
passage, Marcuse describes how the fictitious world of art is both more and less that the given 
reality:  
It contains nothing that does not also exist in the given reality, the actions, 
thoughts, feelings, and dreams of men and women, their potentialities and those 
of nature. […] But it is “unreal” not because it is less, but because it is more as 
well as qualitatively “other” than the established reality. As fictitious world, as 
illusion (Schein), it contains more truth than does everyday reality. […] Only in 
the illusory world do things appear as what they are and what they can be. By 
virtue of this truth (which art alone can express in sensuous representation) the 
world is inverted — it is the given reality, the ordinary world which now appears 
as untrue, as false, as deceptive reality.  51
The aesthetic dimension opened up by artistic representation serves an important role in 
challenging the prevailing one-dimensionality. Taking the analysis even further, Marcuse writes 
that the tension between the established reality and the fictitious world of art (or “Nature” for 
First Nations) open the possibility for the important activity of remembrance, particularly of life 
past (Marcuse 1978, 23). Under the prevailing reality principle, it is less painful to forget past 
suffering as well as past joy. On the other hand, remembrance of the past — made possible in the 
aesthetic dimension — creates a will to end suffering and establish perpetual happiness (Marcuse 
1978, 73). Remembrance, or recollection, is not of a past golden age, or of a state of nature or 
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innocence. Marcuse describes it instead as an epistemological capacity to synthesize experiences 
and fragments of the given (distorted) reality into a schöner Schein (Marcuse 1972, 70). 
Resisting the immanence of one-dimensional society and thinking, the aesthetic dimension, with 
its beautiful images and powers of remembrance, is fundamentally transcendent: “Imagination… 
retains the insoluble tension between idea and reality, the potential and the actual. This is the 
idealistic core of dialectical materialism: the transcendence of freedom beyond the given 
forms” (Marcuse 1972, 70). Just as art — music, visual art, literature or other forms — opens up 
another dimension and invokes remembrance of past ways of being, so too does the idea of 
nature. It is not necessary that this representation of nature be perfectly accurate. Indeed, it may 
even be partly mythical. Its significance is as an alternate dimension, a beautiful image of a 
different reality that breaks apart the prevailing way of being and thereby creates the possibility 
of a better future.   
This has been an excellent starting point for the discussion of nature and aesthetics. But it 
is clear that there is much more to be said. To begin, the concept of aesthetic appreciation is 
made possible only by thinking, reflective subjects. Humans, noted Marx, can labour to create 
according to the laws of beauty, and this presupposes that they know them. Of course, it has been 
my intention to bring the discourse from the concept of active manipulation to that of passive 
reception. Taking in natural beauty does not mean that ecological processes, or inanimate objects 
exert agency on us, as Bennett would have it. She and other adherents of ‘the new materialism,’ 
are right in their insistence that the subject be de-centred (see Bennett 2010 and Coole and Frost 
2010). The object can indeed determine the subject. However, it is taking the analysis too far to 
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say that objects exert agency upon humans to the same degree that humans exercise agency on 
them. For the purposes of this passive, receptive ecological aesthetic, we should say instead that 
while it is in our ‘species being’ to manipulate nature, our highly developed capacities allow us 
to appreciate it without interfering with it as well. In purely practical terms, this is, I think, 
actually the crux of the matter of enchantment. In the end, we do not need long, technical, dense 
treatises on self-consciousness, metaphysics, nature, and history to see that nature is enchanted. 
Quite the opposite: we can see that everywhere and in everything. What is required is simply a 
new and different way of looking at our surroundings. It is not difficult to understand that 
modern science has disenchanted nature in one sense, but re-enchanted it in another. We can 
easily see the unbelievable beauty and complexity that encircles and permeates us. True, many 
today lack access to unspoilt ecosystems. But nature, and life, are everywhere, and so is the 
possibility of experiencing them aesthetically. Only thus can we think about nature as is it and as 
it could still be, and contemplate our role in its future.  
The Spiritual 
In the present conjuncture of human-ecological crisis, a new field of interdisciplinary 
academic study called ‘environmental humanities’ has begun to develop. It asks how we might 
improve our relationship with nature, both for its sake and our own. More so than a work of 
philosophy, politics, or ethics, this dissertation may best be understood as a contribution to this 
new field. At its core, this study has asked what it means to be human, and how we can have a 
meaningful relationship with the natural world. There is a potential future in which ecological 
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life on this planet is severely diminished, and the necessary conditions for human life 
demolished. We will bear the responsibility for such a future. It would constitute our failure as a 
species, and we would rightfully give up our place in the biological kingdom. Conversely, there 
is another path open to us, in which we give up our excessive consumption and destruction, and 
reconcile ourselves with the natural world. This would necessitate a recognition of our unique 
place in the ecological order, and with it an understanding of the true structure of the human 
psyche, or soul. As such, it would be — in the Greek sense of the word — a spiritual moment, or 
awakening. While it seems that we suffer a loss in the relinquishment our unrestrained 
consumption, we in fact have everything to gain. By renouncing our false and destructive needs, 
we make room for our true needs, the satisfaction of which develops our genuinely human, 
creative, and spiritual sides. By freeing ourselves from the thralldom of needless material 
consumption, we open the path for new, different, and more sustainable ways of interacting with 
nature. We may begin to remember that nature is not simply the material out of which we furnish 
goods to consume. Instead, as many First Nations have refused to forget, it is what nurtures our 
existence and fills our lives with meaning. This, of course, means offering a palate for our 
creative labour. But is also means that nature can provide the opportunity for us to experience 
beauty, complexity, and all the wonders of life. It can give us a place to reflect upon the 
interconnectedness of our existence. In the end, nothing can make us more human. It has been 
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